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ABSTRACT 
 
GERMANY’S COLD WAR ON DISPLAY:  
THE POLITICAL AESTHETICS OF GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1949-1989 
Katrin Schreiter 
Professor Thomas Childers 
This dissertation examines domestic culture as a project of nation building in a 
divided Germany between 1949 and 1989. Soviet and American backing during 
escalating Cold War tensions pulled East and West Germans in opposing ideological 
directions, which they initially expressed in diverging aesthetics. Historiography on 
German material culture traditionally concentrates on the East-West competition during 
the first two decades of the Cold War. By extending the narrative into the 1970s and 
1980s, Germany’s Cold War on Display: The Political Aesthetics of German-German 
Relations, 1949-1989 argues instead that internal economic and political collaboration 
between the two German states created an alternative to Americanization and 
Sovietization – a third way that allowed for German cultural rapprochement within the 
context of European integration. To display changes in political culture and trace their 
effect on the German-German relationship, this study analyses archival documents 
alongside objects of domestic culture. This approach includes a discussion of five interior 
design dimensions: the institutionalization process, the design discourse, production and 
consumption processes, furniture trade, and diplomatic utilization of design. Postwar 
reconstruction presented the “two countries in one German nation” with both 
  
vii 
opportunities and challenges in redefining their nationhood, global position, and cultural 
reputation. After initial delineation, East and West Germany’s aesthetic convergence 
began in the mid-1960s with domestic critiques of their respective political systems. 
Cultural and economic cooperation following the 1972 Basic Treaty on Germany’s status 
quo enabled both states to detach their handling of the German Question from 
superpower policies. One major impulse sought to salvage ties by increasing trade, 
resulting in a similar interior design aesthetic that facilitated exports. Other endeavors 
focused on normalizing German relations through cultural encounters and political 
treaties, reconnecting populations on both sides of the border. Concentrating on 
similarities and collaboration, this study refocuses Germany’s Cold War – that is, the 
special relationship between the two German states – and offers a new context in which 
to understand the relative stability during four decades of division and considerably 
smooth transition to unification in 1990.  
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INTRODUCTION: GERMANY’S COLD WAR ON DISPLAY 
With the statement that “the entire German people are called on to achieve by free 
self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany,” the 1949 Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) posed an immediate dilemma to a newly divided 
Germany.1 In spite of this proclamation for national unity, four years of allied occupation 
had already pulled East and West Germans in different directions. Through Soviet and 
American patronage during rising Cold War tensions, Germans identified politically with 
their respective bloc alliance rather than with the Germany on the other side of the 
border. Moving further away from unification, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
and the Federal Republic faced the same problem of defining their new state systems. 
This study examines domestic culture (Wohnkultur) as a project of nation building in the 
two German states to display changes in political culture and how these changes affected 
their relationship. Ironically, their attempts at expressing difference unintentionally 
created a shared code of ideological inscription in the German everyday. Along the way, 
Cold War confrontation evolved into German cooperation through reciprocal influences 
and information exchanges in the realm of interior design. But how did material culture 
emerge as a recognizable language in the intra-German relationship and which functions 
did it serve? To answer these questions, this work offers a new perspective on Germany’s 
Cold War by integrating the material and political ambitions of the two German states in 
one history of Germany’s aesthetic reconstruction.2 
                                                 
1 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949. Emphasis by the author. 
2 In my usage of nouns describing the eastern and the western part of Germany, I tried to refrain from 
employing ideologically loaded language. I use the terms “Federal Republic of Germany,” “Federal 
Republic,” “German Democratic Republic,” and “GDR” like they would be employed in German – without 
any ideological connotation. But the different linguistic traditions in the English language make it 
necessary to point out that also the abbreviation “FRG” as well as “West Germany” and “East Germany” 
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More than two decades after German unification, the historiography of 
Germany’s postwar decades remains starkly divided.3 In the first years after 1989 with 
newly available sources, scholars in Europe and the United States produced a flood of 
narratives about the East German state. Controversies emerged over the relative stability 
of communist rule, which collapsed so suddenly after four decades.4 West Germany’s 
seemingly untainted success served as a benchmark against which to measure the East 
German past. Even in recent years, seminal syntheses of postwar Germany have handled 
the GDR as a footnote to history.5 Scholarship on East Germany has not entered the 
mainstream of German history, which still develops largely against the backdrop of the 
Third Reich.6 The task for historians of postwar Germany is to offer narratives that, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
are value free denominations for the two German states. Especially the latter allows for an easy 
geographical identification. I tried to avoid the shorthand East and West as to not confuse my readers when 
I am addressing the larger East-West conflict between the superpowers. However, if I used East and West 
in relation to the two German states, then I made the specific meaning evident through context. 
3 Elizabeth Harvey evaluated the state of the field of German history instantly after unification in 1990. Her 
calls for a useful integrated German history are still echoed today. Elizabeth Harvey, “The Two Germanies: 
Recent Publications on the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question,” 
The Historical Journal 33, no. 4 (1990): 953-970; H-German Forum on the integration of postwar German 
history, January and February 2011. 
4 The range of explanations for the GDR’s stability reaches from the intimidation of the population through 
the surveillance state (Überwachungsstaat), over the political structures of a dictatorship of mass 
organizations to the social consensus induced by the welfare state (Konrad Jarausch’s Fürsorgestaat) and 
the niche society (Nischengesellschaft). Most of these approaches are marked by at times implicit, but often 
explicit comparisons with the Third Reich and its historiography. These comparative studies of the two 
German dictatorships convince through the apparent parallels of the one-party state. In England, a group of 
scholars has focused on the seemingly contradictory ways in which the stability of the GDR worked in the 
social realm. Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Jeannette Z. Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in East Germany, 1971-1989: A 
Precarious Stability (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2003); Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German 
Communists and Their Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). A similar approach has 
been taken by Andrew I. Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic (New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2007). 
5 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), pp. xv-xvi; 
Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen II: Deutsche Geschichte 1933-1990 (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 2000), Edgar Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 
ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006). 
6 Exceptions to the rule present studies that compare how the two German states came to terms with the 
Nazi past. See for example Jürgen Danyel (ed.), Die geteilte Vergangenheit. Zum Umgang mit 
Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten (Berlin: Akademie, 1995). 
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Konrad Jarausch put it, “break out of the straight-jacket of parallel stories” and instead 
look at mutual influence and internal relationships.7  
At the heart of this literature is the problem of how to bring together the history of 
two competing systems so deeply connected to the bipolar Cold War climate. Detailed 
analysis of what held Germans together still needs to be undertaken. Why did the GDR 
not emulate the Austrian path and emerge as a distinct state in its own right? If cultural 
nationalism is the dominant explanation for the special “German-German” relationship, 
why does this not apply to the Germans of Switzerland – who have created instead a 
nation of multiple ethnicities? The unification of 1990, enveloping the former GDR into 
the Federal Republic, must be examined without the teleological assumption that East 
and West Germany are easily identified as one nation. After all, nobody in Germany, East 
or West, believed that reunification would be possible up to the point when it actually 
happened.8 With these problems in mind, the challenge is to present a methodological 
alternative in approaching the German past that highlights the interconnectedness of the 
two states.  
Germany’s postwar division posed a great problem: redefining the nation after 
German nationalism had been unmasked as ruthless and cruel in the first half of the 
                                                 
7 Konrad Jarausch, “Divided, Yet Reunited - The Challenge of Integrating German Post-War Histories,” H-
German Forum, 1 February 2011. 
8 Literature has explored very different factors that play a role in illuminating the sudden collapse of the 
GDR: the changing international system of the Cold War, the lacking political-military support by the 
Soviet Union, the immanent state bankruptcy after four decades of command economy and the resulting 
failure to fulfill the population’s consumer demands. What is striking is the isolated examination of the 
GDR – the Federal Republic plays only a role insofar as it is the objectionable opposite and the ideology to 
be defeated. See Ina Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 1999); Raymond Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East 
Germany 1945-1990 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Jonathan R. Zatlin, The 
Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
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twentieth century. With the horrors of the Second World War and the genocide of 
Europe’s Jewish population fresh in mind, the racial nationalism of the Third Reich 
complicated the search for acceptable political values. Nationalistic definitions that 
stressed German exceptionality became unacceptable, to which the West German 
decision to remove the first stanza from the German national anthem aptly attests. 
Germany should never again aspire to stand “above everything in the world.”9 In a 
parallel development, allied involvement and policy prescription left the population with 
a sense of insecurity about the origins of the states, which hindered their political 
identification with postwar Germany. Facing Germans’ retreat from public life after years 
of mobilization in mass organizations and the military, politicians in the two German 
states followed them into the living room and politicized the German home. In 
cooperation with cultural and economic elites they employed interior design to create 
distinct national domestic cultures as integrative concepts that communicated the new 
political order. 
The political dimension of German interiors has, of course, been acknowledged 
by the literature on the history of public housing. Discussions of the early twentieth 
century reform movements, such as the Werkbund and the Bauhaus, have debated past 
visions of “everything from the spoon to the city” for the aesthetic uplift of the lower 
classes. While these attempts have been coined an elitist failure, scholars agree on the 
success of the pioneering work of New Architecture (Neues Bauen) and the closely 
connected New Objectivity (Neue Sachlichkeit), which revolutionized the structural 
                                                 
9 The first stanza of the Song of the Germans began with the words “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles, 
über alles in der Welt.” After two world wars, these lines had received a strong expansionist meaning. To 
regain the trust of the international community, the German successor states wanted to prove that they 
practiced collaboration and diplomacy instead of military aggression. 
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conditions in workers’ living quarters in the Frankfurt am Main of the 1920s.10 The 
housing shortage after the destruction of the Second World War guaranteed that such 
socio-political programs remained a central part of national politics in the FRG and the 
GDR alike. However, this time the effort did not simply aim at creating the architectural 
shell of the German home; rather, both German states utilized the opportunity of the 
bomb-shattered towns to bring the new reality of the German division into the private 
sphere.11  
Building on these accounts of earlier reform movements, a new school of German 
design history has emerged that finds strong national impulses in the making of postwar 
material culture. Treatments of the modernist heritage in West German everyday design 
focus on the political reinvigoration of a (West) German national style, while analyses of 
East German cultural policy discuss it as an embodiment of a socialist modern identity.12 
Both strands of literature gesture to the respective other part of Germany, but a balanced 
                                                 
10 Heinz Hirdina, Neues Bauen, Neues Gestalten. Das neue Frankfurt/Die neue Stadt: eine Zeitschrift 
zwischen 1926 und 1933, Amt für Industrielle Formgestaltung, ed. (Berlin: Elefanten Press 1984); Andreas 
Butter, Neues Leben, Neues Bauen: Die Moderne in der Architektur der SBZ/DDR 1945-1951 (Berlin: 
Hans Schiller, 2006); 
Joan Campbell, The German Werkbund: The Politics of Reform in the Applied Arts (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978); Christina Biundo and others, Bauhaus-Ideen 1919-1994. Bibliographie und 
Beiträge zur Rezeption des Bauhausgedankens (Berlin: Reimer, 1994). 
11 Werner Durth, “Kontraste und Parallelen: Architektur und Städtebau in West und Ostdeutschland,” in 
Axel Schildt, Arnold Sywottek, eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 
50er Jahre (Bonn: Dietz, 1993). 
12 Paul Betts, The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, Socialist Modern: East 
German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); and Eli Rubin, 
Synthetic Socialism: Plastics & Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008) offer the most widely read interpretations of industrial design in postwar 
Germany. German literature on the topic is represented by Christopher Oestereich “Gute Form” im 
Wiederaufbau: Zur Geschichte der Produktgestaltung in Westdeutschland nach 1945 (Berlin: Lukas, 2000) 
and Gert Selle, “Das Produktdesign der 50er Jahre: Rückgriff in die Entwurfsgeschichte, vollendete 
Modernisierung des Alltagsinventars oder Vorbote der Postmoderne?” in Axel Schildt, Arnold Sywottek, 
eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre (Bonn: Dietz, 1993),  
612-624; and Gert Selle, Geschichte des Design in Deutschland, Second Edition (Frankfurt: Campus, 
[1994] 2007). Ronald Stade offers an account of the politics behind GDR aesthetics in “Designs of Identity: 
The Politics of aesthetics in the GDR, “ Ethnos 58, no. 3/4 (1993): 241-258.    
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analysis remains to be written. Recently, Greg Castillo’s work on the “soft power” of 
midcentury design has provided a first comparative study of political utilization of 
modern design principles in the two German states’ mutual dealings.13 However, he 
focuses foremost on the superpower struggle over cultural domination of Germany. Like 
most scholars in this field, he limits his examination of cultural policy to the first two 
postwar decades, a period marked by intense competition between eastern and western 
ways of life. As a result, such studies subordinate internal German relations to the larger 
picture of bloc alliance in the East-West superpower conflict. On closer examination, 
however, this period of delineation should be understood as a prelude to the détente of the 
1970s. As the signing of the German Basic Treaty in 1972 “normalized” the antagonistic 
relationship between the two German states, a long-term analysis that expands to 1989 
can provide insights into a more diverse political utilization of German material culture – 
and thus into the internal German relationship – than has been known so far. 
In addition to extending the chronological parameters of the literature, a fruitful 
examination of German material culture needs to bring back into focus Germany itself 
and the relationship between its two parts. The East-West conflict’s tensions left Europe 
with the problem of whether or not Germany should be able to unite and which role it 
should play in the region. While this “German Question” lost its political urgency after 
the peaceful unification of 1990, it is still part and parcel of its Cold War history. Over 
the past decade, a renewed historical interest in the German Cold War has brought 
                                                 
13 Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Design historian Jeremy Aynsley’s account of at times parallel, at 
times opposing East and West German aesthetic developments covers the entire Cold War period: Jeremy 
Aynsley, Designing Modern Germany (London: Reaktion Books, 2009). 
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forward studies that approach it from both cultural and political perspectives.14 
Diplomatic and international historians have looked at the German Question mostly from 
the nervous perspective of its European neighbors or in regards to the national security 
concerns of the Soviet Union and the United States. The general consensus finds that 
nobody but the Germans themselves desired unity.15 Superpower attempts at containing 
each part of Germany within their sphere of influence has led cultural historians of the 
Cold War to look at German political, cultural, and economic development through the 
lens of Americanization and/or Sovietization.16 While these paradigms have long 
dominated the analysis of postwar Germany, over the past decade Americanization has 
been challenged by a more inclusive concept of Westernization, which sees cultural and 
social practices in Germany as products of a constant exchange of ideas between Europe 
                                                 
14 Uta Balbier, Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn. Deutsch-deutscher Sport 1950-72, eine politische 
Geschichte (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007); William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global 
Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); 
M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente & Ostpolitik, 1969-1973 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001) represent a vanguard in what will hopefully become a larger 
trend. 
15 Even Germans entertained a multitude of perspectives on the German Question. The traditionalist view 
saw the question in freeing the GDR from the shackles of communism with the ultimate goal of forming a 
nation-state. Policies that represented this view usually came from the conservative political spectrum. The 
Europeanist view centered on Germany’s role in Europe, trying to move Germany from the periphery of the 
Western Alliance to the center in an increasingly significant political entity. This conception has less to do 
with the notion of German unity than with the reestablishment of its economic and political significance. 
This view was held by liberal parties. The universalist view followed a contrary idea that saw Germans 
overcome their political division and their past by promoting universal values such as peace, social justice, 
and environmental preservation. The Green party as well as segments of the cultural elite supported this 
approach. At one time or the other, the underlying premises of these conceptions informed in different 
ways East and West German decision-making in western relations, East-West relations, and especially in 
the internal German relationship. Anne-Marie Burley, “The Once and Future German Question,” Foreign 
Affairs 68, no. 5 (1989): 66.  
16 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, ed. Amerikanisierung 
und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland, 1945-1970 (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997). An excellent example of this 
literature is Uta Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, 
Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).  
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and North America.17 Looking at the Cold War from the German perspective, it becomes 
evident that after the initial postwar years under the Marshall Plan, Western European 
influences dominated cultural and economic considerations of Wohnkultur.  
Finally, the literature on economic reconstruction must also be considered. The 
importance of economic success for political legitimacy in the East-West competition has 
long been acknowledged.18 Taking the capability to offer the population a comfortable 
and adequate standard of living as the ultimate marker of economic success has led many 
cultural studies to evaluate economic performance exclusively based on consumer 
satisfaction.19 This interpretation is consistent with a general shift in postwar European 
economic behavior when consumption started to take precedence over social security, 
trading rights for goods.20 Product design served as lingua franca in the Cold War 
competition, as exemplified by the famous Kitchen Debate between Khrushchev and 
Nixon in 1959.21 What differentiated the situation in the German context decisively from 
the Soviet-American conflict is the shared cultural heritage – it was not just a competition 
                                                 
17 See most notably Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und 
Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999) and Victoria de Grazia, 
Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005). 
18 See for example Mark E Spicka, Selling the Economic Miracle: Economic Reconstruction and Politics in 
West Germany, 1949-1957 (New York: Berghahn, 2007); James C. Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany: The 
Creation of the Social Market Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); André Steiner, 
Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2004); 
Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft, 1945-1958 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990). 
19 Consumption in both East and West has been studied extensively. For examples see Merkel, Utopie und 
Bedürfnis; Judd Stitziel, Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics, and Consumer Culture in East Germany 
(Oxford: Berg, 2005); David E. Crew, ed., Consuming Germany in the Cold War (Oxford: Berg, 2003); 
Jennifer A. Loehlin, From Rugs to Riches: Housework, Consumption and Modernity in Germany (Oxford: 
Berg, 1999); NGBK( ed.), Wunderwirtschaft: Konsumgeschichte in den 60er Jahren (Cologne 1996). 
20 De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 341. 
21 Susan E. Reid, “ Who Will Best Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition 
in Moscow, 1959,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9, no. 4 (2008): 855-904. 
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for economic preeminence between East and West Germany; it was also a rediscovery of 
forgotten similarities.  
It is true that German-German relations during the Cold War represented a 
piecemeal effort to coexist in a geopolitical situation marked by rising superpower 
tensions. East Germany’s wish to delineate itself from the West stood against West 
Germany’s claim to sole German representation and its official refusal to acknowledge 
the GDR. Nevertheless, they kept open avenues of interaction in the hopes of salvaging 
what was left of the cultural and economic (not to mention familial) bonds between them. 
These channels of communication were subject to constant redefinition, entangling both 
countries in formal as well as informal interactions. In examining a process of 
rapprochement, there are always the pitfalls of teleology that do a disservice to the 
historian’s task of exploring patterns of past developments. Convergence theory of the 
1960s predicted the inevitable rapprochement of capitalist and socialist countries. Facing 
the same challenges of the industrial age, the theory assumed, both systems would solve 
their respective problems with similar technological means, which eventually would 
create the same social and political modernity. East and West Germany, left to deal with 
the wartime destruction of their infrastructure and industry, might seem like ideal 
candidates for applying this theory. On closer examination, however, convergence 
implies a kind of linear determinism that overlooks the internal relationship that bound 
the two German states together. Going beyond parallel histories of convergence, this 
study examines processes, mechanisms, visual and spatial concepts as well as 
institutional and individual agency in the realm of Wohnkultur. This approach to the 
German past allows insights into mutual provocation and cooperation in the field of 
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cultural policy. At the center stands the question of how both Germanys turned a 
competitive situation, the aestheticization of the respective political orders in German 
material culture, into a diplomatic tool for reconciliation. 
In an effort to integrate the narratives of postwar Germany, this dissertation 
explores the emerging internal relationship between East and West Germany by 
examining their respective cultural strategies for negotiating a modus vivendi through the 
medium of industrial design. In approaching this problem, I am using the perspective of 
material culture. Scholars, especially folklorists and anthropologists, have used material 
culture as a lens to reconstruct the histories of past societies.22 Material culture as an 
analytical perspective assumes that the entirety of material culture represents the values 
of the people who commission, produce, consume or use these objects; and by extension, 
it presupposes that they represent the values of the entire society to which they belong. 
Moreover, material culture is a type of historical evidence that does not contain the 
abstract qualities of language, which can render archival sources problematic. Words and 
their meaning are mediated through social context; there is no logical connection between 
the signifier and the signified. Words convey meaning. On the contrary “things both 
embody meaning and convey that meaning” at the same time.23 In accord with this 
anthropological methodology, historian Leora Auslander once coined the term “the 
communicative capacity of objects” in her groundbreaking study Taste and Power: 
                                                 
22 Thomas J. Schlereth, “Material Culture Studies and Social History Research,” Journal of Social History 
16. no. 4 (Summer, 1983): 111-143. 
23 Thomas J. Schlereth, “Material Culture Research and Historical Explanation,” The Public Historian 7, 
no. 4 (Autumn, 1985): 26. Emphasis in the original. 
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Furnishing Modern France.24 By using material culture as a way of historical inquiry for 
the twentieth century, I investigate the articulation of political messages in material 
evidence as well as the ends to which they were employed. With a mixed methodology of 
material culture and traditional archival research, this study traces ideological inscription 
in German Wohnkultur and how they incidentally contributed to a growing German-
German understanding.  
My analysis focuses on five different, but connected, dimensions of materiality: 
the politicization of aesthetics, the intellectual discourse about their meaning, the 
realization of aesthetics in the economic spheres of production and consumption, the 
aesthetic dialectic of the retail and export market, and the use of objects toward 
diplomatic ends. Such a project required a structured research technique that started with 
the archival documents of the Federal Republic in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz and the 
papers of the GDR in the Bundesarchiv branch in Berlin to establish the institutional 
system surrounding official aesthetics. In a next step, design magazines, advice literature, 
and exhibition catalogs offered insights into the theoretical meaning of material aesthetics 
and its change over time. Interviews with former East and West German designers and 
politicians have been instrumental in closing gaps in the archival documentation of 
technological and aesthetic development in industrial design. They also offered valuable 
insights into the lived reality of Cold War Germany. In addition, visits to furniture 
manufacturers and retailers helped to establish the technological, material, and 
infrastructural challenges in furniture production. Finally, a return to the archives, this 
time focusing on the smaller design archives of the Rat für Formgebung in Frankfurt as 
                                                 
24 Leora Auslander, Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996). 
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well as the Werkbund and the Sammlung industrielle Gestaltung’s uncataloged collection 
in Berlin, and the Design Archives in Brighton helped in establishing the diplomatic 
operationalization of material culture. Finally, the government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany provided me the opportunity to see previously inaccessible documents on the 
cultural activities of the FRG Ministry of Economics and the Permanent Representation 
in East Berlin. 
It should be pointed out that this study is based on idealized archetypes of 
furniture and interior design visions. Design historians have grappled with the problem 
that most surviving visual representations were originally produced for publication in 
catalogs, coffee table books, and advice literature or to document exhibition displays. 
These idealized depictions of interiors have little in common with the way in which 
furniture is reappropriated in real life situations.25 Consumers collect specific objects 
from among the vast impersonal array of goods on display and then arrange them in 
personally meaningful ways.26 Similarly, these limitations apply to the documentation of 
German material culture. First, both the GDR and the FRG relied on such ideal interior 
design settings for their political projects of postwar nation building – a project of 
projecting an ideological identity onto the German people through streamlined and 
consistent life styles. Second, consumers remain a corrective to these ideal scenarios of 
Wohnkultur. While parts of the population might have actually liked the official 
aesthetics, the consistent application of the style was rarely executed successfully. 
Furniture is expensive and cannot easily be replaced on a working-class or even middle-
                                                 
25 Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption (London: Basil-Blackwell, 1987). 
26 It needs to be pointed out that modern market research and product testing bring us closer to answers to 
these questions; however, the process of consumer decision-making remains complex. Jeffrey L. Meikle, 
“Material Virtues: on the Ideal and the Real in Design History,” Journal of Design History 11, no. 3: 194. 
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class budget. Therefore, the problem of “wrong” or impure appropriation comes into 
play: one modern piece in an otherwise diversely assorted living room, such as a Cubist 
vase on a Chippendale sideboard, perhaps even placed on a lace table cloth to protect the 
antique wood, obliterates the entire aesthetic concept. The existence of different tastes 
equally complicates stylistic consistency: with increasing individualization of the 
societies in East and West Germany life styles diversified, which was often expressed in 
customized interior designs.27 
This study focuses predominately on cultural events and educational programs, 
which serve as indicators of official aesthetics. Design exhibitions provide a window into 
the ties between politics and aesthetics. Whether domestic or international, both East and 
West German design shows offer insights into the operationalization of material values 
for political goals. While national exhibits intended to enlighten the population about the 
‘right’ consumption, the international exhibitions aimed at political image improvement. 
Both exhibition types were rooted in the conviction that aesthetic progress communicates 
ethical betterment – and the German living room served as moral compass. In this 
scenario, the consumer served as a benchmark against which to evaluate the success of 
the two states in implementing their ideal aesthetics in the everyday. This analysis of 
domestic design sheds light on the processes by which Germany became molded into 
East and West, acculturated in post-Nazism and postwar modernities. Moreover, it also 
reveals how conceptions of domestic products changed Germans’ view of each other 
                                                 
27 The fields of philosophy and anthropology have produced an impressive body of literature that deals with 
the relationships between consumption, style, and individual identity. See for example Pierre Bourdieu 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, translated by R. Nice (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1984); Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, translated by S. Rendall 
(Berkeley: University of California); M. Csikszentmihalyi and E. Rochberg-Halton, The Meaning of 
Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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throughout this transformation and brings into focus the complex challenge to create a 
material identity, a brand that binds together people and signifies ideological allegiance. 
To effectively illustrate change over time, this study consists of two parts. The 
first part develops against the backdrop of East German delineation policy 
(Abgrenzungspolitik) and the West German claim to single German representation 
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch) by paying special attention to mutual pressures, action, and 
reaction. In the immediate postwar years, cultural delineation happened alongside the 
creation of new institutions for product design in both German states. By illustrating how 
interior design served as an aesthetic expression of East-West demarcation, it also 
examines avenues to project their new image to the international community. These 
efforts combined cultural and economic considerations to create a national brand, 
imprinting ideological principles onto domestic culture by prescribing official aesthetics 
in the making of a national domestic culture. These issues are further explored in the 
context of design discourse and consumer education, which presented additional efforts 
to align the population with the national brand. However, the two German states also 
depended on the participation of the production sector to forge this cohesive aesthetic. An 
analysis of the two German economies’ ability to foster a national brand narrative against 
the market behavior of producers and consumers shows how regional structures 
undermined national aesthetic coherence. In the 1960s, rapid industrial growth challenged 
the cultural preeminence of design institutions in the two Germany states. Industrial and 
economic interests prevailed, subsuming the quest for a national aesthetic into broader 
considerations of productivity, efficiency, and marketability. Strong inflections of 
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regionalism, including regional industrial traditions in the GDR and regional politics in 
the FRG, weakened the coherence of national branding further. 
In the second part the focus shifts from the analytical emphasis of German-
German delineation policies to cultural-economic convergence and diplomatic 
cooperation as a specific German way of Cold War détente. It first explores intra-German 
trade within the context of the European Economic Community. West German insistence 
on the unresolved nature of the German Question led to the territorial integration of the 
GDR into the EEC and thus the Common Market. As East German consumer goods 
production grew dependent on trade with the West in the 1970s, the GDR chose to 
compromise its official aesthetic, using Western furniture styles to cater to their Western 
customers. Finally, this part traces German product design’s diplomatic 
operationalization in relation to the question of East German international recognition 
and German-German relations between 1960 and 1989. The two German states were 
concerned about questions of representation, nationhood, and a basic modus vivendi. By 
looking at membership in the international design organization ICSID, industrial design 
exhibitions, and finally German-German cultural negotiations following the Basic Treaty, 
it follows the process by which the two German states grew in international importance in 
relationship to one another.  
Postwar reconstruction presented both opportunities and challenges to the “two 
countries in one German nation” in redefining their nationhood, global position, and 
cultural reputation. This process was neither as contrarian nor as malicious as the 
traditional focus on intra-German competition and demarcation policies suggests. Rather, 
this study adds to the German material culture historiography by extending the narrative 
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into the 1970s and 1980s to show how internal economic and political negotiations 
created a third space next to Americanization and Sovietization that allowed for cultural 
rapprochement within the context of European integration. One major impulse sought to 
salvage ties by increasing trade, resulting in a similar interior design aesthetic that 
facilitated exports. Other endeavors focused on normalizing German relations through 
cultural encounters and political treaties, reconnecting populations on both sides of the 
border. By looking at similarities and collaboration, this study of material culture in 
combination with the economic dimensions of the German Question attempts to provide 
an alternative to traditional Cold War histories of Germany that emphasize rivalry. It is 
an attempt at refocusing Germany’s Cold War – that is the special relationship between 
the two German states – and explaining the relative stability during four decades of 
division as well as the considerably smooth transition to unification in 1990. 
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CHAPTER 1: POLITICIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 
Introduction 
In 1967, Walter Gropius, the founder of the Bauhaus movement and then émigré 
to the United States, wrote to the Federal Republic of Germany’s Ministry of Economics 
to intervene in the contemporary debate around state-funded design institutions. 
Expressing his astonishment about the Federal Republic’s limited use of Good Design for 
economic purposes to enhance the national prestige of its production, Gropius warned 
that Germany was making an enormous mistake: “More than ever, I am convinced that 
the solution to cultural-political questions touched upon by design belong at the center of 
public interest, not the periphery.” After all, design movements such as the Deutscher 
Werkbund and the Bauhaus had once instituted German leadership in modernist, socially 
conscious aesthetics. Convinced that “the Bauhaus tradition has been appraised 
inaccurately” by the political and cultural elites in Germany, the Bauhaus founder 
identified “a lack of connections to power figures in government and economy after the 
War” as the real reason for this negligence.28  
While personally invested in the debate about German cultural identity, the 
expatriate Gropius could not have been farther off the mark with his evaluation of 
industrial design in Germany. After the end of the Second World War, Germans created a 
new, democratic society particularly by drawing on their cultural resources of the pre- 
and interwar periods. One area in Germany’s cultural reconstruction that received much 
attention due to pressing demands for housing, and consequently furniture, was interior 
                                                 
28 Walter Gropius to Karl Schiller, 18 December 1967, B102/207796, Bundesarchiv Koblenz [hereafter 
referred to as BAK].  
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design. The combination of scarce materials and the dire economic situation of the 
immediate postwar years made economical production mandatory and placed design at 
the center of the government’s political and economic considerations.29 Required to use 
resources more efficiently, officials looked for institutional solutions to forge greater 
coherence among the different participants in the production and consumption processes. 
Cultural and political elites developed the idea of institutions that would professionalize 
designers, acquaint producers with the merits of quality design, and educate consumers in 
questions of style and taste to create the “right” demand. Contrary to Gropius’ assertion, 
design specialists of the interwar years, the members of the Werkbund and Bauhaus in 
particular, pioneered the process of aesthetic reinvention on the political and the 
educational level. Moreover, the aesthetic, utilitarian philosophy of interwar modernism 
served as a point of reference, both as an aspired ideal and a rejected foil, which framed 
the German reconstruction effort (see figure 1). 
What happened during this period of design institutionalization in the years 1945 
to 1967 that led Gropius to assume that postwar Germany had light-heartedly passed up 
the legacy of Bauhaus modernism? To answer this question this chapter follows debates 
evolving around the politicization of aesthetics as well as their institutionalization in East 
and West Germany from a comparative perspective. Looking at interlinking domestic and 
international tensions in postwar culture and politics, this chapter explores the conception 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that the postwar economic situation developed differently in east and west.  Part of the 
reason being the differing extent of reparations taken by the Allies and the Soviet Union, varying results of 
socialism and capitalism as well as the positive effects of the Marshall Plan in the Federal Republic. See 
Greg Castillo, “Exhibiting the Good Life: Marshall Plan Modernism in Divided Berlin,” in Cold War 
Modern: Art and Design in a Divided World, 1945-1975, ed. David Crowly and Jane Pavett (London: 
Victoria & Albert Museum, 2008); Jonathan Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political 
Culture in East Germany (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Norman Naimark, The 
Russians in Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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of the West German design council Rat für Formgebung and the East German Amt für 
industrielle Formgestaltung, as well as its predecessors. It will become clear that more 
was at stake than the most economical re-building of the two German states. Rather, these 
debates illustrate the cultural and political reconfiguration of two divergent German 
political systems, marred by their National Socialist past, whose attempts at rehabilitation 
extended from the public sphere all the way into the homes of the population. While 
much research has been done on similar themes from separate national sides, the 
comparison adds an analytical layer that uncovers the ideological underpinnings of 
postwar interior design in the context of the open German Question. As a unified future 
moved out of reach, the two German states explored diverging aesthetic options to 
develop identities for their part of the country. In dealing with the Nazi legacy, the 
process resulted in different structures of state organization on the one hand and cultural 
philosophies on the other. The comparison between East and West can thus further our 
understanding of how political and structural differences influenced the ability of 
modernism’s disciples to realize their vision of post-fascist modernity in democratic and 
socialist societies.  
While this chapter tells an economic-cultural story that connects the two postwar 
Germanys, it casts the net of German aesthetic re-civilization wider to illuminate the 
international context in which this took place. Swedish and British state design 
institutions inspired the German institutionalization of design, a novelty in German 
government structure. Especially the British example served as a point of reference for 
both the West German Rat für Formgebung and the East German Amt für 
Formgestaltung. Dedicated to quality control, consumer education, and national 
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trademark promotion, these institutions were decisive in shaping a cohesive aesthetic for 
their national design and projecting a modern image abroad.30 In 1944, Britain 
established the Council of Industrial Design “to promote by all practicable means the 
improvement of design in the products of British industry,” taking advantage of a 
material new beginning during reconstruction.31  Facing similar challenges in turning a 
war economy to peacetime production, the parallels with Britain influenced the German 
institutionalization of industrial design. On the other hand, in both parts of Germany the 
occupiers hampered the development of pronounced German designs as both the 
Americans and the Soviets tried to envelop their part of Germany culturally into their 
sphere of influence. Throughout the reconstruction period, the reception of American and 
Soviet influences remained contentious.  While the critique of Americanization in West 
Germany became part of cultural debates, in the East open criticism of Sovietization 
remained rare. Instead the GDR explored its socialist culture with consistent reliance on 
its national cultural heritage. Benefitting from other national examples, yet pushing 
against external forces, both Germanys used material culture to navigate their way out of 
the long shadow of the Third Reich. 
 
                                                 
30 The first national design council, the Swedish Society for Industrial Design, was founded in 1845 to 
safeguard the quality of Swedish hand-made crafts and “to counter the perceived threat from industrial 
mass production and from the poor quality products made by craftsmen who were not trained by the 
guilds.” In the early twentieth century, the Society accepted the predominance of industrial goods and 
thereafter sought to guide industrial fabrication towards more beautiful everyday wares that did not imitate 
older luxury. Instead, it provided Sweden’s growing working class with inexpensive, but high-quality 
goods. Svensk Form “How it all started,” http://www.svenskform.se/english/ accessed on July 10, 2008. 
31 Design Council, “Our history,” http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/en/Design-Council/1/Our-history/ 
accessed on July 10, 2008. On the constitution and immediate postwar activism of the Council of industrial 
Design see Patrick J. Maguire and Jonathan M. Woodham, eds., Design and Cultural Politics in Post-War 
Britain: The Britain Can Make It Exhibition of 1946 (London and Washington: Leicester University Press, 
1997). 
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The Long Shadow of National Socialism: Reinterpreting German Modernism 
In contrast to painting or representative architecture, the Nazis never fully 
coordinated the field of industrial design. Instead, the Third Reich integrated Weimar 
modernism into its reactionary politics by instilling it with new meaning.32 In terms of 
aesthetics, industrial design in Germany did not change very much from 1925 to 1965, 
“what did change […] was the cultural meaning and representation of design, as the very 
same objects were embraced by dramatically incongruous political regimes as visual 
markers of their specific political projects.”33 This emphasis on aesthetic continuity opens 
up a myriad of analytical avenues, which warrant exploration: how did this continuity 
shape postwar relationship between politics and design, between people and things, and, 
last but not least, between the two German states? All these arenas were highly 
influenced by the activism of the East and West German political and cultural elites who, 
in contrast to Gropius’ assertions, molded Germany’s post-fascist culture specifically 
against the backdrop of Weimar’s classical modernism. 
De-Nazification constituted one of the most important factors shaping the 
aesthetic culture that emerged after 1945.34 In a turn away from the visual politics of 
fascism that emphasized the aestheticization of the relationship between people in the 
                                                 
32 The politicization of art reached new dimensions under National Socialism. Among the works that 
discuss artistic expression during the Third Reich are Eric Michaud, The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany, 
translated by Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 [1996]); Richard Golsan, ed. Fascism, 
Aesthetics, and Culture (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1992); Peter Adam, Art of the 
Third Reich (New York: H.N. Abrams, 1992); Stephanie Barron, ed. Degenerate Art: The Fate of the 
Avant-Garde in Nazi-Germany (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Museum, 1991); and Brandon Taylor 
and Winfried van der Will, eds. The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture, and Film in the 
Third Reich (Winchester, Eng.: Winchester Press, 1990). 
33 Paul Betts, Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 11. 
34 The other three factors that Betts identifies as shaping German postwar design are economics, cultural 
idealism after the war, and the value of industrial design as diplomatic capital. Betts, The Authority of 
Everyday Objects, 9-17. 
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public arena, such as Albert Speer’s grandiose productions for NSDAP mass rallies, the 
post-fascist campaign to aestheticize the relations between people and things focused on 
the private sphere.35 In an effort to overcome the administrative and economic divisions, 
both the eastern and western zones of Germany encouraged the institutionalization of 
design with the deliberate goal of maintaining a unified cultural identity. Personal 
networks of architects and designers reconnected to work on the cultural reorganization 
of Germany after the abyss of the Third Reich. Many of them had been students of the 
Bauhaus or members of professional organizations, such as the Deutscher Werkbund, an 
association of artists and esthete industrialists founded in 1907 with a long tradition of 
involvement in German cultural politics.36  
The Werkbund of the pre- and interwar years adopted the European turn-of-the-
century trend towards “social aesthetics” as the association’s cause. In order to realize 
their vision for the age of mechanization, Werkbund members, theorists and practitioners 
alike, looked to reconcile industrial production (standardization) and design 
(spiritualization) in aesthetic, social and economic regards. In accord with contemporary 
debates about the virtues and vices of production mechanization, the Werkbund 
contemplated how design should adapt to industrialization, which was generally 
perceived as a threat to traditional craftsmanship and the cultural value of goods. 
However, they also stood against the, by then considered backwards looking, Arts and 
Crafts principles: “Unnecessary ornament was avoided, and the quality of objectivity 
could be achieved through adopting a rational approach to form-giving, guided by the 
                                                 
35 Herbert Steinwarz, Wesen, Aufgaben, Ziele des Amtes Schönheit der Arbeit (Berlin: 1937), 5-6. 
36 For a detailed account of the Werkbund from its founding to the Third Reich see Joan Campbell, The 
German Werkbund: The Politics of Reform in the Applied Arts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978). 
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requirements of engineering and technology, which were deeply respected.”37 Debates 
about the aesthetics of mechanization resulted in the rationalization of industrial shapes. 
In later years, the credo “form follows function” united the Bauhaus with these 
Werkbund ideas.38 Emphasizing the use of quality materials and simple, functional 
shapes, the association promoted the concept of Good Design (Gute Form) as a middle 
ground to introduce a material culture of modern everyday objects.39  
The initial idea that encouraged the creation of the Werkbund was closely 
connected to fears of German cultural and economic demise. In reaction to the late 
nineteenth-century British disdain for German wares — the label “Made in Germany” 
was first introduced with Britain’s 1887 Merchandise Marks Act to warn English 
consumers of German low-quality products40 — the prevention of kitsch became a 
guiding thought in the aesthetic reform movements of the early twentieth century.41 The 
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41 “Kitsch” as a critical concept originated in the nineteenth century. In reaction to Romanticism in 
literature and painting, cultural critics increasingly warned about the overuse of sensitivity in artistic 
expression. With the rise of aesthetic education in the early twentieth century, criticism gave kitsch a 
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cultural crisis and social decay. Ernst Broch, who shaped this discourse in the field of literature decisively, 
understands kitsch to be dishonest and dismantles it as a beautiful illusion that betrays the audience. After 
1945, this conception of kitsch continued to influence aesthetic discourse and education. Walter Benjamin 
wrote about “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” that the object loses its 
authenticity, which he understands to be the essence of things, by substituting a plurality of copies for a 
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Werkbund’s approach to the kitsch problem focused on a correct use of resources that 
rejected the unnatural, the pretentious, and the overly ornamented in both materials and 
form.42 Products manufactured to look like something else, for example a cheap clear 
plastic vase that is made to look like an expensive crystal vase, would fall into the 
Werkbund concept of kitsch. However, the movement realized that enterprises would not 
change their successful production patterns until the consumers would demand high-
quality products and, accordingly, Werkbund members concentrated their efforts of taste 
education on the consuming population. Such sociological approach to kitsch prevention, 
though, necessitated its adaptation to the ruling social order and economic system. While 
the underlying aesthetic principles did not change much between the 1920s to the 1960s, 
Germany’s tumultuous history in the first half of the twentieth century continuously 
affected the political environment in which the Werkbund operated.  
In order to fully appreciate the Werkbund’s ability to adapt their cultural concepts 
to the ideological needs of the respective leaderships, this period of changing political 
environments warrants closer examination. In the pre-1914 context of the empire, the 
Werkbund emphasized the moral and educational value of everyday objects. In particular 
leftists among the Werkbund members envisioned a social reconstitution of everything 
“from the spoon to the city.”43 The post-WWI era saw an expansion and radicalization of 
design conceptions, which came to the forefront particularly in urban planning and public 
                                                                                                                                                 
itself.” Walter Benjamin, Iluminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken 
Books, 2007), 220-221. Displacement or unintended use of things create kitsch. For example, copies of 
design furniture decorated with porcelain knick-knacks in a petit bourgeois living room presents a problem 
of high culture appropriation. For an overview of the kitsch debate over the course of two centuries see Ute 
Dettmar and Thomas Küpper, Kitsch: Texte und Theorien (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 2007). 
42 Gustav Edmund Pazaurek, Guter und schlechter Geschmack im Kunstgewerbe (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags Anstalt, 1912). 
43 Mark Jarzombek, “The Kunstgewerbe, the Werkbund, and the Aesthetics of Culture in the Wilhelmine 
Period,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 53, no. 1 (1994): 8.  
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housing. “Neues Bauen” in Frankfurt and the 1927 Weissenhofsiedlung in Stuttgart 
remain the most consistent testimony to this period of state and municipal funded design. 
The Depression abruptly ended state support in 1929, leaving many ideas for the 
industrial age unexplored, and the Werkbund henceforth had to struggle with its 
association to the vision of failed industrialism. Modern architecture stalled, but a 
softened Bauhaus modernism became successful after 1929 in the new machine aesthetic 
in everyday objects.44 The commercialization of modern design had a negative effect on 
the social grounding of modernism as it “went hand in hand with the disappearance of its 
former reform idealism. The once powerful political pathos of functionalism had given 
way to a severe Neue Sachlichkeit divorced from any real social vision.”45 Furthermore, 
the movement came under crossfire both from the political left and right. Throughout the 
Weimar Republic, the Werkbund ideals for industrial modernism presented a provocation 
to cultural conservatives who feared that industrialization would do away with distinctly 
German culture. On the left, radical Marxist condemned Werkbund elitism as detached 
from the masses, wasting their talents on designing luxuries.46 With the Nazi seizure of 
power, the Werkbund ceased to exist as a private association and was brought first under 
the jurisdiction of Goebbel’s Reich Chamber of the Visual Arts (Reichskammer der 
bildenden Künste) and later under that of the Reich Chamber of Culture 
(Reichskulturkammer).47 Contrary to their different political outlook, Werkbund 
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industrial modernism and Nazi culture, despite its agricultural “blood and soil” ideology, 
proved to be compatible at least in the realm of industry, rationalization, and 
propaganda.48  
Werkbund members continued their aesthetic mission under Nazi rule, at least 
until 1939 when the war put a halt to the Werkbund ideal of quality work.49 Especially 
the struggle against kitsch, which was directed against Nazi paraphernalia in the name of 
a more dignified German material culture, presented a rich field of work for taste 
reformers in the Third Reich.50  While the Nazis thus controlled the commercial exploit 
of their political symbols, they re-appropriated leftist aesthetics of Neue Sachlichkeit for 
their own goals, especially in the work environment. With Alfred Speer’s Beauty of 
Labor (Schönheit der Arbeit) program, the Werkbund goals were turned on their head: 
instead of the ennoblement of the worker, the aesthetic restructuring of the workplace 
now adjusted the worker to the repressive labor system in factories.51 The resulting 
aesthetic was a softened version of Neue Sachlichkeit, a Nazi modernism that 
emphasized technological advancement and functionality with the ultimate aim of 
increasing productivity in preparation for war.52 
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It was this corporative and aesthetic legacy then, against which the Werkbund had 
to reconstitute the movement after the Second World War.53 Indeed, its problematic 
involvement with the Nazi regime was something that the Werkbund desired to leave in 
the past. The tabula rasa of devastated and bombed-out cities of the Second World War 
offered the Werkbund a new beginning and manifold opportunities for imprinting its 
principles into the new material culture. During the years of want, the Werkbund 
reconnected with its original moral and social vision, but transplanted it into a more 
industrialized and globalized postwar era. An educational impetus as well as a purpose-
oriented aesthetic mission drove this reform movement, which meant a certain revival of 
Weimar modernism.54  
 
Reconstruction Design in the two German States 
Immediately after the war, the Werkbund re-established itself in regional groups 
in the eastern and western occupation zones in cities like Dresden, East and West Berlin, 
Düsseldorf, and Stuttgart. The association quickly gained official recognition with the 
western authorities. By the summer of 1948, regional governments subsidized the 
Werkbund group West-Nord with 10,000 DM annually and the Bavarian cultural ministry 
gave its regional DWB group considerably more with 60,000 DM per year.55 The 
regional administration’s subsidies signify an acknowledgement of design as part of the 
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reconstruction effort and illustrate an early flirtation with modernist aesthetics in the 
West. This regional cooperation moreover considerably facilitated the Werkbund’s later 
involvement in the foundation of a West German design council that would continue the 
movement’s mission to prevent the production of kitsch and to continuously educate the 
consumer about the “right” consumption.  
Soon thereafter, the Werkbund started its bids for aesthetic leadership in the 
Federal Republic with two domestic culture exhibitions put on in Cologne in 1949. New 
Dwelling (Neues Wohnen) and New Architecture since 1945 (Neue Architektur seit 1945) 
showed modernist solutions for the bombed-out cities in Germany’s west that design 
historian Jeremy Aynsley describes as “prescriptive visions of design ideals.”56 “[The 
exhibitions] were strongly influenced by developments in Scandinavia, Switzerland and 
the United States since 1933,” but with its reliance on abstraction for the organization of 
products in the displays, they still represented powerfully Werkbund ideals.57 Promoting 
pure minimalism in furnishings, New Dwelling prescribed Germans modesty in their 
consumer behavior based on moral choice and collective commitment to counter the 
corrupting influence of materialism based on false abundance or pretentious 
ornamentation.58 Right away, the Werkbund tied its tradition of taste education 
(Geschmacksbildung) in with their struggle against kitsch and its implications for social 
decay in postwar Germany.59 Photographs from this exhibition show multi-functional 
room settings that no other term then “empty” could describe better. This asceticism 
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stemmed from the poor state of the German economy, underscored by a product range 
that started with furniture dating back several decades to hardly finished prototypes, as 
well as the Werkbund’s renewed endeavor to lead in the invention of socially responsible 
aesthetics. A placard with the words “Werkbund is no Luxury” (Werkbund ist kein Luxus) 
advertised a new outlook on the failed interwar mission: to make affordable Good Design 
products for the masses.60  
At the same time, the eastern Werkbund increasingly lost its political influence 
with the centralization of politics in the Soviet zone of occupation. The Soviet Military 
Administration’s (SVAG) installed exclusive political leadership with the Socialist Unity 
Party as early as 1946.61 Irritated by the following coercive centralization of most cultural 
fields, prominent Werkbund members such as industrial designer Wilhelm Wagenfeld in 
East Berlin and architect Egon Eiermann in Dresden moved to the West. Yet others 
committed to the Werkbund and Bauhaus principles with stronger social(ist) ideals, such 
as industrial designers Mart Stam and Horst Michel as well as the architect Selman 
Selmanagic, remained in the eastern zone.62 The SVAG opened schools for the education 
of designers, beginning with the Weimar University for Architecture and the Arts in 
1946. Weimar, significant as the location of the first Bauhaus school, remained a 
gravitation center for artists, architects, and designers after the Second World War. Horst 
Michel, educated at the Berlin University for the Arts and an experienced member of 
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architect and interior designer Bruno Paul’s studio,63 started an industrial design program 
in Weimar in response to the deprived population’s material needs. Provincial Weimar 
was the perfect location to reconstitute East Germany’s material culture as it afforded 
Michel and the school with close ties to the local industries.64  
In contrast to his West German counterparts who experienced practically 
unlimited possibilities in their approach to industrial design, Michel’s work increasingly 
became circumscribed by socialist ideology and constraints of nascent political 
centralization. The challenge lay in materially expressing the immaterial virtues of 
socialism, which, Michel recognized, entailed not only the aesthetic education of 
designers in order to influence production, but also that of consumers to create the right 
demand for a socialist domestic environment. In Michel’s eyes, durability, honesty, 
effective use of materials, reduced storage and transportation costs, and the avoidance of 
moral decay and pretension of value appreciation via “unauthentic” materials or 
embellished surfaces marked good socialist design.65 These qualities fit perfectly with the 
GDR’s plans for industrialization of the crafts in large-scale serial production. At the 
same time, they aimed at preventing kitsch. Yet herein lay Michel’s problem, because 
like other twentieth-century cultural critics, Michel blamed kitsch as a cultural 
phenomenon on industrialization and mass production. The goal was to facilitate a 
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product landscape that would uplift Germans’ defeated spirits and destroyed homes, 
while circumventing the seemingly unavoidable implications for social and moral decay. 
Michel faced the struggle against kitsch in mass production head-on, working with the 
Thuringia Chamber of Crafts to improve production in regard to aesthetics and efficiency 
as soon as 1946. His experience in arts and crafts made him an expert in household and 
interior design. With the cooperation of local companies, he assembled household wares 
and ceramics in large shows that a jury evaluated to create criteria for “good design”. 
This practice continued in later years during standardization and Sortimentsbereinigung, 
an effort to reduce the number of models for a given product to increase Plan efficiency 
and industrial output.  
Anticipating the GDR economic motto “if only good is produced, nothing bad can 
be sold” of later decades, Michel drafted a “Law Against the Exploitation of the People 
by Kitsch” and introduced it into the Thuringia regional parliament in 1947.66 This Kitsch 
bill expressed Michel’s conviction that political action was needed to prevent severe 
damage to the economy: 
It seems to be necessary to fight increasingly rampant kitsch and its inherent 
waste of resources at the level of the state and to influence the quality of products 
from crafts and industry. The multiplicity of shapes, more or less resulting from 
financial greed, the amassing of dishonest pomp on appliances of the everyday 
and basic commodities, as well as the wasting of resources mean an exploitation 
of the people and dissipation of the people’s wealth.67  
Kitsch seen from Michel’s point of view embodied the reverse of socialist ideals, a 
complex concept of profit-induced diversity that differs from today’s pedestrian 
perceptions of kitsch.  
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While the Kitsch bill never passed, Michel successfully introduced a quality seal 
for crafts and applied arts in Thuringia, a white lily and hammer in a blue circle. Soon 
thereafter the seal helped consumers across East German territory to differentiate 
between good and bad design. Retail recognized the merits of the seal and priced the 
awarded products higher, which in turn created incentives for industry and crafts to 
produce better products. Starting in 1949, Michel and the Weimar Institute organized 
several “Kitsch Exhibitions” to educate the broader public through comparison of well 
and badly designed products.68 These early episodes illustrate Michel’s involvement in 
such ideological and political debates about production and kitsch even before the official 
founding of the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, his tactics continuously aligned 
with the Werkbund’s aesthetic and educational principles, providing ties across the 
political division into East and West. Pioneering a functional and modern aesthetic that 
corresponded to the limited resources available in the postwar years, Michel had become 
a design authority who greatly influenced developments in design education, the 
economy, and even politics. While his take on socialist essentialism aligned with 
economic policy, on closer examination, however, his aesthetic sensitivities went in the 
opposite direction of official aesthetic development under Soviet influence, which soon 
diminished his leadership. 
Between 1946 and 1948, the Soviet Military Administration worked towards the 
centralization of cultural politics in the eastern zone of occupation in cooperation with its 
German partners.69 With the centralization effort, the SED hoped to ensure uniformity in 
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the political reorganization process that accompanied the growing German division. By 
May 1948 the SED announced and all-encompassing claim to cultural leadership at the 
Party’s Kulturtag: “The Culture Conference has expressed the decisive cultural will of 
the Party. It has illustrated the character of the Party as a party of culture [Kulturpartei] in 
the broadest sense of the word as well as the leading intellectual force in Germany’s 
democratic reconstruction.”70 Henceforth, principles of party control rather than artistic 
and aesthetic concerns guided East German cultural and educational policies. Such 
politicization of culture differed distinctly from West Germany’s more liberal and 
decentralized conception of cultural responsibility. Until this day, cultural matters are 
handled at the regional level in Germany; there has never been a Ministry of Culture in 
the Federal Republic. Consequently, the Kulturtag hailed the end of any assumed or 
aspired cultural unity between East and West. Extending the political division of 
Germany, the decision to pursue a “socialist” culture in the eastern zone of occupation 
allowed the SED to model its part of Germany in accordance with the Soviet example 
and in contrast to the cultural fabric of the Federal Republic. In turn, these contrasting 
approaches to cultural policy set the stage for similarly divergent national aesthetics in 
East and West during the reconstruction period. 
 
Separate Economies, Separate Aesthetics 
The nascent political and cultural division between East and West increased when 
the Western Allies took measures to solidify the war-damaged German economy that 
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reparation payments had scarred even further. The Marshall Plan and the resultant 
currency reform of 1948 cemented the separation by creating two German economies that 
fell into dramatically different economic systems: capitalism in the West and socialism in 
the East. Acting against the provisions for Germany’s economic unity at the Potsdam 
conference, Britain, France, and the United States merged their occupation zones and 
treated this territory of the so-called Trizone as a single economic unit while at the same 
time deliberately excluding the Soviet zone of occupation. The Yalta and Potsdam 
agreements between the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, and France had put Germany 
under their joined control until a peace treaty was reached, but its de facto split into two 
different countries with opposing ideologies and separate state apparatus complicated 
reaching a consensus concerning German matters and the status of Berlin.71 Eventually, 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin between June 1948 and May 1949 effectively foreclosed 
Allied cooperation in Germany. Moreover, these events weakened hopes for a unified 
future, leaving Germany to emerge as the ideological battleground of the superpowers. 
As a result of the increasing divide, the two German states focused on developing 
diverging social and political systems that increasingly sought to demarcate from each 
other. 
 When East Germany achieved statehood as the German Democratic Republic in 
the midst of heightening Cold War tensions in the fall of 1949, cultural delineation from 
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the West became an ideological concern in developing a distinct national profile. Such 
process of state formation included the socialist remaking of society and all its underlying 
structures. Toward these ends, early state socialism and its artistic proponents provided a 
comprehensive approach to the human environment: new ways of feeling, thinking and 
living specific to the working class had to be created.72 In the early 1920s, a Soviet avant-
garde movement known under the name “Constructivists” shifted their interest from art 
for art’s sake to an active engagement in processes of socio-political restructuring 
inspired by the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution. During the first years under Soviet 
control, their ambition went beyond simply turning artistic projects into political 
messages. Rather, the Constructivists created a specific type of artistic-political discourse 
in which every decision regarding the aesthetic construction of art became a political 
one.73  
Constructivist cultural expression allowed for the aesthetic visualization of the 
utopian socialist project, yet it further served as a way to communicate to the Soviet 
population its new relation to things in the realms of production and consumption. In her 
study of Constructivism’s most prolific phase between 1923 and 1925, Christina Kaier 
shows that the avant-garde’s devotion to “reintegrating art into the life process” and 
regaining “social use value for art” by creating democratic objects for the everyday.74  
Their emphasis thus lay more on integration of art into the everyday than domination 
over the everyday – a clearly functionalist perspective. The aspired artistic production, as 
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the avant-garde theorist Osip Brik explained, meant to express “the conscious creative 
relationship to the productive process. We would like every worker who gives an object a 
particular form and color to understand why that form and color is necessary.”75 
Although the Constructivist projects paved the way for politicized art in socialism, they 
were less successful in implementing their vision of this new way of life and materiality. 
The problem was perhaps that their radical avant-garde idea of the socialist New Man 
resembled more a utopian work-machine than a human being, or that their Bolshevik 
negation of individual possession overreached human possibility. In the end, the 
Constructivist bond between politics and culture remained, yet the carefully crafted 
relationship between art and the everyday was replaced by an aesthetic remodeling of 
material culture that favored form over function. 
Artistic expression under Stalin rediscovered human emotions and reintroduced 
them into the productive process.76 Boris Groys describes Socialist Realist art as the 
means to recognize reality, or the utopian Soviet reality that was to be created. The 
artistic conception of production lost its centrality, and instead the ways of utilization and 
the attitude towards the productive means gained importance under cultural Stalinism.77 
The direct connection between form and function dissolved, and with it disappeared the 
avant-garde ideas of the Constructivists. In contrast to the earlier negation of personal 
possessions, Socialist Realist architecture explored its extremes, achieving monumental, 
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heavily ornamented, and pompous aesthetics.78 The furniture inside these buildings 
invoked bourgeois styles such as Biedermeier, adding a cozy feeling to the interiors of 
the revolution. Instead of integrating art into the everyday, art came to dominate the 
everyday. And the artist became the locus of this process since cultural Stalinism 
understood design to express his inner reality, “his ability to inwardly identify with the 
Party’s and Stalin’s volition, to amalgamate with it and to create an image or, more 
exactly, a model of this willed reality [...].”79 According to Groys, it was the Socialist 
Realist artist’s task to develop the utopian dream of the avant-garde with “non-avant-
garde, traditional, ‘realistic’ means.”80 Aesthetic expressions were meant to act upon the 
New Man in his evolution toward revolutionary consciousness. Art and the material 
environment therefore played an important role in the education of the socialist individual 
and the creation of collective socialist identity. Similarly, the GDR arrived at such 
juncture in its revolutionary development about twenty-five years later, but the outcome 
of its cultural quest was predetermined by the Soviet example. 
With the Soviet Union as an ideological foil, the leadership of the SED modeled 
itself and most aspects of the East German state after the Stalinist dictatorship. During the 
years of occupation, as Norman Naimark illustrates, the SVAG demanded German 
recognition of Soviet cultural superiority.81 The SED thus continued the political and 
cultural work that the Soviets had begun in 1945 in constructing the first communist 
German state. While Soviet influence in the East remained considerable after 1949, East 
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Germans increasingly commanded their own state apparatus and decision-making, at 
least in regard to domestic policies. Consequently, the SED government faced the task of 
creating the parameters of a German socialist culture, which not only encompassed high 
culture forms of the arts in literature, painting, and music, but also the culture of everyday 
life. Industrial design, at the crossroads of applied arts and economic planning, as the 
environmental manifestation of socialist thought, became part of this aesthetic 
reinvention. Partially in reaction to these centralized efforts of cultural reconstruction in 
the East, the Federal Republic continued and fortified its endeavor of rebuilding the 
country. Western pluralism, meanwhile, included interest groups representing political 
factions, business elites as well as the population, into the state-building process. This 
associational culture (Verbandskultur), however, quickly succeeded at turning the tables, 
making the institutionalizing of industrial design a governmental responsibility.82 
The Werkbund, a well-connected representative of West German associational 
politics, set to work with its lobbying with the two exhibitions in 1949. Not only did the 
“Neues Wohnen” and the ”Neue Architektur seit 1945” shows educate consumers in 
Cologne, they also made officials increasingly aware of the economic potential in 
promoting a modern aesthetic nationwide. By supporting this exhibition effort, the 
Economic Administration for the Tri-Zone officially embraced the Werkbund.83 Such a 
structural transfer of cultural responsibilities from the regional administration to the 
central economic administration heralded the dawn of national solutions to problems of 
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Germany’s postwar housing crisis, including fitted furniture for the limited spaces. 
Despite regional efforts, entire families often had to share one room where they would 
cook, eat, and sleep. Earlier that year, the Economic Administration had entered 
negotiations with the Werkbund about a “committee for design,” but the plans had not 
come to fruition because of unsettled finances and an alleged lack of dedication on the 
part of the Werkbund. Nevertheless, Werkbund members publicly announced the idea for 
a national “council for industrial design” at their annual congress in June of 1949 in 
Cologne, emphasizing its claim to national leadership in material culture once more.84 
Because the occupation status limited political activity on the highest level, the 
realization of a council for industrial design hinged on the formation of the West German 
state as well as events that created a political necessity to act. Such motivation 
materialized with the growing reappearance of German products on the global market.  
Along with the currency reform of 1948 came Germany’s gradual international 
economic reintegration. Ready to contribute to the reconstruction of Europe and the 
development of international trade, West Germany longed to rekindle export relations. To 
test the waters, the Trizone participated in an industrial exhibition in New York in 1949. 
It was the first time since the Second World War that the occupiers granted German 
industrialists permission to present their products at an international event. While recent 
currency reform heralded the liberalization of the trizonal economy, international trade 
events such as the New York Germany 49 industry show offered a forum for 
communicating to the international community that West Germans now subscribed to 
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western capitalist principles and peaceful economic competition.85 In the opening 
remarks to the exhibition catalogue, Ludwig Erhard, then the director of the Economic 
Administration of the Tri-Zonal Area of Germany, expressed his hope that the West 
German display would prove to the world that “the German people’s only desire today is 
to strive diligently for the improvement of human and social welfare and to show that 
they have kept their strength and ability for the accomplishment of this desire despite all 
the mistakes and the terror of the previous decade.”86 It is interesting to note that Erhard 
downplayed the materialistic and capitalistic components of Germany’s participation in 
the fair. In doing so he missed an opportunity to establish a cultural bond with the West 
in general and the United States in particular based on shared attitudes toward trade and 
consumption. Instead he placed German economic recovery in a moral and social context, 
thus emphasizing the ethical importance for aesthetic reinvention. New German 
aesthetics should display industriousness and efficiency in the service of the common 
good, turning away from the pompous aesthetics connected to the public displays of 
National Socialism. Moreover, Erhard’s statement expressed the perhaps naïve sentiment 
among the West German political and economic elite that economic prosperity could 
replace, if not redeem, the vices of the Third Reich in public memory. In this way, 
politicians began to instill German products with symbolic meaning that went beyond 
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economic values. Erhard embraced these material promises for a better future and 
promoted them abroad as new West German virtues. He proposed that the New York 
exhibition displays served the express purpose of conveying the “honest work of German 
hands and minds.”87 The German show participation in New York marked a watershed in 
strategy of cultural diplomacy, which was henceforth rooted in the belief that aesthetic 
quality was tantamount to moral transcendence that would yield external approval. These 
initial years of western economic activity coupled with a new morality laid the 
foundation for a West German democratic identity based on economic success, which 
came to fruition during the “economic miracle” of the late 1950s. 
While the catalog presented the message of a re-civilized Germany in a clear 
language, materially the content of the New York displays failed to convince.88 
Unfortunately for Ludwig Erhard and West German industrialists, the industry exhibition 
proved not to be as successful as they had hoped. Furnished with curved, heavy recliners 
and an embellished display cabinet made of mahogany, the German exhibition received 
reviews that ranged from ridicule to outrage at what was regarded as impractical, 
pompous kitsch.89 Insecure about what kind of aesthetic could best show Germans’ 
postwar attitudes, exhibitioners relied on best-selling Bavarian arts and crafts and Louis 
XV-style furniture. Their spacious designs and extravagant use of materials, though, felt 
inappropriate amidst the postwar scarcity of resources and living space. Moreover, the 
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critique of West German material culture, Betts finds, “suggested a host of awkward 
impressions that West Germans desperately wanted to dispel: first, that West Germany 
remained culturally backward and/or arrogant; second, that it had made no cultural break 
with Nazism; and third, that it had inexplicably turned its back on its affirmative heritage 
of international modernism.” 90 Clearly, aesthetic recivilization as a holistic remake of the 
German cultural fabric warranted more organized approaches, now that there were 
external incentives to act on. The New York opprobrium further raised awareness for 
aesthetic considerations in product development among West Germany’s political and 
industrial elite, offering the Werkbund a vantage point for lobbying in industrial design. 
 
Institutionalization in the West: Coordinating State and Business Interests 
With the ratification of the Basic Law, West Germany achieved statehood as the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, which ended the occupation status and enabled 
West Germans to politically organize themselves. Right away, the Werkbund began to 
work political channels to introduce concerns about national aesthetics into parliamentary 
debate. In October 1950, Werkbund member Heinrich König presented the organization’s 
plan for a national design council before the Bundestag Committee on Cultural Policy. 
Reminding the parliamentarians of the embarrassment at the New York exhibition, König 
connected Germany’s international reputation to domestic reconstruction needs: “Instead 
of handy, functional, and comfortable things to furnish the small apartments of public 
housing, producers offer heavy, pompous show-pieces of impractical arrangement.” 
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König concluded that this kind of “production circumvents the real needs of the masses 
(An dem wirklichen Bedarf der breiten Massen wird vorbeiproduziert).”91  
Pressures to become active in Germany’s cultural reconstruction also came from 
other quarters. The Western Allies, the American military administration in particular, 
intensified efforts to integrate West Germany culturally into the ranks of western 
democratic nations. Financed by the Marshall Plan, a traveling exhibition called “We 
Build a Better Life,” introduced modern home design to the West German population. In 
its three week run, it drew half a million visitors (40 percent of them from the East) in 
Berlin, Hannover, and Stuttgart. Nationally diverse displays offered a common Western 
material aesthetic reflecting “the same taste, same needs, and same interests [that] bond 
the Atlantic community tightly together.”92  This “same taste” was a commitment to a 
modernist aesthetic reminiscent of the Bauhaus with clear lines, sparsely furnished 
rooms, and the limited use of patterned fabrics and ornamented household wares (see 
figure 2). Werkbund member König was highly critical of the exhibition, observing that 
“the products displayed at the Marshall Plan’s “New Home Furnishings” show were not 
‘representational’ in style” of what was to be German design in his eyes.93  
Generally speaking, the West German attitude toward American patronage in 
design was conflicted. In the case of educational institutionalization, West Germans 
highly depended on American financing. One great example of this ambivalence toward 
cultural American influence is the Ulm Institute of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung) 
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in Baden-Württemberg.94 Inge Scholl, the younger sister of Nazi resistance leaders Hans 
and Sophie Scholl, joined forces with Swiss designer Max Bill, a Bauhaus student and 
head of the Swiss Werkbund, in 1953 to found a school that provided a model for 
responsible political education that addressed the materialization of policies through 
design, giving design a moral authority in defining the character of postwar life.95 Their 
goal was to “educate a democratic elite as a counterforce against the tides of 
intolerance.”96 Revealing its aspirations within the legacy of German design, the school 
labeled itself the “New Bauhaus” in 1955, thus signaling to the world that antifascist 
resistance and international modernism were alive and well in the Federal Republic.97 It 
moreover established West Germany’s claim to Bauhaus modernism as its cultural 
heritage. The project was mostly funded by the Scholl foundation, but among others the 
regional government of Baden-Württemberg and the American High Commissioner, 
General McCloy, supported the effort. While they took American money, Ulm’s design 
vision quickly developed an anti-American stance that objected to Western consumerism. 
Rather, Bill, Scholl, and her graphic designer husband Otl Aicher strove to develop 
designs that were driven by the rational and systematic, rather than style and fashion. 
“Within this,” Aynsley observes, “the notion of timelessness was invoked as an important 
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criterion, defined against the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption and in-built 
obsolescence of the American system of industrial styling.”98 Caught between the 
western Allies’ visions for a new Germany and the ever-present communist alternative of 
East Germany, the Federal Republic needed its own strong central institutions that could 
shape its post-fascist identity. 
The creation of a national Werkbund umbrella organization in 1950 under Hans 
Schwippert’s leadership decisively shaped the course of events in the institutionalization 
of design.99 United, the Werkbund successfully impressed upon the Adenauer 
administration the notion that a centralized governmental institution should define West 
Germany’s commodity aesthetic. Through its interwar experience in promoting a German 
product culture as well as through its close ties to the Bonn political elites –Theodor 
Heuss, the first President of the Federal Republic of Germany, held membership– the 
Werkbund enjoyed access to the federal government. Aside from talks between 
Werkbund members and representatives of the Federal Ministry of Economics, 
Werkbund member König and parliamentarian Arno Hennig (SPD) lobbied for the design 
council in Bonn.100 While economic connections between design and export rates 
dominated the discussion, the aesthetic weight clearly lay on shaping a national style. 
Referencing the national products of world renown, such as Murano glass, Brussels lace, 
and French luxury commodities, expert witness Max Wiederanders demanded similar 
German industrial excellence: German quality production that German consumers could 
trust. Assimilation to foreign tastes in order to increase exports, however, he regarded as 
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secondary: German workmanship in quality products should speak for itself.101 What the 
Werkbund wanted was a national institution executing a prescriptive and holistic 
aesthetic reform program. This paternalistic attitude toward consumers in regard to style 
and taste represented continuity with the earlier decades of the century in the Werkbund’s 
self-conception: aesthetic education and the struggle against kitsch in the everyday.  
In the early years of the Federal Republic, however, parliamentarians’ questioned 
the legitimacy of such centralized “taste paternalism” vis-à-vis the population. West 
Germany not only upheld cultural liberalism, but had also inscribed the decentralization 
of culture into the Basic Law, making it the responsibility of the individual states rather 
than the federal government. Yet the term “taste paternalism” encapsulates the 
missionary zeal with which the Werkbund took up its self-assigned task of enlightening 
the population about aesthetic principles instilled with democratic values. The inherent 
contradiction in this rigid approach toward recivilizing Germans to become responsible 
democratic citizens, though, was not apparent to the Werkbund members. The association 
put its best efforts forward to ease politicians’ concerns about the illiberal implications of 
their goals, but instead expert witness Wiederanders confirmed the elitist philosophy of 
Werkbund circles: “The ‘audience’ (Publikum) has neither good nor bad taste. Its taste 
always refers to that of the ‘powerful’ (Mächtigen der Erde), who shape the Zeitgeist, the 
meaning of life and mankind’s ambitions and illusions.”102 This top-down approach stood 
in stark contrast to West Germany’s socio-political goals of democratization and 
liberalization in all areas of cultural, economic, and public life.  
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Meanwhile, the Cold War climate and the East German socialist alternative added 
suspicions regarding leftist agendas to parliamentary concerns about the possible effects 
of socially and morally implicated political aesthetics. Taking into consideration that the 
Werkbund was historically linked to leftist reform movements, official hesitation to 
embrace the plans for a national design institution seemed plausible to contemporaries. 
Thus, increasingly aware of the state’s apprehensions, Werkbund strategy changed to 
playing into the government’s two main interests in industrial design: export increase and 
the diplomatic value of material culture. At later parliamentary hearings in 1950 and 
1951, Werkbund representatives repeatedly invoked the embarrassment of the New York 
fair to stress the economic gains that the Federal Republic could acquire through the 
sponsorship of design. Eventually, the evident economic opportunity trumped 
parliamentary apprehensions about violating democratic principles through centralization 
of cultural policy-making. The Bundestag voted in favor of the initiative with only one 
opposing vote in 1951.103 This event put the Federal Republic’s claim to Weimar 
modernism swiftly in place ensuring Werkbund control over design politics and sending 
the country on its way to finding a West German aesthetic that could withstand 
overbearing Americanization. The initiative furthermore offered a democratic alternative 
to socialism in the East and helped to overcome the Third Reich aesthetics of power. 
Concerned about moral decay of the country’s cultural fabric, the fight against kitsch as 
its aesthetic manifestation in mass production connected design politics increasingly to 
the economic realm. Encountering similar challenges, the GDR fought out its own battles 
about cultural policy and its role in turning East Germans into socialist citizens. 
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Politicization of Design: The Struggle to Create Modern German Aesthetics   
In the GDR of the early 1950s, the Formalism Debate (Formalismus Debatte) 
started an ideological-artistic dispute about a more holistic approach to the aesthetics of 
the socialist material environment. Deeming Socialist Realism the official aesthetic, the 
Party announced a radical reorientation in all areas of cultural activity at the third SED 
party convention on July 20 – 24, 1950.104 By displaying cultural coherence with the 
Soviet Union, the GDR government strove to demonstrate its “otherness” in contrast to 
West Germany. From the beginning, Socialist Realism strove to connect artistic 
expression to the task of enlightening and ideologically re-educating the working 
population in the spirit of socialism. Its method relied on the depiction of reality and its 
revolutionary development from the perspective of socialist partisanship. Dealing with 
modes of socialist production and class struggle, Socialist Realism focused on everyday 
work heroes, who built the socialist utopia, to inspire popular ideological identification. 
This artistic expression received its national substance through the reliance on folk 
culture, materially articulated in artisanal traditions.105 By contrast, East German 
politicians, led by General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, a cabinetmaker by trade, 
denounced modern functionalism as artless, international, and cosmopolitan. Its lack of 
ornamentation, according to the government, signified the missing element of national 
culture and the limitation of design to simple shapes made this aesthetic formalistic in the 
eyes of officials. The fact that West Germany chose functionalism as its official aesthetic 
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during the years of East Germany’s Formalism Debate only reinforced the political nature 
of the GDR’s decision to reject Germany’s interwar modernism. 
For a centrally organized state, this cultural reorientation had far-reaching 
implications regarding the freedom of artistic expression. To avoid censorship, the artistic 
community challenged the Party’s sweeping decision publicly. Over the course of three 
years, the government repeatedly defended its stance in public forums such as 
newspapers and symposia. In this way, the Formalism Debate became decreasingly 
cultural and increasingly political in content. At a time of growing Cold War antagonism 
between East and West, bloc alignment outpaced the search for a modern socialist 
aesthetic and, eventually, the nationalistic values in the realist aesthetics of cultural 
Stalinism held sway. In January 1954, an order by the GDR Council of Ministers 
commanded the furniture industry to develop aesthetically pleasing furnishings “based on 
the national cultural heritage.”106 Reminiscent of the style and ornamentation of the 
Gründerzeit (c. 1870 – 1890, literally: Founders’ Period), the German cultural heritage in 
the GDR was henceforth expressed in artful decorations, curved lines, and expensive 
handicraft techniques. East Germany’s first major public housing project in East Berlin, 
the Stalinallee, displayed wedding-cake style facades, heavily adorned with sculptures 
and mosaics depicting workers and farmers. A coherent vision for the apartments’ 
interiors followed in a 1952 exhibition held in the first finished high rise. The furnishings 
were bulky with patterned upholstery fabric. Pleated lampshades, lace curtains and squat-
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shaped porcelain added a curious petit-bourgeois feeling (see figure 3).107 This emphasis 
on ornamentation simultaneously represented a search for a politically untainted past, a 
demonstration of integration into the Eastern bloc, and aesthetic delineation from West 
Germany. 
Considering the political realities in the GDR, historians have treated the 
Formalism Debate as a predetermined affair or ignore it altogether.108 Martin Bober, for 
example, argues that the debate was merely the Party’s attempt to create the illusion of a 
pluralistic public sphere in the GDR.109 Yet there exists evidence to the contrary, that the 
debate comprised an openly fought battle between political thinkers and functionalist 
designers. As shown above, a number of schools founded on Bauhaus teaching principles 
already existed in East Germany by 1950. Esteemed socialists like Horst Michel led these 
interior design schools, on which the country depended, to create commodities for 
reconstruction. Second, the fact that the debate lasted about three years and was 
conducted in public speaks to the earnestness with which politicians and cultural elites 
immersed themselves in the making of East German official culture.110 By discarding the 
Formalism Debate as a predetermined affair, Bober misses the initial stage in 
negotiations between designers and the state over the place of Bauhaus modernism in 
GDR design and the struggle against an unfamiliar culture of Soviet provenance.111 
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Bauhaus modernism and its students nevertheless comprised the main target of 
the political campaign. At the risk of losing its livelihood, the GDR Bauhaus community 
resisted state intervention in artistic expression. Mart Stam, a Dutch architect appointed 
as the first director of the new School for Applied Arts (Hochschule für angewandte 
Kunst) in Berlin Weissensee in 1950 became the most prominent casualty of the conflict. 
Stam, a socialist idealist who had worked with architect and urban planner Ernst May on 
the Neues Bauen public housing projects in Frankfurt a. M. in the 1920s and went with 
the May Brigade to help build the industrial cities of Magnitogorsk, Makeyevka and Orsk 
in the Soviet Union, had introduced the Bauhaus curriculum and methods in 
Weissensee.112 Stam additionally founded and headed the Weissensee Institute for 
Applied Art (Institut für angewandte Kunst) to respond to the immediate needs of East 
Germany’s postwar production.113 The three years of the Formalism Debate with cultural 
Stalinism eventually gaining the upper hand, however, ostracized Stam and his wife. 
They left the GDR in 1953, disenchanted with the country where Stam had hoped to 
contribute his vision for a socialist way of life to a true Marxist state.   
Stam’s departure from Weissensee marked the final stage in the Formalism 
Debate as well as the institutionalization of cultural Stalinism in East Germany. The 
remaining Bauhaus community viewed this development critically. In a 1985 interview, 
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Selman Selmanagic, a former Bauhaus student, highly regarded interior designer, and 
architect who worked with Stam at both the Institut für angewandte Kunst and the 
Hochschule, lambasted the transformation of the institute into a government agency.114  
He saw Walter Heisig, Stam’s successor at the institute, as a person “without 
comprehension,” who “designed florets on ceramics and such kitsch.”115 Labeled as 
“German cultural heritage”, this naïve representation of reality was henceforth the official 
aesthetic of the GDR. The remaining Bauhaus disciples in East Germany, as Eli Rubin 
astutely observes, left Berlin and went into artistic exile in the provincial centers of the 
GDR.116 For example, Stam’s student Martin Kelm started the independent Halle Institute 
for Design and Development with fellow Stam student Günter Reissmann in 1958.  
While the sun was sinking on functionalism in the East, it rose for their 
counterparts in the West who fortified their political and cultural influence in the early 
1950s. On April 4, 1951, the Bundestag resolved to create a design council to enhance 
Germany’s image abroad and promote the country’s exports.117 Its official tasks included 
“to advise industry by procuring qualified creative minds, to reestablish Germany’s 
competitiveness at international exhibitions and trade fairs, to support the education of 
new designers in arts and crafts schools and professional schools, and to take all 
measures necessary that benefit the instruction about quality and shape as well as the 
education of traders and consumers.”118 Therefore gaining official avenues of power as 
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the arbiter of West German good taste, the Werkbund seemed to have finally reached its 
goal. By exerting aesthetical influence over both industry and consumers, the design 
council revived the Werkbund’s elitist reform project of the prewar years.  
This centralization of cultural power in the hands of the Werkbund, though, was 
compromised by two factors: the funding situation and the decisions concerning 
personnel. After the period of cultural streamlining in the Third Reich, the founding years 
of the Federal Republic saw a flurry of activity by lobby groups, particularly in the arts. 
Industrial design, emerging as a new profession in Germany after World War II, 
competed for state funding with high culture. While the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
financially supported the arts, industrial design did not fall under their jurisdiction, being 
at the intersection of arts and production.119 The connections politicians drew between 
industrial interests and design considerations resulted in the subordination of the Rat für 
Formgebung under the Federal Ministry of Economics. Henceforth, this decision, 
primarily based on budget considerations, linked design to export promotion. In June 
1953 the West German Rat für Formgebung finally set to work in Darmstadt, Hesse, as a 
non-profit foundation of public utility under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics.120  With the exception of international exhibitions, West German economic 
interests, not the Werkbund’s cultural hegemony, outlined the state’s plan for the design 
council. This initial conflict in founding the design council continued to generate strong 
infighting until the Werkbund officially retreated from the Rat für Formgebung in 1968.  
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The second problem affected the make-up of the Rat für Formgebung. The 
original goal had been to create an advisory body of distinct personalities that took on 
cultural leadership in the young republic. Yet the Ministry of Economics soon abandoned 
this plan and, instead, pushed for including representatives from all economic fields. 
Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard (1949-1963, CDU) initially appointed sixteen 
designers and industrialists to the council. These appointments almost exclusively 
included Werkbund and esthete industrialists, indicating the state’s faith in industry as a 
partner in social reform. But Erhard appointed twenty more unsalaried consultants—
representatives of varying backgrounds such as crafts, labor unions, consumer 
organizations, and public administration to democratize the new institution—which 
started the discord between the government and the initial council members.121 The 
Werkbund especially objected the appointment of Eduard Schlafejew as director. 
Schlafejew had been a competent economic administrator under Erhard’s Ministry of 
Economics, which made him a “puppet of industry” and lacking in design expertise from 
the point of view of the Werkbund.122  Instead of an aesthetic mission then, the council 
would become a pawn for economic interests, a “second Federal Trade Office.”123 This, 
the Werkbund feared, would strip the design council of cultural assertiveness and 
diminish its leadership in the aesthetics of material culture.124 Lobbyist König, worried 
about a loss of control and influence, likened the situation to the Werkbund’s first 
experience with failing state-cooperation in the Weimar Republic under the Reich Art 
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Supervisor (Reichskunstwart).125 After more than a year of negotiations with the ministry 
and threats of withdrawal from the project altogether, the Werkbund chose the lesser of 
two evils and compromised. They accepted Schlafejew’s appointment on the condition 
that one of their own, long-time Werkbund members, Mia Seeger, would fill the position 
of general secretary. With her appointment, the Werkbund gained lasting artistic 
influence over the Rat für Formgebung. Seeger was an experienced “cultural broker of 
German modernism” whose expertise had been proven in her organizational work for 
important Werkbund exhibitions, most notably the 1927 Weissenhofsiedlung.126 In the 
end, instead of insisting on their vision for the design council and risking to alienate the 
ministry, leading Werkbund members decided to work within the ministerial framework, 
a framework that they believed to be a watered down version of their design 
institution.127  
The legal status of the design council remained contested within the Federal 
Republic. In a pamphlet introducing the council and its task, the presidium labeled it a 
government-initiated “self-administrated organization” instead of a state institution. Both 
the federal government and the Bundestag had operated “from the assumption that wide 
circles in the German economy will recognize the importance of industrial design and 
support it respectively.”128 Generally speaking, the Werkbund’s success in Bonn can be 
accredited to their connections to the economic elites represented in the Federation of 
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German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI). Its membership 
consisted of professional architects, designers, and urban planners who often worked 
closely with the industry. The progress made in production technology and methods 
prescribed private enterprise a broadening of political activism to include theoretical-
economic areas. After initial hesitation, the business community strongly supported the 
Rat für Formgebung. Leading industrialists, such as Siemens and AEG, set up a 
foundation “in support of design,” from which the design council drew some funds.129  
Through overlapping membership the BDI was well represented in the Werkbund 
and vice versa.130 This overlap in membership shows further how a small group of 
designers and entrepreneurs strove to exert influence over the artistic and economic 
policies in the inception of this national design institution. As the government 
increasingly set the terms in negotiations about the council in 1951 and 1952, industry 
looked for alternative means to promote their companies’ design. The BDI founded a 
project similar to the national design council, the Committee for Industrial Design 
(Arbeitskreis für Industrielle Formgebung) in 1952, illustrates this influential group’s 
multilayered efforts to realize their aesthetic and economic ambitions. Fourteen of the 
thirty-six associations represented by the BDI were present at the constituting assembly 
of the Arbeitskreis, which shows considerable interest for questions of form and design 
among industrialists. This initial success quickly resulted in the BDI’s involvement in a 
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second, much more practically involved area of activism in design.131 Gustav Stein, the 
BDI’s lawyer, became a prominent figure in this process as he pulled the strings behind 
the scenes by connecting potent and willing industrialists with the opportunity to 
advertise their wares – as long as they subscribed to the principles of Good Design. The 
BDI Arbeitskreis organized special shows of selected, well-designed products at the 
annual industrial fairs in Hannover, Frankfurt, and Cologne.132 To publicize their work, 
the BDI Arbeitskreis started the non-profit organization Industrial Shape (Industrieform) 
in the city of Essen, whose cause evolved around displaying well-designed goods.133 
These permanent exhibitions with industry-sponsored displays aimed at improving sales 
by educating the public about Good Design. Within three years of its opening in 
November 1955, more than 492,000 visitors saw the exhibition, which was put together 
by a jury headed by no other than Werkbund president Hans Schwippert.134 Such 
successes, showing the popular demand to learn about the features of modern appliances, 
encouraged the industry to retain its efforts alongside the design council throughout the 
economic miracle years and well into the 1960s. 
Perhaps this dual activism of entrepreneurs in both the Rat für Formgebung and 
the BDI Arbeitskreis caused the financial footing of the design council to remain a major 
problem. As mentioned before, in its inception the Rat took organizational cues from 
similar institutions in other countries. One of the reasons why the British design council 
impressed the initiators of the West German equivalent in particular was its stable 
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financials. The British Council of Industrial Design was a state-supported agency with a 
budget of over 6 million DM (West German Marks) of which the state provided 3.5 
million by 1967.135 The GDR, for comparison, financed its later design institution with 
state subsidies of 796,000 DDM (East German Marks136) in 1963, its first fiscal year.137 
In contrast, in the first five years after its inception in 1952/53, the West German Design 
Council received only 70,000 DM yearly.138 This amount grew steadily to 220,000 DM in 
1967 – still a fraction of the funds available to the British Council of Design and a less 
than a third of what the East German industrial designers had. Part of the problem was 
that the West German industry did not keep up with its formal promise to support the Rat 
für Formgebung financially in later years. This lack of continued commitment might have 
resulted from the success that industry-controlled initiatives, such as Industrieform, 
achieved. Industry’s initial dependence on the design council as a state institution seems 
to have decreased proportionally as the significance of the BDI projects increased. 
The years of 1950 through 1953 are therefore an important period for German 
state-guided industrial design. Though lacking constructive material results in either 
Germany, this period set the tracks for official aesthetics and established the structural 
parameters in which the design councils operated throughout the years of division. From 
the Rat für Formgebung’s inception, the Bonn Republic worked against any kind of 
centralist scheming, although the council’s mission was, paradoxically, all-encompassing 
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in design matters. Despite the limitations set by the state, for the Werkbund it was now or 
never. Ultimately, after decades of lobbying, 1950-53 were the years when the Werkbund 
goals finally intersected with state interests to create a modern identity for a German 
state. The Formalism Debate, which happened in the GDR at the very same time, had a 
similar effect on the design landscape in the East. The Institut für angewandte Kunst in 
Weissensee became a proponent of cultural Stalinism after Stam’s departure in 1953. But 
the GDR continued its efforts to centralize design, which eventually resulted in the same 
conceptual shift that had already come about in the West, allocating design as a part of 
the economic reorganization process. 
 
Institutionalization in the East: Regrouping after the Formalism Debate 
In the GDR, the creation of a central design institution comparable to the Rat für 
Formgebung began with the Weissensee Institut für Angewandte Kunst, which had been 
added to the Ministry of Culture as an advisory body in 1952. However, the practical 
implications of this institution under Heisig’s leadership remained limited and the 
archives are silent about its ability to guide the search for an East German national 
aesthetic.139 The necessary addition of another advisory body to the Ministry of Culture, 
the Council for Industrial Shape (Rat für Industrieform) in 1962, points toward the 
Weissensee institute’s weaknesses in the economic realm. Assigned to ensure the 
“implementation of state initiatives in the field of industrial design,” the council had to 
“supervise their realization through economic institutions, trade organizations and 
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specialized institutes.”140 The main objective was to bring design into agreement with 
state economic planning while complying with the principles of East German cultural 
politics. Located at the intersection of manifold economic processes, the representatives 
on the council included all sectors of the economy: up to 25 designers or representatives 
of analogous universities and specialized institutes, one representative each from the 
Ministry of Culture, the National Economic Council (Volkswirtschaftsrat), the State 
Planning Commission, the Ministry for Trade and Supply, the Ministry for Foreign Trade 
and inner-German Trade, the German Construction Academy, the German Office for 
Material and Product Testing, the Office for Standardization, the Association of German 
Fine Artists, the Chamber of Technology, and two to three representative from the 
People’s Owned Companies.141 Horst Michel became a member of the council’s board; 
Martin Kelm, the Mart Stam student who had been working in Halle, received the 
Minister of Culture’s call to serve on the council as a representative of a specialized 
institute after which he moved quickly onto the council’s board.142 
In contrast to the West, the East initially thought design to be purely a part of 
cultural issues in the development of a socialist society. The initial positioning of the Rat 
für Industrieform under the Ministry of Culture indicates that the East German 
government still categorized industrial design as applied arts and did not immediately see 
it as an asset to economic development in the early 1960s. This notion possibly originated 
with the country’s focus on heavy industry in the early years of reconstruction. To fulfill 
reparation payments to the Soviet Union while at the same time following the economic 
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principles that had catapulted the Soviet Union from an agricultural country to an 
industrial powerhouse, the GDR put most of its resources into coal mining and steel 
production.143 Yet after the experience of the June 17, 1953 workers’ uprising that spread 
like wild fire from Berlin throughout the country after the government raised construction 
quotas but failed to fulfill consumer demands, the Party became increasingly aware of the 
political dimension of consumer goods. Fulfilling demand became a way to gain public 
support through material means. Eight years later, the closing of the German-German 
border on August 13, 1961 heightened the political profile of consumer goods. By 
building the Wall as a manifestation of German division, the GDR not only kept its 
population from leaving, but also temporarily cut off the flow of western goods. This step 
actually aggravated the GDR’s consumption dilemma, because the Berlin Wall 
underscored the line between a prosperous Germany in the West and one pressed to fulfill 
basic consumer demands in the East. Accordingly, creating a distinct aesthetic in 
commodities different from the modern project in the West, increasingly became a means 
of working towards a national identity that could forge a feeling of belonging. 
International developments further contributed to a new attitude toward the ideological 
meaning of material culture. The policy of peaceful coexistence as “the new mode of 
global conflict” after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 revived the struggle for a socialist 
culture: “Peaceful coexistence has at its root the decisive, forceful battle against all 
manifestations of bourgeois ideology. Specific artistic problems are also to be classified 
in this broader political context.”144  
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At this critical point, Martin Kelm reinvigorated the Institut für angewandte Kunst 
and increased its political responsibilities under the name “Zentralinstitut für 
Formgestaltung” in 1963. Kelm thus returned from his artistic exile in Halle to Berlin and 
brought new vigor and control in the centralized efforts to direct industrial design.145 
Shortly thereafter, the Zentralinstitut with Kelm as its head began its ascent to 
prominence within the East German planned economy, foreshadowing the eventual 
success of functionalist design within East Germany’s production industries. Although 
the earlier Rat für Industrieform was the first attempt at creating an advisory body that 
connected all areas of the East German economic apparatus, the Ministry of Culture had 
no control over economic planning. Meanwhile, the Zentralinstitut was the first East 
German government body committed to forging a cohesive aesthetic with increasing 
influence in the planning process. Throughout the 1960s, industrial design proceeded to 
become more deeply anchored in the economic structures of the GDR.146 In 1965, the 
Zentralinstitut moved to an institution dedicated to standardization and product testing, 
the German Office for Standardization and Product Testing (Deutsches Amt für 
Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW) together with the council, which was renamed 
“Rat für Gestaltung”. The transfer from the Ministry of Culture to the DAMW signaled a 
significant change in perception of industrial design’s role in East Germany’s economy. 
Rather than being thought of as a beautification of products, politicians began to see 
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industrial design as part of a scientifically measurable process to enhance products and to 
make them competitive in the international market.  
 
The Politics of Design 
The putsch deposing Walter Ulbricht from power in 1971 facilitated Kelm’s next 
step up the career ladder. The new first party secretary General Erich Honecker changed 
the Zentralinstitut into a government institution in its own right in 1972 and renamed it 
“Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung.” Kelm had already become a member of the 
Council of Ministers with the Zentralinstitut‘s 1965 transition to the DAMW, but as the 
director of the institute he officially became part of the economic planning apparatus. 
Given the far-reaching implications of his authority in design decisions, Rubin concludes: 
“Kelm now had power over other ministers of the economy, and was elevated to the 
position of State Secretary, making him almost untouchable by any aesthetic 
criticism.”147 Two laws ensured that the central design institution remained the main 
arbiter of taste in the GDR.  First, the 1965 law that required all People-Owned 
Companies (Volkseigene Betriebe, VEB) in the production industries to employ designers 
and, second, the 1973 law that obliged all factories to “‘outsource” their industrial 
designing work exclusively to the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung became crucial 
stepping stones for Kelm’s lasting influence over East German industrial design and the 
tipping point of the power scale in favor of the functionalists.148 
The possibilities of one-party rule and the mechanisms of the planned economy 
enabled Kelm’s increasing hold on power. Contrary to the competitive associational 
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environment that shifted cultural leadership in the West, SED nomenclature added to the 
upward mobility and endurance of GDR office-holders.149 Günther Mittag, a member of 
the Politbüro since 1958 and Secretary of Economics in the Central Committee since 
1962, took Kelm under his wing. Mittag oversaw Kelm’s dissertation about the role of 
industrial design in socialism and vouched for his party credentials as well as his 
aesthetic vision for a socialist way of living.150 Meanwhile, passionate socialists like 
Selman Selmanagic, the director of the Weissensee School, felt that Kelm betrayed 
socialist cultural principles. Selmanagic summarized his low opinion of Kelm’s 
qualification in industrial design: “Unfortunately, it’s the case here [in the GDR, the 
author] that Kelm pats himself on the back self-congratulatory. But nobody knows him. 
And when I see objects, I see where he finds his inspiration. That upsets me as a 
comrade. I want that the capitalists to copy from us, and not we from them. That is my 
goal, but I did not reach it, unfortunately.”151 Whereas not many people in the GDR 
design scene took notice of Kelm for his artistic vision, he definitely was known to the 
political elites as an excellent bureaucrat with good connections. Kelm thus personally 
benefited from the standardization of industrial design and its separation from the arts in 
the East.  
Nevertheless, Kelm’s ascend to power completely contradicted GDR cultural 
policy. As logical as the relocation of the Zentralinstitut under the DAMW may have 
sounded in the general climate of standardization and production streamlining, an 
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exclusively linear interpretation of this event as the ‘natural’ outcome in the East’s 
progress toward economical production would undervalue the ideological determination 
among the political elite. The earlier, triumph over the struggle against kitsch, 
spearheaded by designers like Michel who were trained in the tradition of Weimar 
modernism, show that the ideologist had the power to dominate cultural debates. In fact, 
the party apparatus was painfully aware of the ideological inconsistencies among the 
industrial designers. In 1964, the Culture Department at the Central Committee reported 
attitudinal problems among the Ministry of Culture’s industrial designers: “Revisionist 
attacks from the applied arts against the cultural policies of the Party are supported by 
some of the Zentralinstitut für Gestaltung members of staff.” With openly functionalist 
arguments, the industrial designers argued “against a connection between applied arts and 
our socialist ideology as well as the designer’s task to work according to the newly 
developing aesthetic necessities of socialist men.”152 Fearing that these challenges from 
within would unhinge applied arts from the “edifice of socialist aesthetics” and could 
even result in attacks on the principles of Socialist Realism in the fine arts, the Culture 
Department demanded adequate strictness to get the Zentralinstitut back in Party line. In 
a way, Kelm and his unruly institute thus were kicked upstairs to avoid further meddling 
in cultural politics, though the Culture Department knew that “the supporters of this 
wrong opinion will interpret the Zentralinstitut breaking away from the Ministry of 
Culture as a confirmation of their opinion.”153 It becomes clear that the SED never 
entirely succeeded in controlling the aesthetic-ideological vision in the field of industrial 
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design. There was room for practical arguments that favored functionalism because of its 
more economical use of resources and production facilities objecting to the 
embellishments in Stalinist aesthetics. Eli Rubin argues that the Party realigned its 
aesthetics as early as 1953 with the events of June 17th.154 Yet rather than a change in 
official policy, what one can detect here is a softening of aesthetic guidelines in practice, 
not in discourse. The Culture Department’s conflict with the industrial designers about 
socialist cultural principles points to a (ideologically and discursively) well and vibrant 
Socialist Realism. It seems that a practical dilution of cultural Stalinism falls into the 
early 1960s, in correlation with Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization during the Thaw.155 
Kelm became a member of the Council of Ministers in 1964 and advanced to a good 
standing with Erich Honecker, whose personal secretary was Kelm’s wife. His 
minimalistic vision for interior design, however, was not yet trend-setting in the GDR. It 
took another decade until Kelm was able to design the interiors of Honecker’s state 
guesthouses using nothing other than Bauhaus furniture.156 
Whereas East Germany experimented with different German styles in the first two 
postwar decades, the Federal Republic developed its national aesthetic slowly, 
continuously testing international reaction. International representation was at the core of 
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the Rat für Formgebung’s mission and it took most of the 1950s until they arrived at a 
clear vision of their moral message. The design council dismissed the international style 
of Nierentisch organicism, which was very popular in West Germany, and instead created 
a design style that was grouped around functionalist principles. Tracking the aesthetic 
development from the 1954 Milan Triennial, the 1957 Milan Triennial, and the 1958 
World Exposition in Brussels, one can see an increasing emphasis on humility and 
transparency distinct from the monumental architecture and folkloristic home design had 
become the aesthetic legacy of the Third Reich.157 The number of arts and crafts objects 
shrunk while a growing number of industrial designed goods were put on display (see 
figure 4). Betts assesses this aesthetic as functionalism that blended old and new 
Sachlichkeit.158 By the late 1950s, the materials featured in the German pavilion at 
Brussels were clean and modern, such as glass, tubular steel, concrete, and wood.159 
While eyed with suspicions by the national media, this new, subdued West German 
aesthetic won acclaim from the foreign press. Captivated by its “spiritual functionalism,” 
the London Times hailed the German Pavilion at Brussels as elegant, transparent, and 
radiant.160 West German simplicity, and, most importantly for its diplomatic value, 
openness won international recognition. These three groundbreaking exhibitions affirmed 
that the West German linkage between industrial design and antifascism worked in the 
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international arena, setting new standards for how West Germany utilized interior design 
and architecture to communicate its postwar identity.161    
The work of the West German Rat für Formgebung, however, came to a complete 
standstill between 1964 and 1965. The government’s uneasiness about cultural centralism 
limited the opportunities for unified industrial design in the West, a situation drastically 
different from the place that East Germany’s design institutions held in its state 
apparatus. As early as 1960, as Christopher Oestereich has noted, the Federal Republic’s 
government was reluctant to turn the design council into an exclusively public agency.162 
Business involvement and private sponsoring remained a prerequisite for the continuation 
of the design council. Yet, with its existence threatened by the lack of governmental and 
industrial financial commitment, the president of the Rat für Formgebung, Ernst 
Schneider, acting also as the president of the BDI Arbeitskreis persuaded the designers in 
the institution that only a merger with the industry’s Arbeitskreis could solve its financial 
and personnel crisis by showing a united front. In 1965 Schneider wrote to the Minister 
of Economics Kurt Schmücker (CDU, 1963-1966) regarding his conviction that the 
council would be able to tackle its growing challenges given a new organizational and 
financial basis. Schneider put the council’s national significance in a global perspective: 
“The idea that the German Rat für Formgebung fulfills a socio-political function has been 
recognized as a state task and honored as such in the Federal Republic as well as in many 
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other industrial countries.”163 But the government refused more funds pointing to the 
responsibility of the specific industries, which would financially benefit from the 
council’s work. With no bargaining power vis-à-vis the government, the council 
attempted to work the Cold War angle between East and West Germany to attain more 
state funding. Yet even comparisons with the GDR’s well-financed design institution 
apparently lacked political sway. The negotiations and mutual blaming resulted in a new 
constitution for the design council, in which the Arbeitskreis attained administrative 
control over the Rat für Formgebung. Werkbund members feared that the design council 
would be sidestepped and felt their cultural ideals betrayed by industry interests.  
In June 1967, the Rat für Formgebung sent a report to the Ministry of Economics 
assessing different options for reorganization and extension of its responsibilities. The 
ministry, though, found that the work of the last three years had been ineffective (only 
two thirds of the budget was put to use in 1966 and likewise in 1967) and saw little 
promise for success in the changes proposed by the council. The Minister of Economics, 
Karl Schiller (SPD, 1966-1972), and his staff identified the council’s personnel structures 
as the true impediment for successful restructuring.164 The personnel problems of the 
Design Council culminated in a public fall-out between the Werkbund and the BDI 
Arbeitskreis in 1968-9. The Werkbund maintained publicly that the Design Council had 
been “swallowed by the industry (von der Industrie geschluckt worden).” In a transition 
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period, the BDI and the Werkbund shared leadership in the council.165 Yet, the Werkbund 
demanded a “complete institutional and personnel separation” from the Arbeitskreis and 
reassertion of the Rat für Formgebung’s democratic legitimacy.166 Instead, the 
organizational structures, including Ernst Schneider’s joint presidency of both 
institutions, remained unchanged.167 As a result, the Werkbund publicly stepped away 
from the design council in the summer of 1969. The Werkbund board of managers 
published a statement lamenting that “the Werkbund cannot identify with the Rat für 
Formgebung as it once had been able to” under the given circumstances.168 The feeling 
was mutual. A promotional pamphlet that the design council produced two decades later 
in 1989 to inform the general public about its history made this evident by completely 
omitting the Werkbund’s integral role in the inception of the design council.169 
In a parallel development, functionalism as a socio-political and moral agenda 
underwent a crisis. The HfG Ulm presents a prime example of the institutional 
repercussions caused by this change in intellectual climate. Ulm, having developed a 
dogmatism of austerity that became its trademark for success in the years of want, 
suddenly faced strong public criticism, which became its eventual downfall during a 
period of increased consumption in the 1960s.170 Situated on the Kuhberg Mountain, a 
hill overseeing the city, the school was not only physically, but also conceptually 
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removed from the life of the people “below” them. The HfG Ulm nevertheless 
represented an institutional stronghold of die-hard functionalism that correlated with the 
Design Council’s aesthetic postwar vision for a liberal Federal Republic. Neglecting 
popular taste and consumer demands, Ulm found itself increasingly criticized in the 
press.171 Especially a highly critical article about the institute in the West German 
political magazine Der Spiegel caused the Baden-Württemberg government to review its 
financial commitment to the school.172 These tensions in the relationship between Ulm’s 
design principles and wider societal trends led to the loss of funding from the regional 
government in 1968 which resulted in the institute’s closing in November of that year. 
The criticism of Ulm was not a singular instance of popular critique vis-à-vis elite 
institutions in general and functionalism in particular.173 1967/68 saw worldwide social 
change that expressed the end of a democratic consensus, which in Germany the HfG 
Ulm and the Rat für Formgebung claimed to materially express in their functionalist 
aesthetics. The closing of the Ulm institute marked the disillusion with the reformist and 
moral power of functionalism as a distinct West German aesthetic.  
 
Conclusion 
Postwar Germany’s institutionalization of industrial design offers insights into 
more than the challenges of reconstruction. It also reflected larger concerns of the Cold 
War division: competition for cultural leadership in Germany, the alignment with the 
Western and Eastern Blocs respectively, and a way to create integrative concepts for 
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popular identification with the new states. Most successfully, though, it expressed a 
cultural policy of demarcation in the German Question, affirming that unification had 
moved out of reach. The subsequent aesthetics, functionalism in the West and 
Gründerzeit styles in the East, were thought of expressions of official national culture. 
However, the political means with which they approached this problem differed between 
the two German states. Party control in the East led to a system of personal patronage that 
suppressed a truly socialist conception of the material environment. Meanwhile, the 
Federal Republic’s parliamentary debate and questions of state subsidies resulted in an 
associational battle for institutional control. These structural, financial, and political 
challenges contributed to watered-down versions of the initial institutional goals in the 
GDR and the Federal Republic alike. Whereas the initial commitment to a certain 
aesthetic became evident in the political battles won by cultural elites in the early 1950s, 
both the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung and the Rat für Formgebung underwent 
drastic changes that did not stop short of ending aesthetic visions.  
Having considered these specifics of the politicization and institutionalization of 
industrial design in postwar Germany, Walter Gropius’ 1967 plea for institutionalized 
industrial design becomes more comprehensible. He reconnected with his home country 
at a time when domestic forces contested the legacy of the Bauhaus and the Werkbund 
movement.  In the Federal Republic, the official financial commitment to the Institute of 
Design in Ulm and the Rat für Formgebung collapsed. Both strongholds of functionalist 
design suffered institutional blows exacerbated by the general crisis of functionalism in 
West Germany of the mid-1960s. At that time, the GDR aesthetics only began to develop 
into a modern direction. The ascent of functionalists like Kelm and Michel successively 
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hollowed out Socialist Realism from within the state apparatus, but until the mid-1960s, 
political elites held on to cultural Stalinism as official aesthetics in the East. Yet as the 
reconstruction years came to an end, the protest movements of 1968 challenged the 
political purity that functionalism had occupied in the West and the Prague Spring 
disillusioned true believers in communism in the East. These events put two decades of 
overcoming the Nazi past and German-German demarcation into question.  
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CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRIAL DESIGN AND THE GERMAN QUESTION’S 
SOCIAL DIMENSION 
Introduction 
At a time when Germany was in the process of democratizing itself, the 
Werkbund initiative for a design council was only one attempt among many to find an 
all-German (gesamtdeutsche) aesthetic. Werkbund member Wilhelm Wagenfeld, one of 
Germany’s most influential Bahaus-trained designers who had recently left the East, 
initiated a similar institution in the new state of Baden-Württemberg.174 In this context, 
he warned the state administration in 1949: “I am from Berlin and, therefore, from the 
Germany beyond the zone border. I have seen that we can counter the East only with a 
new intellectual world and, thus, with new social empathy [neues soziales Empfinden] 
and thinking.”175 Wagenfeld understood the intellectual appeal of socialism as he himself 
held leftist political views and had remained loyal to the Werkbund mission that 
promoted designers’ social responsibility. Most importantly though, by suggesting that 
Western material culture was inscribed with moral meaning, Wagenfeld opened up a new 
way of thinking about design in the context of the German Question. Specifically, he 
pointed to the need for a deeper rethinking of social and cultural structures to counter the 
lure of socialist material collectivism. At the same time, his remarks show that industrial 
design became a competitive field in the German Cold War, which contoured the West 
German discourse in contrast to the quickly developing socialist alternative in the East. 
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More than a loose assemblage of voices, discourse between politicians, designers 
and cultural critics grappled with the meaning of these aesthetics in the everyday. In the 
early reconstruction years, elites had focused on pronounced national aesthetics for 
political rather than social purposes. Alongside the cultural identification with the West, 
such aesthetics expressed Adenauer’s “policy of strength” on the German Question, 
based on the logic that Westbindung, rearmament and membership in the NATO would 
eventually bring about German unification. In reaction to Bonn’s position, the GDR 
followed a policy of demarcation from the West by showing allegiance to the Eastern 
Bloc both ideologically and culturally. However, when one examines design discourse 
beyond initial bloc alliances, it becomes evident that the ideologically loaded Cold War 
climate limited the elite’s ability to inscribe material culture with a spirit of social reform.  
To understand how material necessity related to social ideas, this analysis of 
German design discourse under capitalism and socialism is interested in the actual 
communication of aesthetic principles to the population. While the Federal Republic tied 
large parts of its material culture to the Werkbund reform ideals of the interwar years, the 
philosophical underpinnings of this aesthetic were lost on many onlookers. Meanwhile, 
the GDR reached back to the late nineteenth century, a time of stark social stratification, 
expansionism, and aesthetics reminiscent of Prussian classicism. However, while GDR 
politicians and designers tried to inscribe material culture with socialist humanist values, 
the systemic political and economic centralization effort soon overshadowed any 
philosophical interest in a more humane material environment. How did the two German 
states and their cultural representatives navigate these contradictions on a discursive 
level? What did these prescriptive visions of domestic modernity mean for the 
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populations’ everyday life as an integral part of cultural rebirth? More specifically, did 
Germans still know how to live in their homes, rather than to purely inhabit them? These 
concerns became a pivotal point of the German public discourse, centering on the place 
of emotions in opposition to rationality and technological progress that came with 
economic modernization. The decoration of interiors in particular featured in the 
discourse of emotional reaction to shapes and colors in material culture. Theoretically, 
privacy and emotionality replaced the public “aesthetics of power” of 1930s Nazi 
Germany.176 Yet this personal dimension of official design aesthetic faded into the 
background as larger questions of economic reconstruction and delineation in the German 
Question became more urgent.  
 
Social Discomfort of Reconstruction Design 
Wagenfeld’s warning to the Baden-Württemberg administration echoed West 
German intellectuals’ early anti-fascist campaigns for a complete break with the German 
past. Their vision included an alternative material and social philosophy in West 
Germany, one that stood in opposition to the so-called war-mongering forces of 
nationalism and capitalism. Coming from the left political spectrum, they envisioned a 
social revolution, which would give birth to a humanized, non-Marxist Germany in the 
middle of a united Europe. These intellectuals saw the potential for cultural rebirth in 
Germany through the young generation and “its perceived condition of alienation from 
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the German past.”177 Yet this radical new beginning did not occur.  The Weimar 
generation took control in Bonn, marginalized the antifascists, and established a capitalist 
economic system with the help of the Western Allies. In turn, they brought with them 
aesthetics that evoked the cultural elitism of their interwar prime. Aesthetics, then, 
became just another issue where the political leadership both avoided a confrontation 
with the legacy of the Third Reich and ignored the opportunity for necessary socio-
cultural remaking of Germany. 
The West German Bauhaus Debate in 1953 reflected similar concerns in the realm 
of architecture. Church architect Rudolf Schwarz started the debate when he rejected 
Bauhaus rationalism for the rebuilding of Germany.178 He targeted especially radically 
leftist practices and avant-garde projects, while promoting a conservative “modernism of 
the middle.”179 These ideas, however, were hardly new and Schwarz attacks failed 
because his contemporaries recognized his arguments from political battles that had been 
fought over the closing of the Bauhaus in the Third Reich.180 However, participants in the 
1950s discourse on architecture and design developed an underlying uneasiness about 
functionalism as a revisionist official aesthetic. The debate evolved around the digression 
of functionalism from a social program aimed at reforming societal stratification through 
material uplift into an iconic form, a style that covered up persisting social relationships. 
As Frederic J. Schwartz noted, in the public sphere of the FRG, Bauhaus modernism 
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served as shorthand for everything that National Socialism opposed.181 Accordingly, this 
invention offered postwar designers safe aesthetic references that distinguished West 
Germany culturally from the Third Reich. On the one hand, this enabled both 
theoreticians and practitioners of design to circumvent any serious consideration of social 
function.  However, functionalism’s association with an untainted past made it difficult 
for the intellectual elite to critique the aesthetic and its political utilization. Associated 
with western democratic values, Schwartz concludes, Bauhaus aesthetics left the FRG 
without the necessary reference points, concepts or terminology to move beyond its 
past.182 Caught between its history and the communist alternative in the East, West 
Germany faced more than a rhetorical problem – the discourse warranted a new language 
that carried social significance. 
The lack of a material philosophy informed by the social dimension greatly 
affected the way West German design politicians communicated the everyday merits of 
official postwar domestic culture. Early exhibitions struggled to persuade the population 
that they should welcome functionalist furniture into their homes. A pragmatic 
terminology developed that had no social reference point, but rather echoed wartime 
appeals for perseverance. One of the first exhibitions that proposed a new West German 
Wohnkultur went up in Stuttgart in 1949. How to dwell? (wie wohnen?) was a 
collaboration of the regional Werkbund with the local chamber of commerce. 
Acknowledging popular ambitions of home ownership in his contribution to the 
exhibition catalog, the chamber’s deputy president wrote: “A house for the family is the 
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dream of many. Rightfully so! A people that cultivates domestic culture does not give up 
on itself.”183 Given postwar reality of bombed out urban areas, however, the attentive 
reader also learned that, for the time being, Germans had to content themselves with 
smaller apartments. “The occurring changes require completely different things. […] The 
small apartment is not transitional, it is constant.”184 The hardships of the changed 
housing situation engendered nostalgia for a comfortable past that the war had put out of 
reach. In an effort to make their new apartments feel like home, many West Germans 
acquired furnishings that reminded them of better times, much to the disdain of design 
politicians. Their consumption choices, guided by sentimentality rather than the actual 
limitations of the postwar situation, only confirmed the Werkbund in its task of regulating 
consumption. Advancing a practical attitude toward furnishings, the exhibition catalog 
promoted the advantages of modern materials such as glass, metal and plastics in 
furniture design. To illustrate their point, the organizers chose Egon Eiermann’s wicker 
chair.  A light but uncomfortable piece, Eiermann’s chair would be featured in the 
German pavilion at the Brussels World Exposition years later in 1958, to embody this 
break with an iconic past.  
Rather than embracing the challenge of instilling material culture with the means 
for reform, even Werkbund members, once firm in the terminology of social uplift, 
struggled to describe any underlying welfare concepts of West Germany’s striving 
Wohnkultur. In anticipation of the 1957 Interbau architecture exposition in Berlin, a 
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milestone in international modern public housing construction, the Rat für Formgebung 
showed the furnishings for one of the projected apartments at H55, an interior design 
summit in Swedish Hälsingborg. Instead of explaining how the exhibited solutions would 
improve living conditions for the masses, however, some Werkbund members voiced 
frustration with the exhibition’s limitations that had resulted in the jury’s design choices. 
For example, Mia Seeger limited her description of the presented interior design solutions 
to the fact that both the exhibition space and the requirement to display exclusively 
serially manufactured products had restricted the German committee to space-saving 
furniture.185 
 With her professional expertise, Seeger should have been able to articulate the 
new West German social outlook in design, had there been one. At Erhard’s request, 
Seeger became a member of the Rat für Formgebung in 1951 and became its first 
executive manager of in 1954.186 She had earned her place as an organizer and juror 
among progressive architects and designers during a long assistantship with the Stuttgart 
Werkbund office before the Second World War.187 However, her expertise only 
underscored the social ignorance of West German domestic culture in the H55 catalog. 
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Other European countries, particularly in Scandinavia, were much more advanced in 
respect to public housing and general welfare. In comparison, the West German 
application of interwar modernism looked insubstantial. It had lost the reform component 
that once propelled the members of New Objectivity and Neues Bauen to the top ranks of 
Europe’s leftist visionaries.  
German intellectuals from the political left, motivated by the general population’s 
rising concerns about capitalism’s shortcomings over the course of the 1960s, reignited 
the critique of its material markers. The Cold War’s escalating arms race and the politics 
of nuclear deterrence had shown that trade and collective prosperity failed to fulfill the 
promise of world peace.188 Modernist design began to stand for this failure of a 
humanistic capitalist order. In his 1965 critique of “functionalism Today” at the annual 
Werkbund conference, leftist philosopher Theodor Adorno discussed the emptiness of 
postwar modernism.189 He historicized the functionalist rejection of ornamentation, 
emphasizing that one era’s indispensible design feature could easily turn into obsolete 
ornamentation for the next generation.190 To Adorno, its negative historicism uncovered 
functionalism as a political dogma. The prescriptive idea inherent in functionalism, the 
defined relationship between form and utility, Adorno argued, rendered the functionalist 
object “unfree.” To include society into the process of cultural reinscription, he suggested 
to open up materiality to unknown functions, thus yielding more humane objects.  
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As the debate continued, the design periodical Form published a series of articles 
that became increasingly critical of functionalism over the following years. This 
discourse highlighted some decisive shortcomings in the first inception of functionalism. 
One fundamental problem was that the designers considered to have fathered 
functionalism, Henri Labrouste and Louis Sullivan, who coined the term “Form follows 
function,” had never actually defined what function meant: the practicable, the useful or 
the technically optimized?191 On closer examination, functionalism started to look more 
like an ideology than an aesthetic truth. Contributors to this design discourse demanded 
the sacrifice of the “sacred cows” of functionalism. By 1969, the Form pronounced 
“grandpa’s functionalism” dead. 192  
The legacy of functionalism’s shaky foundation, however, did not end here. The 
Weimar designer generation’s inability to address the social function of design multiplied 
through its teaching, thereby created generations of “socially unconscious” designers. 
Germany’s only educational institution founded on the assumption that material culture 
necessarily represented political consciousness, the Hochschule für Gestaltung in Ulm, 
closed its doors in 1968. Even if the school had remained open, its functionalist 
dogmatism had lost its attraction by the late 1960s.193 In the first postwar generation, 
many industrial designers had a practical background in the crafts. Rolf Heide, one of the 
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most influential neo-functionalist designers in Germany to date, began his career in 1950 
as a cabinet-maker.194 He studied architecture at the Muthesiusschule in Kiel, which was 
named after one of the Werkbund founders Hermann Muthesius. His colleague Peter 
Maly followed a similar path.195 When asked about the social vision behind their designs, 
both responded that a consideration of social function was not important to their design 
process. Rather, they made things to be beautiful, not socially responsible.196 Maly and 
Heide embodied the absence of a social philosophy in the West German discourse on 
material culture.  
At the end of the 1960s, it becomes clear that functionalism, with its fetishization 
of geometric forms, had been uncovered as being inherently production oriented, while 
ignoring the consumer. At the same time that Bonn withdrew its commitment to the Rat 
für Formgebung, the FRG grew unable to conceal its decision to follow a less humane 
economic program. In an effort to salvage the national functional aesthetic, the debate 
moved on to consider Adorno’s proposed extended functionalism (erweiterter 
Funktionalismus), one that designs objects to serve humanity rather than maltreat it with 
sharp edges.197 Wagenfeld had worried that the Federal Republic on its path toward 
capitalism would lose sight of the significance of materiality. This concern had not only 
manifested itself in the language of functionality, but also multiplied through the 
teachings of his contemporaries. To theoreticians and practitioners of design, these 
                                                 
194 Josef Kremerskothen, “Wohnen wie noch nie,” in Rolf Heide – Designer, Architekt, Querdenker, ed. 
Dirk Meyhöfer (Ludwigsburg: Avedition, 2000), 13. 
195 He entered his cabinet-maker apprenticeship in 1955 and later moved on to study at the technical college 
for interior design in Detmold. Josef Kremerskothen, “Wegstücke,” in Peter Maly, Designermonographien 
5, ed. Alex Buck and Matthias Vogt (Frankfurt a.M.: Form, 1998), 18. 
196 Peter Maly in discussion with the author, 6 May 2009. Rolf Heide in discussion with the author, 5 May 
2009. 
197 See Adorno, “Funktionalismus heute,” 8.024; Hartmut Seeger, “Syntaktik und Semantik,” Form 
46/1969, 34-36. 
  
84 
conclusions presented a disillusioning bottom line to two decades of reconstruction 
discourse and its failure to instill West German material culture with an agenda that stood 
for human improvement. Any motivation to think about the human aspect of design, it 
seemed, originated from the socialist German alternative across the border.   
Within socialism, designers intrinsically considered how their designs improved 
the human condition. At the center stood the new socialist man and his material 
environment, a theoretical and practical challenge for socialist societies since the 
constructivism of the 1920s. Yet in the case of the German postwar socialism, the line 
between collectivist theory and individualistic practice was blurred. West German 
economic success, along with the legitimacy that the Federal Republic derived from it, 
forced the GDR to soft-peddle on the question of consumer goods in order to convince 
the population of the merits of socialism.  
In an effort to culturally align with the Soviet Union and to differentiate itself 
from the Federal Republic, Ulbricht purged Weimar modernism and its disciples from 
cultural and educational institutions between 1951 and 1954. The “Formalism Debate” 
established a cultural consensus supportive of German cultural heritage, in contrast to 
“artless and cosmopolitan” modernism in the West. While Socialist Realism became the 
main artistic expression in the GDR, its backwardness often produced products that taste 
reformer Horst Michel described as Kitsch. In the applied arts, historical styles such as 
Rococo, Classicism, and Biedermeier inspired the cultural rebirth of the East German 
state. This style also favored ornamentation over functionality and hygiene – an 
especially important aspect for household wares. After dealing with the scarcity of 
furniture in the late 1940s, the 1950s reintroduced personal comfort (Behaglichkeit) into 
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the discourse.198 Kitsch and petty-bourgeois coziness (Gemütlichkeit) were privileged 
over economic considerations and production ethics. His self-appointed mission to 
provide the GDR with honest, unassuming designs seemed jeopardized by the very 
policies that the Party decreed. From the beginning, Michel was at odds with the new 
culture doctrine. Already in late 1950, he stated that “the person who buys Rococo china 
in 1950 shows bad taste.”199 He reiterated this position in 1952 at the first conference for 
interior design at the Deutsche Bauakademie: “This [cultural policy] cannot end in 
providing “princely” furniture to the working people. We shouldn’t talk them into things 
that look like bourgeois riches, instead we need to give them real riches that serve 
humanity.”200  
With such a contrary view on socialist material culture, it is somewhat surprising 
that Michel remained an influential figure of national importance. His work gained 
recognition abroad in 1957 when the West German Institut für neue technische Form in 
Darmstadt organized an exhibition that featuring the designs of Michel and his Weimar 
colleagues. West German designers perceived Weimar’s designs as the East’s “return” to 
functional shapes, celebrating the emergence of a “functionalist German style” on both 
sides of the German-German border.201 However, this was a premature celebration of a 
shared aesthetics. At the Culture Conference of 1957, the SED renewed the claim for a 
“socialist-realist culture.” It declared cultural work a political mass phenomenon for the 
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working population, a view contrary to the elitism in the West. The following year the 
political leadership connected cultural renewal with its economic goals and “declared” a 
cultural revolution for the victory of socialism at the fifth SED Party Congress 1958 in 
East Berlin.  
In the spring of the following year, the Bitterfeld Conference, a conference of 
writers with representatives of the government, the Party, workers, and the intelligentsia, 
discussed the prospects of assimilating workers and peasants into Socialist Realism. A 
resulting politico-cultural program that aimed at overcoming the previous detachment 
between the arts and workers became known as the Bitterfelder Weg.202 This new attitude 
diffused through all areas of the state, even the economy. By holding official industrial 
design competitions across industrial sectors, economic planners attempted to include the 
working people in the process of finding a socialist culture that corresponded to the needs 
and taste of the population.203  In this way, they believed, waste and kitsch would be 
avoided. At Bitterfeld, Ulbricht himself spoke about the evils of kitsch, calling it the 
“heritage of capitalism,” implying that profit-oriented mass production ignored cultural 
responsibility.204 In the same vein, Michel wrote the pamphlet The Industrial Designer on 
the Bitterfeld Path (Der Industrieformgestalter auf dem Bitterfelder Weg), in which he 
criticized the lack of cooperation between designers and workers in socialist production. 
Arguing that only the laborers truly knew their needs, Michel maintained that the state 
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should rely on them to eliminate the production of “commodities that do not comply with 
our Zeitgeist. Bourgeois kitsch, modernist Formalism, decadence and snobbism are not 
befitting for us.”205 The Bitterfelder Weg pursued a more holistic approach to mass 
production, implying the possibility of responsible socialist manufacturing.   
Meanwhile, economic planners struggled with the implications of economic 
socialism for the consumption of the population. This discourse developed parallel to the 
cultural debates at the Bitterfeld Conference and tried to bring centralization, 
rationalization, and standardization in line with the level of cultural significance that 
Ulbricht had required. Fearing that a rigid restructuring of production would flatten the 
cultural value in socialist materiality, the question of how to retain a “domestic culture 
despite standardization” arose.206 At the occasion of the first standardization show in 
Leipzig in 1959-1960, the GDR interior design journal Kultur im Heim initiated a 
prophylactic discussion to combat the impression that standardization would necessarily 
lead to uniform apartment furnishings.207 Alongside pictures of the first standardized 
living room furniture sets, the journal asked its readers “Would you have guessed that 
these are standardized pieces?” However, no matter how tasteful the execution, 
standardization and assortment streamlining (Sortimentsbereinigung) logically resulted in 
limited choices for consumers. 
To quell consumer discontent, the Zentralinstitut needed to justify the monotony 
caused by standardization. By introducing leftist cultural intellectual Giulio Carlo Argan 
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into the debate, designers and policymakers tried to reconcile the paradox of uniformity 
with individuality. Designer and Zentralinstitut employee Ekkehard Bartsch quoted 
Argan’s formalistic critique of Weimar modernity, stating “when industry exclusively 
reproduced shapes that were meant for crafts, that is as singular pieces, monotony 
resulted from the repetition of these formal specialties.” On the contrary, he argued, 
standardization celebrated the generalized shape because “the machine has no other job 
than to make a thousand pieces of it” and thus “identity and not uniformity results, 
because every object will keep the character of an original.”208 According to this 
interpretation, uniformity was only present in form because of its assigned function. 
Identity, on the other hand, was inherent in standardization, because it was left to the 
owner to ascribe a product’s specific function, thus leaving the object to fulfill individual 
expectations:  
The individual can develop freely and creatively only on the basis of standardized 
production. Only when humans stop seeing the fruits of their material ambitions 
as a marker of their social status and attitude will they finally be able to benefit 
from technological innovation. Products become real servants of his [sic] 
existence, he himself stands in the center, not his supporting equipment.209  
This position had much in common with Adorno’s suggestion for an extended 
functionalism that considered the human being. In other words, the FRG and the GDR 
faced very different challenges in changing social relations through material culture, but, 
by the mid-1960s, they arrived at similar ways of thinking about the place of objects in 
industrial society. 
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In practice, however, GDR planners and designers soon realized that the 
production and efficiency-oriented organization of mass serial production rendered a 
small number of furniture models ubiquitous. This, in turn, led to the feared “moral 
deterioration” (“moralischer Verschleiß”) of the individual designs and thus a loss of 
their cultural identity.210 The challenge here was to find a happy medium between 
industrial productivity and socio-cultural demands. It was neither in the interest of the 
GDR leadership nor its goal to make public and private life entirely uniform – the GDR 
always wanted to keep the appearance of a dictatorship with a human face. 
A concept for a GDR design retrospective under the working title “From Bauhaus 
to Bitterfeld” (Vom Bauhaus bis Bitterfeld) attempted to describe design around 1960. 
Yet even the design politicians involved in these decisions could not sufficiently explain 
the ambiguity of GDR design politics of the early 1960s, because of the blurry line 
between official design verdict and production reality. 211 While the diversity of 
permissible forms increased again, some formal, if arbitrary, limits continued to exist, as 
the later generation of designer discovered. They unsuccessfully tried to make sense of 
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official distain for designer Hubert Petras cylindrical, plain white vases, which had been 
exhibited at the fifth Dresden Art Exhibition in 1962: “The strict, compromise-less 
cylinder shapes delineated themselves from shallow industrial mass production. Yet 
officials agreed that they run counter to the optimistic attitude towards life of a civilized 
people with a happy future.”212 Each object thus was judged on its own merit, without 
considering the context. Only in 1965 did the Zentralinstitut put on an exhibition that 
featured multiple objects in completed interior design settings. Titled Modern Dwelling 
(Modernes Wohnen) the exhibition constituted an experiment in Hoyerswerda, Saxony. 
Furniture that had come under scrutiny in the 1950s, such as Hellerau’s Model 602, was 
prominently featured in the display.213 Sponsored by the Zentralinstitut, the 15,000 
visitors saw the exhibition for free. For the first time in a decade, their opinions were not 
only recorded, but also coveted to evaluate the success of the new, holistic exhibition 
concept. Not so surprisingly, the modern way of living found broad acceptance, but the 
limited availability of the displayed products frustrated the population.214 As the 
increasingly centralized economy tried to catch up in the realm of consumer goods in the 
1960s, exhibitions presented material possibility instead of reality. People in rural areas 
understood the modern lifestyle from an aesthetic and practical point of view, yet the 
markers of progression remained largely unavailable. 
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After years of fighting kitschy ornamentation and outdated lavish designs, the turn 
in cultural policy from Socialist Realism to modern idioms confronted taste reformers 
such as Michel with the opposite extreme – fashionable and modish designs that outlived 
their aesthetic lifespan within a few years. In response, Michel shifted from criticizing 
backward-looking stylistic historicism to warning against exaggerated originality and 
avant-gardism. Michel reiterated his concerns in 1964 on the occasion of the 
Zentralinstitut’s reorganization under the roof of the DAMW, which included the 
implementation of standardized design criteria for technological product evaluation. 
Pointing out that quality in mass production was difficult to maintain, he rejected the 
argument advanced by producers and retail that “products are designed badly because of 
popular taste and demand.”215 The guest books of the aforementioned exhibition attest to 
the fact that at least parts of the population liked modernist-inspired designs. Though 
Michel acknowledged the sincerity behind this line of argument, he suggested that until 
this point the efforts undertaken to achieve better designs were insufficient. After all, “in 
every type of taste, in every style, tasteless products exist. It is the task of the designer to 
create something decent in every individual or seasonally conditioned taste.”216 Rejecting 
doctrinaire one-sidedness that favored a specific style or slavishly followed official 
cultural policies, Michel saw material socialism play out in the relationship between the 
product and its user. His plea for moderation as a guiding concept in a country that tried 
to propel its economy forward with centralization and Five-Year Plans, though, did not 
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align well with communist ambitions for membership among the leading industrial 
nations.  
Toward the end of the decade, GDR design politicians fully embraced the leftist 
politics of interwar modernism. To honor the 1968 twenty-year anniversary of the state’s 
founding, the Zentralinstitut organized an exhibition that put GDR design at the 
intersection of the Bauhaus/Werkbund tradition and Soviet constructivism. The historical 
section addressed a range of artistic expressions that the GDR designers saw themselves 
indebted to: 1840-1895 historicism and eclecticism, 1895-1915 arts and crafts reform 
movements and stylistic art such as Art Nouveau and Neoclassicism, and finally 1918-
1933 New Objectivity, Expressionism, and Functionalism.217 This exhibition plan was 
the first to list the latter two among the roots of socialist design in East Germany and paid 
special attention to the leftist politics of some of its protagonists. In contrast to the West 
Germany, the social program of interwar modernism fit right into the GDR discourse on a 
socialist way of life.218  
With the abolition of Socialist Realism as artistic maxim, the Zentralinstitut’s 
internal communication shifted course from cultural definitions to questions of socialist 
scientific progress in the 1960s and 1970s.219 The main prerequisite in the institute’s 
work remained the improvement and design of the socialist way of life within the GDR, 
but technological and economic considerations took over. Walter Ulbricht laid out the 
agenda in his presentation on “Basic Tasks for the Year 1970” accordingly: “The quality 
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of housing influences work productivity and development of the socialist identity. People 
reproduce their labor mainly in housing areas. With the evolution of a socialist mode of 
life, though, qualitatively new demands on housing develop.”220 The design of the home 
and of kitchen furniture was to be purposeful and pragmatic in order to free up time to do 
“more pleasant and useful things, such as cultural activities or educating ourselves.”221 
Nonetheless, some aesthetic concerns joined this practical approach to the housing 
environment: “Bad shape and color effects of tools, home textiles or furniture limit our 
joy of habitation.”222 The government thus understood the home to be an important part 
of the workers’ state, a place of recuperation and recovery from and for work as well as a 
locus for self-improvement -- socialist aesthetic concepts were thought to greatly enhance 
these processes. Yet the Party continued to fail in providing a clear definition of everyday 
needs for a “socialist way of life.” Determining these markers of socialist life was left to 
the Zentralinstitut and later the Amt für Formgestaltung, which approached the problem 
through research as their assignment was to “influence the scientific determination of 
requirements in future living in order to create the basis for future designs of the living 
environment.”223 By turning the aesthetic reconstitution of East German material culture 
into a scientific experiment, the GDR aligned its conception of the human environment 
with its general scientific-economic interpretation of socialism. At the same time, it 
caught up with Khrushchev’s rationalization of the Soviet everyday, which proclaimed 
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technology as the locus of communist modernization.224 Once again, the population took 
the backseat to larger considerations of international and economic importance. 
Moreover, the GDR made the decisive move to engage West Germany in the struggle for 
economic preeminence in the German Question and gave up its advantageous position as 
the Germany that, in a complete break with the past, built its material culture around 
socialist ideals. 
 
Leading by Example: A Visual and Tactile Experience of Wohnkultur 
Without a convincing social message behind material culture, the problem of how 
designers and design politicians could communicate national aesthetics to the population 
emerged. “Show and tell” became a popular method in the two German states to generate 
public acceptance of their respective modern domestic cultures. The Werkbund and the 
Zentralinstitut in cooperation with regional administration put together a range of 
activities that brought the message to the people. These endeavors targeted all ages to 
ensure the education of present and future consumers to buy the “right” products for the 
building of socialist and capitalist society.225 
In 1954, the West Berlin Werkbund was the first to initiate taste education 
(Geschmackserziehung), a form of consumer education that relies on clear distinctions 
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between good and bad design, in secondary schools of the divided city.226 To provide 
teachers with materials for demonstration, the Berliners invented so-called “Werkbund 
Boxes” (Werkbundkisten) that they filled with exemplary objects for the students to see, 
touch, and utilize in the classroom. The Werkbund arranged the objects in the boxes 
according to their material, function, utility, technology, shape, and color. Different 
thematic foci – “work space”, “kitchen appliances”, and “the set table” – engendered 
among the students a sense of utilitarian order and emotional context for the products in 
each box (see figure 5). Teachers could borrow the Werkbund Boxes free of charge and 
integrate them in the arts curriculum as they saw fit. In 1967, Lower Saxony was the last 
to join in with the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, which had been lending 
similar boxes to primary and secondary schools since 1956. Often, the boxes contained 
design of Werkbund members Heinrich Löffelhardt and Wilhelm Wagenfeld, and firms 
close to the association, such as Zwiesel glass, Arzberg china, and Carl Pott cutlery.227 
Teachers received instruction manuals for discussing how the design corresponded to the 
function of the objects. Again, material culture’s potential for social reform was not an 
issue, but the assembled products represented for social norms. Some of the boxes, like 
the ones that focused on table settings, not only provided objects to look at, but also 
encouraged students to utilize them in simulations of family meals. In this way, the 
younger generation learned about the social traditions of objects while receiving an 
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aesthetic education, thus perpetuating conservative concepts of family and social 
relations.228 
With the intellectual critique of functionalism, which in later years went by the 
moniker of “Good Design,” the Werkbundkisten initiative began to lose momentum in the 
early 1970s. One state after the other ended the program in the general climate of anti-
authoritarianism and youth protest. At the same time the art education curriculum moved 
away from the fetishization of function as the guiding principle for instruction on form 
and “good taste.” A final report of the Werkbund in Lower Saxony stated that “Socio-
political demands in school and the youth’s skepticism toward things that they perceive 
as representations of the establishment lead to a loss of their binding character or even to 
an urge to fight them - which make conventional art education impossible” when they 
ended their short-lived box program in 1970.229 As with Adorno’s critique of 
functionalism only a few years earlier, the Werkbund had to realize that their prescriptive 
vision of the relationship between people and their material environment had become 
outdated. 
In the GDR students’ education in their relationship to the material environment 
took a completely different point of departure. After the secondary school reforms of 
1958, the curriculum required poly-technical education and industrial apprenticeships.230 
The underlying principles of this program had similar intentions as the Bitterfelder Weg 
by acquainting school students with the means of production in connection with the 
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cultural value of objects.231 It also aimed at introducing university-bound students to the 
everyday experiences of workers, familiarizing them with the social foundations of the 
German socialist state. In the West, professional internships became increasingly 
common in later decades, but here the goal lay in preparing young people for their 
vocations. 
To target the adult population who possessed actual buying power, both the 
Werkbund and the Zentralinstitut started interior design counseling.232 The so-called 
Wohnberatungen developed around the Federal Republic, starting in 1953 in 
Mannheim.233 By 1972, sixteen Werkbund-affiliated Wohnberatungsstellen received 
subsidies from the Ministry for Housing (Ministerium für Wohnungswesen) and 
municipalities across the republic.234 As such political support indicates, interior design 
counseling had an educational mission tied to welfare and social reform. However, the 
usual discrepancy between assertion and reality caught up with the Werkbund. Instead of 
explaining ways of creating a humane living environment with limited resources, the 
mission fell back on cultivating a West German domestic culture by impressing the 
functional aesthetic of Good Design on the population.235 Customers brought blueprints 
of their apartments to trained interior decorators who used model furniture, samples 
ranging from wallpaper to tea sets, and continuously updated product indexes to help 
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them find space-saving solutions for their home. Some of the Wohnberatungen further 
offered exhibitions that displayed examples of Good Design or presented an idealized 
apartment setting. At the 1957 Interbau exhibit in Berlin, the Werkbund not only offered 
advice for the home in similar exhibitions, but also for leisure time consumption. This 
involvement in all areas of the material environment epitomizes the Werkbund’s 
paternalistic claim through taste and consumer education to regulate the way in which the 
population led its life.236 As the dogmatism of functionalism came under increasing 
critique with the social protest around 1968, the Werkbund eventually joined the critique 
and changed the counseling in Wohnberatungen to consider the social context and to 
move away from “the taste of an elite of sensitive esthetes.”237 Michael Andritzky, the 
Werkbund member most involved with Wohnberatung, finally demanded that interior 
design counseling should divorce itself from politics and economic interests.238  
While the West German Werkbund tried to distance itself from the political order, 
the socialist order of the GDR practically produced Wohnberatung. With a change of the 
economic orientation from heavy industry toward consumer good production under 
Ulbricht’s 1963 New Economic System of Planning and Steering (NES), furniture retail 
morphed from fulfilling the most basic needs of the population to a more service-oriented 
organization. For example, the Wohnberatung in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Ulbricht’s idealized 
socialist industrial city both in regard to urban planning and architecture, joined the retail 
organization in the district in 1964.239 Just like their Western counterparts, interior 
designers advised customers with the help of samples, product catalogs, and mini-
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exhibitions that promoted ideologically correct furniture and advertised new synthetic 
materials, such as Melafol. As part of the service, interior designers distributed 
information about where the customers could find specific designs, no small 
accomplishment in the state of chronic consumer product scarcity of the East German 
planned economy.240  
The head of the Dresden interior design department Furniture Retail District 
Dresden, Hans Lindemann, exemplifies how Wohnberatung was interlinked with the 
economic system.241 Aside from counseling consumers, Lindemann also published texts 
about good taste in socialism, traveled around the district and paid house visits, educated 
other interior designers and functioned as liaison to the council that decided over the 
product range rationalization. Within the constraints of the planned economy, the mission 
of the Wohnberatung was to create domestic environments that enabled and supported 
new experiences as well as ignite the population’s joie de vivre.242 These services were 
free unless the customer asked for the conception of an entire apartment. Nevertheless, 
the personal comfort of the home came second to the overall economic goals. 
Wohnberatung belonged to an entire institutionalized system that “ ‘trained’ consumers 
to ’want’ what the government decided that they ‘needed.’ ”243 Since many customers 
moved into the new standardized, prefabricated high-rises that arose across East 
Germany, many of the new apartments had the identical blue-print. Thus, the problem of 
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moral degeneration linked to standardization that contributed to a loss in cultural value of 
GDR industrial design reemerged. 
Despite, or even because of, the failure of design politicians and intellectuals to 
develop a terminology that could give East and West German domestic culture a 
profound socio-cultural meaning, the market for interior design publications boomed by 
the mid-1960s. This medium communicated trends, new ideas, and tastes through images. 
, thus amending the discourse’s silence with pictures that showed how one should live in 
modern postwar Germany. In a survey conducted in 1962 and 1963 in Cologne and its 
suburbs, sociologist Alphons Silbermann, found that among the design interested 
Cologne inhabitants with basic schooling, 39 percent read articles on furnishings and 
living spaces. Among those with a secondary education (Gymnasium), this number 
increased to 69 percent.244 Readers usually referred to special interior design magazines, 
the daily press or (lifestyle) magazines for information on interior design.245 
Consequently, the media catered to a broad audiences ranging from experts to the 
generally interested. 
Looking through the design press in postwar Germany, three types of design 
magazines emerge that differed in focus and target audience. The West German design 
magazine Form moved gradually toward a specialized and professional audience. When 
it first was conceptualized in 1957, it strongly connected to the Werkbund’s general 
mission of educating the public about Good Design. Jupp Ernst and Wilhelm Wagenfeld 
served on the board of editors. Over the following years, renowned architects and 
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designers such as Max Bill, Marcel Breuer, Walter Gropius, R. Buckminster Fuller, 
Misha Black, Fritz Eichler, Luigi Nervi, and Herbert Read assembled around the editors’ 
table at the Form offices. Initially named Internationale Revue – Form, which signified a 
broader interest in shapes in the everyday around the globe, the editorial board changed 
the name to Form – Zeitschrift für Gestaltung in 1966, which indicates a target shift away 
from a general audience to professionals and the design-interested. Along with this 
specialized audience came increasingly specialized debates, such as the critique of 
functionalism in the late 1960s. Before, these debates had taken place exclusively in the 
Werkbund newspaper Werk und Zeit, shielded from the actual people who were the 
subject of these discourses. Rather than offering concrete advice as how to furnish 
German homes, the journal depicted images of new design trends and artistic 
developments that mostly remained highly abstract. In this regard, Form took on a hybrid 
form of half specialist, half generalist medium that was available at newsstands across the 
country and even on the other side of the border. There, GDR design professionals also 
read Form to stay informed about the developments in the West.246  
Prior to the first issue of Form, the Institut für angewandte Kunst (later renamed 
Zentralinstitut and Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung) published the first volume of its 
specialized industrial design journal Form und Zweck (Form and Function) in 1956. The 
publication became a forum for institute employees and design professionals to show the 
connection between politics, ideology, and industrial design.247 While designers 
                                                 
246 Until the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, West German magazines and scholarly periodicals 
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247 See for example Dr. Walter Besenbruch, “Die Künstler und die Partei,“ Form und Zweck, 1957/58, I-
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presented and described the scientific data for their designs, Form und Zweck did not 
provide advice on how Germans should furnish their homes. The debates remained 
largely scientific and ideological, without any application to the real living conditions of 
the masses.  
Interior design magazines, on the other hand, developed a broader, popular 
appeal. In 1957, Kultur im Heim (Culture at Home) showed the early concern of 
socialism for the domestic environment and its affect on the New Man. The editors put 
great emphasis on images for presenting new designs. The pictures usually provided the 
context of arranged living situations, though most of them stemmed from company or fair 
displays. The logic behind orchestrated displays aimed at achieving emotional reactions. 
Horst Michel explained the merits of using a holistic approach to interior design with 
complete displays: “A vase does not hover in a vacuum. It stands on a piece of furniture, 
perhaps on a patterned table cloth, next to another object in front of a colored wall with 
pictures, and there are flowers in the vase […] Only in accord with other things does an 
emotional impact arise.” 248 Such settings demonstrated a cohesive socialist domestic 
culture in contexts that the population could easily apply to their homes, where 
furnishings created a sense of repose, comfort, and, in the years of Honecker’s party rule, 
privacy.249  
The most successful West German interior design magazine Schöner Wohnen 
(Better Living) utilized similarly idealized settings. The magazine has influenced West 
German tastes from 1960 until today. After a successful first issue in 1960, its readership 
                                                 
248 Horst Michel, “Industrieformgestalter auf dem Bitterfelder Weg,” n.d., pg. 5, SiG.  
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quickly grew to two million. 250 Filled with pictures of the newest trends in furniture 
design, color palettes, and room arrangements, Schöner Wohnen brought interior design 
to the masses in an effort to promote aesthetically cohesive German living environments 
(see figure 6). Studio photographs populated the pages of the magazine, an art form in 
and of itself as the founding-editor-in-chief Josef Kremerkothen noted: “Small rooms 
could not look cramped, improvisation could not seem primitive – they had to appear 
lively […], light had to create atmosphere […], colours had to be finely matched with 
materials.”251 Interior designer Peter Maly, fresh out of school in Detmold, joined the 
magazine in its start-up phase and developed into one of the most talented studio 
designers. As the furniture industry was still recovering from the war, some prized pieces 
remained unavailable to complete the “look” of a room. Maly, therefore, began designing 
the missing furniture himself, which led to a number of collaborations with high-end 
furniture producers, launching his career as an internationally successful furniture 
designer. 
The practice of arranging settings created an entire generation of interior 
designers in the FRG who knew how to find the best light, up-to-date color combinations 
and leading designs. These new designers, however, did not take into consideration their 
actual human utility.252 After Rolf Heide finished his architecture studies in Hamburg, he 
started working for Germany’s most successful women’s magazine Brigitte in 1959. He 
oversaw a magazine section dedicated to giving practical advice in response to reader 
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questions. However, his designs incorporated real world problems, such as how to 
combine antique with new furniture or cheap furniture with designer collector’s items 
(see figures 7 and 8). This column’s success inspired the publishing house Gruner and 
Jahr to publish Schöner Wohnen, the first magazine to exclusively focus on the domestic 
environment, which Heide joined in 1970.253 Henceforth, he also created idealized room 
arrangement and exerted tremendous influence in the shaping of population’s interior 
design taste.  
In the GDR, the utilization of studio pictures took a completely different 
direction. By the late 1970s, Kultur im Heim, the East German counterpart to Schöner 
Wohnen, abandoned ideal room arrangements in exchange for actual apartments. This 
development has been associated with the loosening of the Party’s hold on every facet of 
public and private life.254 On closer examination of the magazine itself, it becomes 
evident that this change in imagery developed alongside the stagnation of GDR furniture 
design. In order to create a smokescreen of consumer choices and options, the editors 
often resorted to showing the same furniture in the same standardized pre-fabricated 
apartments, but in the context of different subcultures and lifestyles, hoping readers might 
not notice. As the East German state overextended itself with Erich Honecker’s the 
consumer promises of the 1972 Unity of Economic and Social Policy, the publication 
changed focus from showing the population the unavailable possibilities of socialist 
production to the make-do ideas of their neighbors. In this way, the publication avoided 
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causing the kind of public disgruntlement that the earlier interior design exhibitions had 
created.  
 
Conclusion 
By exploring the avenues of communication between theoreticians, practitioners, 
and consumers of design, this study captures debates surrounding the social significance 
of design in general, and domestic culture in particular. The demise of functionalism as 
an aesthetic truth affected the two German states in different but related ways. As 
functionalism fell from grace in the Federal Republic in the late 1960s, it had just found a 
platform in the GDR. Not surprisingly, initiatives to bring this national aesthetics to the 
masses flourished during this period. By visualizing the emotional context of furniture in 
arranged displays and on blueprints of family homes at Wohnberatungen, the Werkbund 
and the Zentralinstitut brought their vision to the people. Students in East and West 
experienced material culture in art and poly-technical instruction.  Here, they received 
lessons not only about aesthetics but also about the social relations in their respective part 
of Germany. 
Design publications, exhibitions, and interior design magazines played an 
important part in official style diffusion throughout the two German societies. In the early 
1950s, alongside the establishment of design institutions, a flurry of publication activities 
commenced in both Germanys. At first, print materials about new aesthetics became 
available through design exhibitions. Such communication channels then solidified 
through a robust magazine culture in East and West supported by practitioners of 
industrial and interior design, as well as those interested in home-decor. Moreover, these 
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readers used journals and magazines to learn about design innovations in the respective 
“other” Germany. Lost for words, the press and professional design journals created 
idealized studio photographs to promote the appearance of the new national culture. 
Designers, politicians, and retailers hoped that consumers would internalize these images 
and make their consumer choices in support of the aspired national aesthetic. 
But the discursive developments in the GDR are not as much a result of a lacking 
social reform idea as in the West. Socialism inherently pushed for a revolution of the 
social and cultural fabric. While this debate began with the cultural concerns surrounding 
Socialist Realism, namely integration in the Eastern Bloc and demarcation from West 
Germany, it received a new quality when the principles of production became the leading 
influence in policy-making. Following Michel’s aesthetic interventions allows insights 
into the changing meaning and function of socialist material culture, as Michel 
condemned the same kitsch products that the government promoted as the epitome of 
GDR national culture. With an aesthetic of moderation, Michel continuously contested 
East German state socialism’s material and political ambitions, while pursuing a 
consciously socialist production.  
Whereas Michel was a proponent of centralized industrial organization, he 
promoted only small and medium scale production to keep social responsibility a part of 
manufacturing. With the standardization of product ranges, he hoped to have more 
control over what was produced as well as distributed to the East German home.255 This 
attitude did not foreclose diverse styles, as long as they moderately interpreted a taste or 
fashion. Michel did not believe in coercion and taste dictation. He rather strove to 
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enlighten retail buyers and consumers to positively influence production with the right 
demand. Michel helped establish a modern vision during the reconstruction years and the 
Bitterfelder Weg in the late 1950s and early 1960s, he was unable to leave a mark on the 
Formalism Debate and the later years of modish production. In these phases, which of 
course overlapped not coincidentally with heightened Cold War tension and deteriorating 
German-German relations in the early 1950s and1960s, moderation contradicted GDR 
ambitions. A distinct national culture and mass production presented two ways in which 
East Germany aimed to earn a higher profile in the postwar world.  
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CHAPTER 3: PRODUCING MODERN GERMAN HOMES: 
THE ECONOMY OF NATIONAL BRANDING  
Introduction 
The goal of turning the discourse on official aesthetics into practice set both 
German states on a track that business historians have called “national branding.”256 This 
term describes the efforts of a network of designers and producers to create a narrative of 
political significance around their products. The urge to give greater meaning to their 
works fits well within the political climate of the Cold War period, when an important 
component of German-German relations emphasized competing ways of living. 
Designers and producers created a narrative that took “home furnishings and associate[d] 
them with established cultural categories and principles, moving meaning from the 
culturally constituted world to the consumer good.”257 Like a product brand, divergent 
ways of living not only offered both German populations a sense of belonging, but also 
promoted their cultural achievements abroad.258 A coherent aesthetic, however, hinged 
upon strategic cooperation and communication between the political leadership, 
designers, industrialists, and consumers in East and West – an endeavor that, over time, 
proved quite difficult to accomplish. In the end, rivaling ideas about German modern 
Wohnkultur undermined the necessary narrative coherence for the promotion of East or 
West German “corporate identity” at home and abroad, which left the two German states 
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Nation: Danish Modern Furniture and Denmark in the United States, 1940-1970,” in Trademarks, Brands, 
and Competitiveness, ed. Teresa de Silva Lopes and Paul Duguid (New York: Routledge, 2010), 77-101. 
257 Grant McCracken, “Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of the Structure and Movement 
of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods,” Journal of Consumer Research 13, no. 1 (1986): 76. 
258 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations,” Harvard Business Review (March-April 
1990): 73-93. 
  
109 
vulnerable to external influences and set the stage in the late 1960s for their unintended 
aesthetic convergence.259 
Taking into consideration the fundamental structural differences between the 
economic and political systems of the FRG and GDR, this chapter compares how 
policymakers interacted with the industrial sector and consumers to link ideologically 
conforming ways of living to economic reconstruction and prosperity. The problem under 
consideration here is one of political rhetoric versus economic reality: why, after decades 
of cultural delineation, did both states fail to assert an official style, a “national aesthetic” 
in German workshops and homes? This chapter is especially interested in exploring 
economic and political mechanisms in East and West Germany that impaired the 
consistent implementation of official aesthetics in everyday life. First, it looks at the 
economic-cultural structures established in East and West to put their respective aesthetic 
goals into practice. In a second step, it examines the practical limits of official aesthetic 
influence on industrial production and consumption. In the process, both Germanies 
moved away from rigid functionalism and Socialist Realism respectively to a shared idea 
of economical production and living comfort.  
 
Economic Prosperity and Political Legitimacy 
Competition for popular support tied the creation of a coherent national narrative 
of postwar German aesthetics directly to economic prosperity, an important sphere of 
German-German relations. Material wellbeing and its cultural denominators became 
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proxies for economic preeminence. Following the example of Richard Nixon and Nikita 
Khrushchev’s famous Kitchen Debate at the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 
July 1959, the German Democratic Republic entered into competition over standards of 
living with the Federal Republic of Germany.260 At the height of the Berlin Crisis in 
1959, an “Open Letter to Furniture Workmen in the German Democratic Republic” 
explained the workers’ role in the German Cold War for hearts and minds:  
In this situation, West Germans look to us. They observe how we live. Our 
successes in the social and cultural arena are great and lack an equivalent in the 
Bonn Republic. We have made progress in the field of material consumption as 
well. And it is in material consumption where we must advance faster to overtake 
West Germany.261 
At the time, the well-oiled GDR propaganda machine most likely distributed letters such 
as this above to all major industries. For workers in the furniture industry, though, the 
connection between the socialist way of life, expressed in Wohnkultur, and the fruits of 
their labor was especially evident. The idea behind accelerating the development and 
production of a distinctly socialist furniture culture aimed at counteracting images of 
abundance coming from West Germany.262 Officials of the GDR projected confidence in 
their ideological superiority vis-à-vis the West mainly through the display of cultural and 
social achievements, such as the integration of the female workforce in the production 
process.263 At the same time, politicians could not deny that an impediment to East 
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German hegemony in the divided country manifested itself in their backward economy – 
the Achilles’ heel of state socialism. While the letter identifies slow growth as the cause 
for the underperformance of industry, it remains silent about any practical cure. Rather, 
economic planners assumed that economic problems could be overcome using willpower 
alone – an attitude characteristic of socialist command economies.264 With this letter, the 
East German state eventually aligned its economic and political agendas by asking 
workers to increase productivity as an expression of progress, and to reach a leadership 
position rather than simply membership among industrialized nations. 
Part and parcel of this plan was the economic overtake of West Germany, yet its 
“economic miracle” gave the Federal Republic a competitive advantage over the GDR. 
While literature on the Federal Republic of Germany approaches the West’s foundation 
in various ways, historians agree that the prosperity of the social market economy 
(soziale Marktwirtschaft) generated support among the population.265 Such popular 
support contributed to West Germany’s political legitimacy at home and abroad. Since 
many had lived through the stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting global financial 
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crisis, which had shaped popular memories of the Weimar Republic and informed 
suspicions about democratic rule in the postwar period, economic progress and the 
acceptance of a new democratic state went, for a cautious population, hand in hand.266 
Therefore, the unprecedented social improvement of the 1950s generated a positive 
attitude toward the new democracy. West Germans eventually “identified with the 
economic benefits of the Federal Republic of Germany rather than with any political 
institutions or traditions.”267 As Mark E. Spicka’s examination of Christian Democrats’ 
election campaigns in the 1950s reveals, the Adenauer government understood popular 
sentiment and used it to form consensus by forging national identities deliberately around 
economic policies and the social market economy. With a political culture in place that 
evolved around a prosperous and successful economy, the West posed a great challenge 
to the relatively economically weak GDR.  
The partition of Germany facilitated the western economic miracle. Because of its 
diversified national economy, geographical factors as well as structural development 
favored the Federal Republic. Traditionally agricultural areas in the east were cut off 
from industry in the west, especially in the Ruhr region, southern parts of Lower Saxony, 
the Rhine-Main region with continuation to the Rhine-Neckar Region and the region 
surrounding Stuttgart in the south. Furthermore, the Rhine river system enabled the 
transportation of consumer and bulk goods towards the northern ports. Meanwhile, 
because of its location at the edge of the Eastern bloc, the GDR lost its former importance 
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in the east-west traffic. The FRG held most of the coal and ore resources, while the 
resource-rich areas in the east had been surrendered to Poland. West Germany also had a 
larger percentage of climatically favored and consumer-oriented agricultural areas, and 
ice-free ports.268 Moreover, the partition prevented the West from having to support the 
agrarian East. These favorable conditions, coupled with a modified free-market economy, 
left the West well-positioned to quickly increase production to satisfy consumer demand 
and to regain foreign markets, beginning with the Korean War in 1950, which led to an 
industrial boom that lasted well into the 1960s.269  
Years into the reconstruction period, the GDR continued to suffer additional 
disadvantage because it shouldered the larger portion of Soviet war reparation claims 
after 1945.270 Economic planners countered this weakness in the 1958 collectivization of 
industry into “People-Owned Businesses” (Volkseigene Betriebe, VEB) to improve Plan 
coordination and increase individual output. One after the other, most every industry 
joined the coordination effort to eradicate overlapping production and waste of resources. 
Subsequently, the superficial restructuring of regional clusters of furniture industry was 
successful in densely industrial areas such as Zeulenroda, Dresden, Themar, Neugersdorf, 
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and Oelsa-Rabenau.271 However, where industry was thinly spread out, these attempts at 
concentration and specialization did not take hold until the second wave of 
collectivization in the 1970s.272  
Inferior conditions alone cannot explain the increasing gap between East and 
West German economic performance during the Cold War. Economic historians have 
offered different explanations for the failure of the GDR economy. Jaap Sleifer blames 
the slow improvement of low labor productivity, whereas André Steiner finds the Plan to 
have been the cause for bad economic results in the GDR.273 Steiner’s findings suggest 
that the Plan set “soft” goals because economic policymakers were never fully 
knowledgeable about the real potential of material and human resources, which, he 
argues, could have yielded much higher returns.274 As I will show, imperfect linkages 
between the production and consumption systems represent another area of 
underperformance, which not only negatively influenced technological development, but 
also sabotaged the East German national brand narrative and undermined the 
population’s identification with the state. Because of the inefficiencies in the GDR 
economy, East Germans voted with their feet, steadily migrating westward in search of 
better economic and more liberal political conditions. In April 1961 alone 30,000 GDR 
citizens fled to the West. This exodus marked an enormous brain drain, since the average 
                                                 
271 Zeulenroda was already turned into a VEB in 1956. Five-Year Plan, Wissenschaftlich-technischer 
Fortschritt der VEB Ostthüringer Möbelwerke Zeulenroda, 16 April 1956, DE1/26517, BAB. 
272 Concept, “Zur Entwicklung der Möbelindustrie der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin,” 
September 1964. DE 1/ VS II 12173, BAB, 3. 
273 Jaap Sleifer, Planning Ahead and Falling Behind: The East German Economy in Comparison with West 
Germany, 1936-2002, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft 8 (Berlin: Akademie, 2006), 157-161. 
274 André Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Munich: Deutsche 
Verlagsanstalt, 2004), 7 and 13. 
  
115 
GDR refugee was young, educated, and highly adaptable.275  The general loss of GDR 
competence interrupted the country’s technological and scientific development, deeply 
undermining its industrial progress. The construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 
1961, however, abruptly halted this refugee flow.  
While many were willing to risk their lives trying to cross the newly fortified German-
German border in later years, the number of successful escapes remained extremely 
small.  
The Berlin Wall stood witness to the economic dissatisfaction and political 
disagreement that weakened the GDR’s legitimacy domestically and internationally to 
such a degree that the Party felt forced to take extreme measure in order to prevent people 
from leaving. Equipping the Iron Curtain with barbed wire and automated machine guns, 
the Soviet Union, at Ulbricht’s request, cemented the status quo of a divided Europe with 
a divided Germany at its center.276 Chances for German unification became even more 
remote, though neither side stopped paying lip service to the general idea. Rather, the 
fortified border further severed economic ties between the GDR and the FRG, not to 
mention family relations, thus further integrating East Germany into the COMECON. 
The years 1958-1961, then, not only marked a turning point for the already difficult intra-
German relations from the Berlin Crisis to the construction of the Wall, but also set the 
stage for an open confrontation over superior industrial prowess.  
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Centralism vs. Regionalism in the Struggle for Aesthetic Coherence 
Curiously, the German-German competition for superiority in industrial design 
and material culture had first and foremost domestic implications. While the actual rival 
was on the other side of the zone border, at times opposing goals of the central 
government and the regional administrations caused internal struggles in design and 
production. In most cases, centralism and regionalism ought to strike one as forward 
concepts of political and social organization, involving the assignment of specific 
responsibilities to different levels of governance. In the German case, however, regional 
and federal powers have always been muddled, leading back to the contested conceptions 
of authority enshrined in the German Confederation (1815-1866).277 In terms of postwar 
national branding, these opposing forces undermined the creation of a cohesive identity 
narrative. 
A considerable body of scholarly literature has examined the effects of German 
cultural regionalism on questions of identity. For example, the idea of Heimat (homeland) 
is often contrasted with the nineteenth-century struggle for a German national state.278 
Meanwhile, the significance of regional and centralized administrative structures in 
politics and the economy for cultural concepts has remained largely unexplored, 
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especially in the postwar period. One possible reason for this neglect may be scholars’ a 
priori conception of the Federal Republic as a decentralized, federal state that was deeply 
anchored in its federal constitutional structure, with the GDR perceived conversely as a 
controlling, centralized state that modeled its totalitarian aspirations after the Soviet 
Union.279 By looking at the intertwined history of the post-German states, however, the 
paradigms of centralism and regionalism bring to the fore conflicting trends in political 
culture that undermine simplistic characterization of either Germany.  
To clarify the usage of terms in the context of industrial design, I have developed 
two archetypical definitions, whose terminology can be applied to both the federally and 
the centrally organized German states. Regionalism in industrial design I understand to 
be activism originating with regional cultural institutions and economic structures that 
shape design principles in order to economically and politically assist the region, thereby 
favoring a regional aesthetic identity over a coherent national style. Design centralism, 
then, is the attempt to create central structures that define and execute cultural and 
economic policies for the entire nation, thereby suppressing regional activism and 
aesthetic diversity.  
Dualism between center and region in post-1945 West Germany generally worked 
to assign differing sets of powers to either level, but at times these overlapped. In cases of 
overlapping powers or abrogation, however, the more powerful center won out over 
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regional objectives.280 For example, cultural policy was an especially contested field 
during the Cold War years. While cultural policymaking powers lay with the region, its 
reverberations were felt in the areas of diplomacy and national economy, two political 
areas directed by the federal government. In the GDR, political centralization only slowly 
percolated down to economic structures and, apart from mass organizations, even less to 
the realm of everyday culture.281 As the history of these tensions between region and 
center well predated the German partition of 1945, a strong culture of regionalism was 
present in both Germanys when they reached statehood. The following discussion of East 
and West German design policy traces the lines between central and regional powers in 
the realms of culture and economics, which were blurred at best, or even completely 
sidestepped at times. 
From the beginning, West German industrial reconstruction led to the creation of 
novel local organizations. They were the result of changed regional conditions, the 
refugee problem, and the reorganization of transportation routes caused by the German 
partition. In contrast to the centralized economy of the Third Reich, these new 
organizations remained anchored at the regional and municipal level, where they became 
“essential control elements.”282 In the scarcity of the postwar years, regional development 
took precedence over national planning, and a competition for investments and national 
subsidies ensued. The foundation of the West German design council Rat für 
Formgebung, a national institution dedicated to supervise industrial development in the 
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field of design and marketing, stood in stark contrast to these regional tendencies. The 
fact that its foundation articulated the seemingly contradictory notion of cultural 
centralism in a federal liberal state was also not lost on contemporaries. “It may seem 
surprising that government-controlled agencies should act as arbiters of taste in industrial 
design and assume a frankly partisan or even doctrinaire attitude in promoting modern 
design,” observed art historian Lorenz Eitner, a 1957 Humboldt fellow in West Germany. 
“This is possible in Germany (where the State has often played an active role in such 
matters) because since 1945 the weight of official approval has come to rest on the side 
of modern art, modern architecture, and modern design.”283 The Rat für Formgebung thus 
claimed to represent a social and political consensus on modern design. However, 
because the West German economy was not centralized, informal agreement with 
industry about which aesthetics could best visualize the spirit of a postwar Germany was 
crucial to the Rat für Formgebung’s success.  
Fortunately for the design council, organized industrial interests, embodied by the 
Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), shared 
with it an aesthetic inherited from Weimar modernism. The BDI became a trusted ally in 
the conservative government’s economic policies of the early 1950s.284 By 1950, a lack 
of capital, multiple allied production restrictions and decreased domestic demand worked 
against the structure of the liberal economy. These conditions caused the unemployment 
of more than two million workers. Conjuring up images of Weimar, depression, and the 
danger of political radicalization, the Adenauer government came under fire from the 
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political opposition. When the Marktwirtschaft experiment threatened to fail, the West 
German government felt American pressure to institute some degree of state regulation. 
Adenauer turned to industrial associations to avoid reversing the principles of the postwar 
economy. Consequently, the BDI took on the task of distributing scarce resources and 
organizing exports, demonstrating their indispensability in the young republic.285 
Corporate traditions thus found their way back into the liberal economy of the Federal 
Republic, which, as Wolfrum puts it, raised the question of whether the republic would 
be able to withstand strong economic corporatism in the long run.286 In regard to its 
history of industrial design, this question certainly needs to be answered with a clear no. 
The role that industry played in West Germany's cultural revival cannot be 
overemphasized. Beginning with the foundation of a philanthropic committee, the 
Culture Council (Kulturkreis) in 1951, the BDI awarded fellowships and organized art 
shows to support the arts in Germany.287 The BDI lawyer and art enthusiast Gustav Stein 
largely initiated this cultural engagement. As the executive manager of the BDI and the 
Kulturkreis he published a booklet in 1952, which invoked the historical responsibility of 
entrepreneurs as patrons of the arts. For example, big-business names, such as Thyssen, 
Krupp, and Reemtsma, re-introduced the concept of the collector-benefactor.288 Yet the 
motivation behind this kind of cultural philanthropy was not entirely altruistic. Patronage 
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helped the industry to polish its image, which years of collaboration with the Nazi regime 
had badly damaged.289 Stein himself believed that art was a socio-political force that 
connected people. The diffusion of everyday life with cultural objects, in his opinion, 
could prevent the disintegration of society – a process that he had witnessed in the 
Weimar Republic.290 While the Kulturkreis members’ taste in art was as diverse as its 
membership, Werner Bührer has found that the BDI followed official aesthetics in its 
award practices and, in this way, became Germany’s biggest patron of abstract modern 
art. This inclination toward modernist taste carried over into the BDI’s work with 
industrial designers, who were eventually included in the award structure of the 
Kulturkreis in 1957.291  
In the early years of its existence, the Rat für Formgebung held a mediator 
position between business and large-scale consumers. Serving as a source of information 
for government institutions in particular that were in dire need of office furniture, mess 
kits and flatware for cafeterias, and art to put into the new administrative buildings in 
West Germany’s new capital Bonn, the Rat connected producers and large customers.292 
Gatekeeper to prestigious projects such as furnishing German embassies abroad or 
displaying products at numerous international exhibitions, the Rat possessed considerable 
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power over industry between 1952 and 1965. The more or less voluntary cooperation 
between industry and economic policymakers under the leadership of Economic Minister 
Ebert strengthened the national brand at first, as the BDI and the Rat für Formgebung 
worked on the same modernist narrative. However, the foundation of a BDI group 
specifically dedicated in industrial design (Arbeitskreis) in 1952, organized to directly 
represent industrial interest in questions of design, eventually disrupted this peaceful 
cooperation between policymakers and big business. Like the design council, the 
Arbeitskreis set as its task the education of designers and the encouragement of rational 
and socially responsible industrial design.293 As previously illustrated, because of the 
similarity of their mission, the Arbeitskreis was very involved in the activities of the Rat 
für Formgebung and had attained a leading role by the mid-1960s when Ernst 
Schneider’s dual presidency of both associations began to infringe on the independence 
of the design council in a fashion that could be termed a hostile takeover. Thereafter, the 
mission of the design council became increasingly industry-oriented at the expense of its 
cultural mission.294  
By the mid-sixties, the BDI Arbeitkreis’s reconstitution as the Design Circle 
(Gestaltkreis) in 1965 signaled an emerging divergence of state and business interests.295 
Entrepreneurial debate pinned this difference in perspectives on attitudes toward the 
utility of industrial design. The secretary general of the Study Group of Industry for 
Product Design and Product Planning in Stuttgart, Baden-Württemberg, implicitly 
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commented on the emerging tension between the government’s vision of product design 
and that of the business community: “Our study group came together to help members 
replace unclear will with methodological thinking. They don’t want to speak any longer 
about the design-idea and its cultural-political goals, but want instead to search for 
practicable ways toward its realization.”296 While in earlier years the visions of the Rat 
für Formgebung and the BDI had overlapped when industry interest supported the 
“entrepreneur as patron of the arts” concept, they diverged at this juncture, because of 
business’s more profit-oriented interpretation of design as a selling point rather than a 
cultural message.297  In the everyday, West German design thus lost the initial simplicity 
and rigidity of postwar functionalism.  Consequently, the official aesthetic survived in 
government-sponsored exhibitions, yet production gravitated towards catering to 
consumer tastes. Unfolding strife between the Werkbund and BDI factions on the board 
of the Rat für Formgebung between 1968 and 1969, coupled with a lack of decisive 
management after Mia Seeger’s departure, furthermore added to the Rat’s decline in 
economic significance for the business community.  
Even more so, the business community’s vision for German design as a national 
brand had a more pragmatic emphasis than that of the Werkbund-inspired Rat für 
Formgebung. During the Weimar years, Werkbund and Bauhaus designers had sought to 
create design solutions that would elevate the lower classes. Despite these lofty goals, 
however, their designs ultimately became collector’s items that only the affluent could 
afford. Members actively involved in the BDI Arbeitskreis, on the contrary, often came 
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from middle-class enterprises and family companies.298 Because the scale of small- and 
medium-sized businesses allowed for the combination of traditional craftsmanship with 
serial production, Mittelstand entrepreneurs were more likely to consider questions of 
design and premium materials than were mass producers.299 In particular, the furniture 
industry upheld these standards because technologies of wood processing had not 
advanced enough to mechanize production entirely. In this light, the then-contemporary 
observation that “German design is for the middle class” pointed to both the production 
and the consumption-related aspects of West German industry.300  
In their postwar development, Mittelstand industries differed decisively from big 
business, which scholars have discussed predominately as an example of West 
Germany’s economic Americanization.301 While aspects of American marketing and 
management permeated big industry, smaller businesses, such as in the furniture industry, 
were less prone to Americanize their business methods.302 Instead, German Mittelstand 
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entrepreneurs shared their belief in durable materials and timeless shapes with other 
European countries that had developed socially conscious design movements in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, such as the Swiss Werkbund (1913) and the Dutch De 
Stijl (1917). By necessity as well as by intention, reconstruction design embodied 
German such values by combining the aesthetic with the utilitarian and social 
responsibility with economic accessibility. Concerned with satisfying urgent needs rather 
than speeding up consumption cycles, German industrialists in the early republic despised 
the American production practices that consciously cut short product lifespan with 
superficial styling and mediocre quality of materials and construction.303 This attitude 
persisted until well after reconstruction and was affirmed in 1965 when the BDI 
Arbeitskreis reconstituted itself as the Gestaltkreis. Gustav Stein summarized its renewed 
mission as follows: “If everybody took part in the conscious quality reduction coming out 
of America, then there is only one recipe for success for us: technological quality with its 
‘Made-in-Germany’ seal shaped by ‘good design as a quality factor.’ ”304 Business elites 
thus envisioned their own narrative of a West German national brand that rested on 
quality production. Perceiving themselves as the guarantor of these quality standards with 
a commitment to value, in their mind, German aesthetics and production ethics stood in 
opposition to American ones. 
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Like industrialists in the Federal Republic, the economic planners of the GDR 
aimed for quality design and quality products. East Germans upheld durability and social 
responsibility as the underlying principles of production, as evidenced by the DAMW’s 
attempts to prolong product lifespan via quality control.305 Economic planners expected 
living room and bedroom furniture to last fifty years. As late as 1984, almost a third of 
the East German population maintained that furniture should be bought only once in a 
lifetime (see Table 3). The fact that Germans in East and West opposed the American 
“throwaway society” (Wegwerfgesellschaft) suggests that the historiographical debate 
about Americanization is not able to explain all facets of Germany’s postwar cultural and 
economic development.  
From the 1950s onwards, several industry-sponsored institutions in West 
Germany strove to establish modern standards in permanent design exhibitions, most 
notably the Institut für Neue Technische Form in Darmstadt and the Haus der 
Industrieform in Essen. The furniture industry section of the BDI hosted a reception for 
the press in which presenters elaborated on topics such as “On good and bad taste,” 
“Serial furniture and its significance for today’s apartment,” “Thoughts on the issue of 
‘modern’ ” or “On the meaning of furnishing.”306 Munich’s Neue Sammlung, a tax-
supported gallery of modern design, and the regional chambers of commerce, especially 
in Stuttgart, not only maintained permanent collections of well-designed products, but 
also put together traveling exhibitions. On top of these enterprises, West German cities 
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funded a network of Wohnberatungen, information centers equipped with pattern books 
where interior designers counseled West Germans on how to furnish their apartments. By 
1961 these Wohnberatungen could be found throughout the Federal Republic.307 Most of 
the initiatives for a modern “German” taste correlated with the furniture boom of the 
1960s, when 40 percent of all households were buying furniture.308 Fueled by such 
demand, the 1960s and 1970s became the most exciting decades in West German 
furniture development.  
Yet this myriad of regional initiatives soon began to weaken the Rat für 
Formgebung’s initial attempt at centralizing industrial design in the Federal Republic. 
Conflicting interests of industry and designers as well as differing perspectives on 
economic progress within industrial associations chipped away at the West German 
national brand narrative. For example, design centers in Stuttgart (Baden-Württemberg) 
and in Essen (Nordrhein-Westfalen) developed strong particularistic notions with 
powerful ideas for industrial development in regions that were already economically 
more successful than the rest of West Germany. In the 1970s, Stuttgart’s design center 
applied repeatedly for membership in an international design organization, the 
International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID), where the Rat für 
Formgebung was a founding member and representative of German interests.  
Relations between the Stuttgart Design Center and the Rat für Formgebung hit a 
new low when the latter became involved in Stuttgart’s ICSID candidacy process. 
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Throughout the Cold War, most countries appointed only one design society to this 
international body to project a cohesive national cultural policy. After all, the ICSID 
provided an international forum for promoting the national brand in the realm of 
industrial design. Stuttgart’s application triggered a letter exchange between the ICSID 
board and the Rat für Formgebung, in which information about the relationship between 
the Rat and the Stuttgart Design Center was solicited in order to determine membership 
fees. If the Rat vouched for a close relationship, the Design Center would only pay 
reduced fees. Herbert Ohl, head of the Rat für Formgebung, however, was unwilling to 
make the case for such a relationship. “I should think also,” Ohl sarcastically added, “that 
they would themselves not like to be regarded as part of the Rat für Formgebung, since 
we are a federal state.”309 Ohl’s reaction seems indicative of the adversarial nature 
between the two institutions. The higher membership fees, as Ohl well knew, had not 
been budgeted in the Stuttgart Design Center’s annual finances, and he knowingly 
jeopardized a stronger German presence in this international body. In trying to save the 
national brand cohesion, Ohl deepened the petty rivalry between the center and the 
region. Nevertheless, the Stuttgart Design Center reached an agreement with the ICSID 
and became a member in 1979 without the support of the Rat für Formgebung. 
Eventually, Stuttgart even attempted to desert the national brand altogether by 
unhinging economic policy in Baden-Württemberg from the national context. In the 
1980s, the region explored supranational European alternatives. Its regional design 
politics created the pretext for interregional cooperation with three industrial and 
technological powerhouses in other western European countries: Italian Lombardy, the 
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French Rhône-Alpes, and Spanish Catalonia. Together they established the “Four Motors 
for Europe.”310 Lacking an institutional structure and mutual borders, these four regions 
nevertheless established an alliance for regional economic growth and increased political 
influence in European Union (EU) committees.311 The committees collaborated in the 
fields of culture, education, research and science, environmentalism, and other sectors. 
Stuttgart’s Design Center played an important role in coordinating cultural and economic 
events.312 This interregional cooperation offers a radical example of anti-centralist, anti-
federalist policymaking in Europe. It shows how competing concepts of economic and 
cultural governance muddled the narrative of the West German brand. Instead, Baden-
Württemberg and its Design Center contributed to a multinational brand that competed 
with the national narrative.313  
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Modernizing the GDR Brand: Streamlining, Mechanization, and Standardization  
Economic centralism theoretically equipped East Germany’s political elite to 
squelch regional diversity. In contrast to West Germany, the creation and maintenance of 
a coherent national brand narrative based on socialist realist aesthetics seemed like a 
reasonable task. This endeavor was supported by the design institute’s progression 
toward the center of economic planning. By 1965, the renamed Zentralinstitut für 
Gestaltung, came under the jurisdiction of the German Office for Standardization and 
Product Testing (Deutsches Amt für Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW).314 Sitting at 
the insection of culture, technology, and economics, the Zentralinstitut’s institutional 
history echoes the leadership’s belief that artistic quality determined the cultural value of 
commodities in the new socialist society. By including the production process and the 
workforce as the most important ideological building bloc of East German socialism, this 
new society was precisely what the GDR wanted to envelop into the national narrative. 
 As the new name implied, the Zentralinstitut became part of the central planning 
apparatus, thus consolidating cultural and economic power under one roof. However, 
starting in 1963, economic considerations of the New Economic System of Planning and 
Steering (NES) took precedence over the cultural facets of a coherent narrative inscribed 
in material culture. NES was Prime Minister and General Secretary of the SED Walter 
Ulbricht’s plan to put the GDR back on international markets after a period of extreme 
                                                 
314 The GDR design institution changed names and assignments several times: Institut für angewandte 
Kunst (Kulturministerium, 1952-1962), Zentralinstitut für Formgestaltung (Kulturministerium, 1963-1965), 
Zentralinstitut für Gestaltung (Deutsches Amt für Warenprüfung und Messwesen, 1965-1972), Amt für 
Formgestaltung (1972-1990). 
  
131 
isolation directly following the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.315 Economic levers 
played an important role in NES, which attempted to combine traditional command 
planning with indirect steering of enterprise via mostly monetary incentives. These 
economic levers, including net profit deductions, taxes, prices, the cost and availability of 
credit and fund formation, became methods for indirectly aligning enterprise with the 
Plan.316 Some of the levers aimed directly at motivating a workforce that received set 
wages separate from their performance. With bonuses and other financial incentives, 
economic planners tried to enliven workers to increase their output.  
Some of these lessons had been learned in earlier attempts to centralize aesthetics 
in the realm of production in order to create a cohesive national brand. The GDR had 
experienced setbacks early on because of regional opposition within the production 
sector. One of the largest furniture companies, the Saxon furniture complex in Dresden-
Hellerau, continued to follow a simplistic aesthetic. Dresden-Hellerau’s functionalist 
tendency was rooted in the reformist background of the parent company, Deutsche 
Werkstätten Hellerau, a former Mittelstand business. Its founder Karl Schmidt had been 
an influential leader in the turn-of-the-century Werkstätten reform movement, which 
strove to combine social responsibility, craftsmanship, and industrial production.317 
Bruno Paul, the famous Art Nouveau interior designer and architect, was one of the most 
brilliant minds who worked for Hellerau. From 1930 on, he conceived Hellerau’s first 
serial furniture program, the “Growing Apartment” (Wachsende Wohnung), which 
                                                 
315 For a in-depth discussion of Ulbricht’s motivations and goals for NES see Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics 
of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill: University Press of North Carolina, 1997), 
41-72. 
316 Jeffries and Melzer, “The New Economic System of Planning and Management,” 27. 
317 Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau, Mythos Hellerau. Ein Unternehmen meldet sich zurück. Catalog for the 
Exhibition in the Deutsche Architektur Museum (Darmstadt: Druckhaus, n.d.), 13. 
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complemented the strict functional aesthetic of Neue Sachlichkeit. This standardized 
program offered different furniture pieces that could be assembled as a living or dining 
room set according to the customers’ individual needs.318 
To combat Hellerau’s failure to conform to the Party’s demands, Ulbricht 
personally tried to suppress the company’s aesthetic influence. In 1953, he stopped the 
publication of a booklet about Hellerau on the grounds that the furniture displayed in the 
book contradicted the GDR’s official aesthetic guidelines.319 The population, however, 
liked the practical furniture that Hellerau produced. For example, at a home furnishing 
exhibition in East Berlin’s Alexanderplatz in 1953, which lacked stylistic cohesiveness 
and exhibited a tendency to bulky proportions, visitors asked for Bruno Paul’s 
Wachsende Wohnung. Confused by the display, visitors demanded furniture that they 
considered to be well-proportioned and cheap.320 A year after Ulbricht’s disapproval of 
the company’s product line, Hellerau’s head of development emphasized that, while the 
artistic department endeavored to follow official guidelines in developing a modern 
socialist living culture, “it ought to be our goal to maintain Deutsche Werkstätten 
[Hellerau]’s noted good style or, rather, to win it back.”321 Surely, Hellerau represented 
an exception to the ultimate goal of streamlined furniture production in the GDR. But 
Ulbricht’s reaction and the subsequent collectivization of industry starting in 1958-59 
                                                 
318 Bruno Paul designed his first serial furniture in 1908 in cooperation with the Vereinigte Werkstätten für 
Kunst im Handwerk München. This program could be customized to customer tastes and needs. For a 
detailed treatment of Paul’s pioneering aesthetic in standardized furniture see Sonja Günther, Bruno Paul, 
1974-1968 (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1992). 
319 Walter Ulbricht to Amt für Literatur und Verlagswesen, 30 November 1953, DC20/3945, BAB. 
320 Hans W. Aust, “Hausfrauen wollen keine Diplomatenschreibtische,” Berliner Rundschau, 22 November 
1953. 
321 Kant (head of development Hellerau) to Wurzler and Weber (Combine Dresden-Hellerau), 11 October 
1954, 11764/3131, SStD. 
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attempted to circumvent the individual character of singular businesses such as 
Hellerau.322  
Paradoxically, the collectivization process, which was meant to overcome 
incoherence in the national brand, created even more regional activity and new problems 
for a national narrative of cultural reinvention. Despite efforts to collectivize and 
centralize the national furniture industry in the GDR the process continued to take shape 
slowly. The Thuringian furniture industry was the first to unite private and state-owned 
furniture factories in the Gera and Jena area under the name VEB Ostthüringer 
Möbelwerke Zeulenroda/Triebes in 1959.323 Cooperative relations between enterprises of 
all ownership forms, the underlying theory suggested, would yield increased efficiency of 
resources and organize entire economic branches horizontally. Zeulenroda offered an 
attractive test case for the streamlining of the furniture industry alongside the successful 
implementation of cultural centralism in the GDR. With its production centered on 
stylistically overwrought furniture (Stilmöbel), Zeulenroda positioned itself well to 
uphold the official East German aesthetic. At the first exhibition of GDR interior design 
in the West in 1959 in Munich, Zeulenroda furniture represented the national brand 
because design politicians were convinced that its “progressive” furniture production 
served “the cultural prestige of [the German Democratic] Republic in any case.”324 With 
                                                 
322 Hellerau combined forty-six companies into one combine structure by 1980. The furniture combine 
Zeulenroda included only twenty-eight production sites. Andreas Lauber, Wohnkultur in der DDR – 
Dokumentation ihrer materiellen Sachkultur. Eine Untersuchung zu Gestaltung, Produktion und 
Bedingungen des Erwerbs von Wohnungseinrichtungen in der DDR (Eisenhüttenstadt: Dokumentations-
zentrum Alltagskultur der DDR, 2003), 89-92. 
323 Draft, „Beschluss der zentralen Möbelwerker-Konferenz vom 14. and 15. Mai 1959,“ DE1/26547, BAB. 
Lauber, Wohnkultur in der DDR, 30. 
324 Zeulenroda to Graßhof (DIA), 16 February 1959, DE1/26547, BAB. Zeulenroda was the cradle of 
curved, handcrafted furniture, a circumstance probably due to its proximity to the Erzgebirge where 
tradition in wood manufacture has persisted until today. 
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successful streamlining of the industry, so the theory went, the product range from East 
German industry would cohesively display a socialist vision for Germany. 
Yet by 1962 collectivization proved to be more complex than expected, because a 
myriad of ownership forms still existed across the country (see table 1). The biggest 
problem lay in the fact that about 96 percent of smaller furniture companies, employing 
48 percent of the manpower, only produced 34 percent of the national production 
volume. This mismanagement of manpower represented a fundamental problem of the 
GDR command economy: waste of resources. For the furniture industry it also 
represented a technological challenge. In furniture production a large portion of 
companies were artisan businesses, which could rarely be transformed into large-series 
producers (Großserienproduzenten). However, from the 1950s onward, the ultimate goal 
of any restructuring of furniture production had been the creation of Großserien to fulfill 
the demands of the population. 
Form of 
Ownership 
(Status 31 
December 1962) 
Production 
Volume 
in Million 
MDN/UPP 
Share (%) Number of 
Companies 
Share (%) Number of 
Employees
; excl. 
Apprentice
s 
Yearly 
Average % 
GDR 1,730 100.0 14,520 100.0 92,250 100.0 
Industry 1,143 66.0 563 4.0 48,015 52.0 
VEB 866 50.0 178 1.3 32,705 35.5 
HSB 218 12.6 228 1.6 11,670 12.5 
Private Company 58 3.3 156 1.1 3,590 3.9 
Co-operative 1 0.1 1 0 50 0.1 
Small Trade/Crafts 587 34.0 13,957 96.0 44,235 48.0 
PGH 225 13.0 415 3.0 14,325 15.5 
Priv. Small 
Trade/Crafts 
And Small Industry 
362 21.0 13,542 93.0 29,910 32.5 
Table 1: Ownership forms in the Furniture Industry, 1964.325 
 
                                                 
325 Concept, “Zur Entwicklung der Möbelindustrie der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin,” 
September 1964, p. 1, DE 1/ VS II 12173, BAB. 
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To effectively control regional industry and maximize efficiency, the Planning 
Commission needed intermediate-level institutions located between the ministry and 
enterprise that could organize industry transregionally. In the late 1950s, the Planning 
Commission created the Association of People’s Owned Companies (Vereinigungen 
Volkseigener Betriebe, VVB).326 These administrative units coordinated production by 
redistributing “tasks to allow greater specialization, standardization and the use of spare 
capacity,” providing the economic leadership with greater control over research and 
development, which was heretofore located at the individual firm level or that of the 
combines. 327 However, the introduction of the VVBs created rivals to that of the central 
planning institutions. Focused on their own industry, the VVBs did not work communally 
toward upholding a cohesive narrative of national branding. Furthermore, the VVBs 
remained subdivided in districts that did not cooperate to cover consumer needs across 
East Germany’s entire population, a problem that would become increasingly difficult to 
overcome with continued specialization and compartmentalization between and within 
districts. 
In 1964, the VVB Möbel started yet another attempt at restructuring furniture 
production. A Basic Concept (Grundkonzeption) listed the shortcomings of the industry 
thus far and explored options to counter them. Until 1963, furniture production 
constituted about 2 percent of the GDR’s total industrial production, which testified to an 
immense underutilization of this industrial branch. This can especially be seen in the 
                                                 
326 Aktionsprogramm der VVB Zeulenroda, 15 June 1958, DE1/26547, BAB; Strukturpapier zur Stellung 
und Rolle der VVB, n.d., DE1/26547, BAB. 
327 Ian Jeffries and Manfred Melzer, “The New Economic System of Planning and Management 1963-70 
and Recentralization in the 1970s,” in The East German Economy, ed. Ian Jeffries and Manfred Melzer 
(London: Croom Helm, 1987), 28. 
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GDR’s technological standards, which could not withstand international comparison. The 
mechanization of furniture manufacturing lagged far behind, due to years of paying 
Soviet war reparations and implementing an economic policy that favored investments in 
heavy industry over light industry. Furthermore, the report noted a large variety of styles 
and furniture models. For example, there were between 1,200 and 1,400 different 
versions in the upholstery sector, which undermined efficient serial production and scale 
economies. Economic planners shifted to mechanization, standardization, and 
modernization of furniture manufacturing, opening a new chapter in the provisioning and 
supply for both national retail and foreign trade.328 Until 1970 the list of goals for the 
restructuring included: eliminating fragmentation in productive capacities; specializing 
production by increasing the degree of mechanization; applying modern processing and 
manufacturing technologies; dealing in materials that corresponded to world quality 
standards; and the implementation of serial production and Großserienproduktion.329 
These modernization measures also shifted focus in national branding: instead of the 
“keeper of German heritage” narrative, the story developed in a direction that would 
reconnect East Germany’s cultural vision to other industrialized countries. After all, the 
1960s was the decade of the space race, great leaps, new frontiers, and new societies, 
concepts that embodied a global hope for human and material progress.330  
Alongside the structural reorganization of the furniture industry in the GDR, more 
efforts were made to standardize its production aiming at reaching higher efficiency. 
                                                 
328 Concept, “Zur Entwicklung der Möbelindustrie der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin,” 
September 1964, DE 1/ VS II 12173, BAB. 
329 Ibid., pg. 15. 
330 Jeremi Suri describes the atmosphere of the early 1960s as one of hope for a better future and the time to 
reap the promised fruits of hard toiling during the 1950s economic reconstruction. Jeremi Suri, Power and 
Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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Again, in theory, these measures intended to bring all parts of the production and 
consumption processes into the narrative of the East German national brand, which was 
changing from historic references to a modern aesthetic. The measures that the planning 
apparatus implemented included the standardization of measurements in cooperation with 
the construction industry, the nation-wide streamlining of assortments 
(Sortimentsbereinigung) – a specific type of product range rationalization based on 
cultural and political motivations – , and close quality control.331 Sortimentsbereinigung, 
in particular, was a radical process that dramatically reduced the numbers of models in 
the market, yet allowed the furniture industry to venture into mass production.  
In the end, modular storage furniture (Schrankwand) answered these calls for 
resourceful mass production, responding to the demands of standardization and 
heightened efficiency. The furniture “modularization” program that designer Rudolf Horn 
conceptualized for the Hellerau combine in 1966, called MDW, perhaps embodies this 
change in production attitude best (see figure 9). Instead of creating one variant of a 
hundred types, Horn changed the underlying concept to producing a hundred variants of 
one furniture type by substituting one distinct function with multiple functions for a piece 
or part of furniture. Boards and panels constituted the basis of the construction concept, 
which relocated production from the work- and resource-intensive furniture industry to 
wood pre-fabrication that simply provided the wooden panels.332 Consumers could 
                                                 
331 Gruppe Holz und Kulturwaren – Fachgebiet Möbel, Arbeitsprogramm-Entwurf der Arbeitsgruppe 
“Standardisierung,” 28 June 1960, DE 1/ 48691, BAB; and DAMW-Gütebericht 1. Jhg. ’63, 24 July 1963, 
DE1/48691, BAB.  
332 Rudolf Horn, “Zur Gestaltung und Konstruktion eines Industriemöbelprogramms für den VEB Deutsche 
Werkstätten Hellerau,” ca. Fall 1967, Folder “Ausstellung Funktion – Form – Qualität Warschau 1967 – 
Texte,” SiG. 
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assemble the pieces at home. In this way, the Zentralinstitut hoped to gain more 
efficiency as well as conserve raw materials in the furniture industry.  
The program was based on a vertical modular grid that optimized storage 
functionality and warehouse turnover. The pieces aligned by 96 mm vertically and 600 or 
800 mm horizontally and included shelves, doors, tabletops, desktops, and drawers. Its 
aesthetic appeal lay in the combination of matte-finished surfaces on the basic structure 
and shiny veneers with real-wood visual appearance on the frontal pieces. MDW became 
a best-selling item because of its modularization, availability, flexibility, and the degree 
of customization provided to the final user. The system’s simple modular assembly and 
disassembly made it easy to move the furniture to new quarters or to add supplementary 
parts as needed. MDW basically grew, or shrunk, over the course of the consumer’s life. 
Horn redesigned it twice in the 1970s and 1980s, ensuring its production until the mid-
1980s. To date, MDW ranks as one of the longest-selling and most successful furniture 
lines in pre-Ikea Europe.333  
MDW also stood for the complete rethinking of relations between production, 
retail, and montage. Retail had to be reorganized to provide first-time buyers with the 
Wohnberatung that would lead to the best solution for any given house, apartment or 
room, and to offer assembly in a timely manner. Consumers could choose to assemble the 
pieces themselves without professional help. However, Horn envisioned close 
cooperation between furniture stores and industry. He quoted Walter Ulbricht’s 
guidelines from the seventh Party convention: “It is here that retail fills out its role as 
contributor to the People’s economy – for the good of the economic efficiency. The 
                                                 
333 Rudolf Horn (designer and lecturer for design at the school for applied arts Burg Halle-Gibiechenstein) 
in conversation with the author, February 9, 2009. 
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economic laws of socialism are better put into effect.”334 Wohnberatungen had existed in 
the GDR before, but the projected MDW counseling exceeded prior institutions in scale 
and ambition, revealing a systematic attempt to promote both an aesthetic and a utilitarian 
vision to the broader public.335 
MDW also exemplifies the division of labor that marked the new sine qua non in 
the modernization of the GDR economy. Between 1964 to 1970, the economic Planning 
Committee increased investments to concentrate production in local networks. Starting 
with 30 million Ostmark (East German Marks) in 1964, yearly investments assigned to 
the furniture industry rose to 35 million Ostmark in 1965, and from 1966 to 1970 to 50 
million Ostmark each year.336 Existing infrastructure had to suffice, as plans did not 
foresee new buildings or annexes. Furthermore, the funds allocated for equipment 
exclusively went to machines fit for serial production.337 These provisions made the 
furniture industry an integral part of Ulbricht’s NES between 1963 and 1970. The 
restructuring of the furniture industry included the forced “concentration” of forty local 
companies in 1965. While big companies saw to the mass production of serial furniture, 
the small crafts businesses were to respond to short-term changes in demand and fill gaps 
in the product range.338 Consequently, companies specialized either in a certain model or 
                                                 
334 Walter Ulbricht quoted by Rudolf Horn, “Zur Gestaltung und Konstruktion eines 
Industriemöbelprogramms für den VEB Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau,” ca. Fall 1967, Folder 
“Ausstellung Funktion – Form – Qualität Warschau 1967 – Texte,” SiG. 
335 Werner Glöckner, “Komplette Innenräume,” Form und Zweck, 5/1980, 12. 
336 Concept, “Zur Entwicklung der Möbelindustrie der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin,” 
September 1964, p. 26, DE 1/ VS II 12173, BAB. 
337 Ibid., 27. 
338 This trajectory ironically represents rather traditional patterns of labor division in the German industrial 
sector. Similar networks formed organically in western capitalism as will be discussed below.  
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furniture ensemble, in certain technological processes or steps in the production process, 
or in assembling certain parts.339 
With NES in place, the reality of production and consumption increasingly 
dictated aesthetic developments. These qualities fit perfectly with the GDR’s plans for 
industrialization of the crafts in large-scale serial production. By using statistical analysis 
in economic planning processes, the GDR government mapped out all possible 
production and consumption scenarios at five-year intervals. Design increasingly marked 
the starting point for the manufacturing process. Working from model designs, economic 
planners could allocate the materials needed, order the required machinery for 
production, assign the manpower necessary to operate the machines, organize the product 
packaging as well as the transportation of parts and finished goods between factories and 
retail, and coordinate distribution within the sale areas. To control the design process as 
well, furniture collectives received financial bonuses for successful export products, 
which heightened the incentive for factories to put their best effort forward in producing 
quality “East German” goods. For example, the Zentralinstitut and the DAMW handed 
out the quality seal “Good Design” and assigned medals at the semi-annual Leipzig trade 
fair starting in 1964. The quality seal allowed GDR companies to increase the product 
price for domestic retail as well as for export thus reaching their annual Plan goal faster. 
Accordingly, NES measures also motivated an increase in aesthetic and technological 
development on the part of companies. 
For the future, the planning commission’s basic concept expected that the 
furniture industry would produce a complete and continuous range of functional and 
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modern furnishings. The economic planners demanded “superb quality, technologically 
state-of-the-art” furniture that should contain a higher “moral” value, meaning that it 
should be more durable, display greater functionality, and be of a simpler and lighter 
construction to achieve a better handling and design.340 Eventually, GDR manufacturing 
thus practiced the principles that taste reformer Horst Michel had envisioned for honest 
production, which provided a material environment for the ideological education of 
society in German socialism. Modern “productive” materials were designated to increase 
moral value. Chipboard and fiberboard, new surface materials, and chemical 
manufactures, were used to reach these new standards. Rather than safe, traditional 
materials like wood, the planners favored man-made materials, such as plastic and 
synthetics (Plaste und Elaste) for drawers, doors, frames and entire chairs.341 Eli Rubin 
describes this alternative, synthetic East German modernity as a construction of socialist 
economic superiority.342 But more than just an economic program, theoreticians saw the 
chemistry program as a cultural one as well. Horst Redeker’s 1960 pamphlet “Chemistry 
provides Beauty” (“Chemie gibt Schönheit”) set the tone for this period.343 In the 
furniture industry, synthetics found application mainly in the finishing of products. While 
the ultimate goal was an enhancement of the socialist surface, it mostly resulted in 
glossing over the lack of quality materials. Moreover, these new guidelines revised the 
previous emphasis on ornamentation and arts and crafts in furniture production. In this 
                                                 
340 Concept, “Zur Entwicklung der Möbelindustrie der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin,” 
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341 Ibid., 8 and 20. 
342 Rubin, Synthetic Socialism. 
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way, the leadership changed the GDR national brand from a backward-looking cultural 
heritage narrative to a forward-looking synthetic modernity. 
 
Family Businesses, Esthete Producers, and Industrial Espionage   
The 1964 restructuring of the GDR furniture industry strongly related to the state 
of West Germany’s furniture production. Investments in mechanization technology had 
of late propelled the Federal Republic to the top of storage furniture-producing nations. 
West Germany’s successes became the implied benchmark for the GDR furniture 
industry.344 To complete the modern brand narrative, however, the GDR planners 
depended on the cooperation of the industrial sector, just like Western design politicians 
needed to work hand in hand with entrepreneurial elites. However, the GDR missed the 
mark on one of German capitalism’s important actors: the family business.  
In the postwar era, a number of German family businesses that produced furniture 
grew from small firms that competed in niche markets into international companies. 
Nonetheless, they preserved their family ownership as well as influence on business 
culture and leadership. Yet few scholars have acknowledged the economic strength of 
these businesses and thus overlooked how financial and personal involvement in the 
company created specific organizational structures.345 Gary Herrigel, however, notes that 
                                                 
344 Raymond Stokes has described technological advances as the key to West Germany’s reappearance as a 
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the growing family business was one of Germany’s two separate paths into industrial 
modernity, thus linking this form of enterprise to the narrative of German capitalist 
success.346 In creating specialized regional networks of artisanal work through 
associational cooperation, a “decentralized industrial order” emerged alongside big 
business strengthened by the distinctive social ethos of the Mittelstand entrepreneurs. In 
the realm of design, personal involvement of family members and the ability to draw on 
regional artisanal skills often made family businesses drivers of innovation.  
In West Germany, most of the furniture industry developed in clusters in Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, and North-Rhine Westphalia.347 By the 1980s, the industry 
mechanized with remarkable speed, resulting in more output using less manpower in a 
decreasing number of businesses. Most of these firms were medium-sized family 
businesses with a workforce of less than one hundred. In 1977, Bavaria 267 wood 
furniture producers earned more than two billion DM with exports amounting to 120 
million DM with 24,000 employees. Four years later, 264 firms earned 2.25 billion DM 
and export revenues of 180 million DM with roughly 23,000 workers.348 Seventy-seven 
upholstery companies that employed 11,500 furniture makers completed the industry’s 
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landscape in Bavaria. They earned an additional 1.5 billion DM, of which 136 million 
DM resulted from exports in 1981. With such regional networks in place, collaborations 
between different branches of the industry contributed to the efficiency optimization. For 
example the collaboration between upholstery and storage furniture manufacturers led to 
attractive modular programs that offered solutions for the entire house and enticed 
consumers to spend more money on one purchase. While only 20 percent of the 
population bought furniture at the beginning of the 1980s, compared to 40 percent during 
the furnishing boom of the 1960s, the amount that they spent doubled from 318 DM to 
646 DM per purchase.349 Through mechanization and mutual support in regional 
networks, the industry had found creative ways to sustain itself even during times of 
economic downturn and the dawning saturation of the market. Continued technological 
reinvention of West German living environments added to the sustainability of the 
medium-sized furniture production. 
At the forefront of modern furniture design in the FRG stood the Nordrhein-
Westfalen family company Interlübke. Founded by brothers Hans and Leo Lübke in 
1937, the company became a household name by the 1960s. Based on the ideas of Swiss 
interior designer Walter Müller, the Lübke brothers developed an “endless” closet and 
shelving system in 1963 that revolutionized the German living room: the Schrankwand, a 
modular furniture system that could be rearranged or added to as needed (see figure 10). 
While there were other people working on similar solutions to provide flexible storage in 
the living room, the Lübke closet system, called Interlübke 63, won over consumers with 
its durability and simple elegance. It shaped the identity of the company to such an extent 
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that the family decided to rename their entire business “Interlübke.” Well aware of, but 
ignoring Stilmöbel enthusiasts in Germany, Interlübke did not follow trends or listen to 
consumer polls. Rather, the company leaders relied on their own tastes to create 
progressive and modern high-end furniture.350 As trendsetters, the Lübke family 
represented the ideal type of esthete industrialists in the Federal Republic: a middle-class 
family business that excelled in quality design and whose interests aligned with the 
aesthetic mission of the industry-dominated West German Rat für Formgebung. One of 
the founders’ sons, Helmut Lübke, even served as the council’s president from 2001 to 
2006. However, companies that could afford a selective and exclusive clientele were the 
exception and not the rule. Expensive, modern taste remained a luxury for most middle-
class families. 
Sharing a business ethos with their West German counterparts, East German 
entrepreneurs took pride in their personal involvement with their company, which 
included a drive for self-determined innovation. An expanding body of literature has 
looked at the causes for economic underperformance in the GDR with the main focus 
often lying with large-scale industries, such as machine tools, optics, chemicals, and 
electronics, which are overseen by boards that share decision-making and strategy. 
However, little attention has been given to the entrepreneurial spirit of the Mittelstand 
business owners as a factor for innovation and success in the socialist economy.351 Yet 
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GDR economic planning also affected entrepreneurial opportunities and family 
businesses during the period of intensified collectivization and standardization, 
threatening to turn away crucial members of the national brand.  
The new narrative of synthetic modernity put even more pressure on the planning 
commission to keep up with other industrial countries. With a mix of paranoia and 
hunger for success, the GDR fostered its technological development through industrial 
espionage. While this is not the place to speculate about the real impact of espionage on 
the East German economy at large, it is well worth exploring the intersection of 
entrepreneurial spirit, expert knowledge, and spy activity in the family business 
Bruchhäuser in Güstrow, Brandenburg. The case of Axel Bruchhäuser serves as an 
example to show how even a respected and financially well-situated family could feel 
stifled by the overbearing state machinery of economic planning, with its intrusive policy 
changes that looked for one-size-fits-all solutions to advance the technological edge of 
East German production. 
Axel Bruchhäuser’s espionage story began in 1969, when he requested to be 
assigned the status of a “travel cadre” (Reisekader).352 Reisekader were persons who are 
granted official permission to travel outside of the GDR for business and/or political 
purposes without undergoing the GDR’s typically long visa process. This permission 
especially included the Federal Republic, where Bruchhäuser wanted to travel to visit his 
business contacts in the furniture industry. His father, Werner Bruchhäuser, had built a 
furniture company in Güstrow before Axel’s birth in 1943. Already as a young boy, Axel 
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took great interest in furniture construction.  He patented a design for a chair made of 
tubular steel and wicker while still in secondary school. After his engineering studies at 
the Technische Universität Dresden, he joined his father’s firm, where he took over 
responsibility for technological development and marketing, among other areas. During 
the standardization efforts of the early 1960s, the DAMW took note of the high quality 
standard and the continued improvement of production technology in the Bruchhäuser 
company.353 By the late 1960s, this enterprise, a private firm with majority state 
shareholding, produced couches, chairs, and other seating furniture that was successful on 
the export market. In the FRG, it counted RKL Möbelwerkstätten Neukirchen, in nearby 
Nuremberg, and Arthur Haendler GmbH, Düsseldorf in the FRG among its biggest non-
socialist customers.354  
Werner Bruchhäuser, Axel’s father, had been a Reisekader ever since the 
company started exporting furniture to West Germany in 1966. It may have been either 
the request for the seemingly unnecessary doubling of travel permits for one firm that put 
the Bruchhäuser family on the radar of the GDR intelligence service Stasi (Ministerium 
für Staatssicherheit, MfS) or the fact that the father had not turned out to be a good and 
reliable Stasi informant.355 After long deliberations, and an extensive background check 
that included school documents and character evaluations from Bruchhäuser’s former 
peers at the university, the Stasi decided not only to grant Axel the travel permission, but 
also to hire him as an Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, an unofficial informant and collaborator of 
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the intelligence service, with the alias “Axel.”356 His research in synthetic fillers for 
upholstery cushions coupled with his technological knowledge made him an ideal 
candidate for industrial espionage. Moreover, Axel had never openly criticized the 
regime, he had a clean record in the required socialist youth groups, and he had been a 
great student in school and at university, where he had become an expert in chemical 
technology for the furniture industry. Even the fact that he had no particularly political 
background and came from a middle-class family, which is to say “bourgeois” from the 
point of view of the Stasi, helped his case. The Stasi concluded that this profile would 
make him even trustworthier in the eyes of western business partners, who would thus 
speak to him more openly.357 Once his acquisition and IM training had been completed, 
the Stasi showered Bruchhäuser with attention and financial incentives to work for them. 
The intelligence service actually purchased a West German car, an Opel Commodore, for 
him to travel around the Federal Republic with more ease.358 For two years everything 
went smoothly. Bruchhäuser and his father both went on trips to Western Europe and 
reported back to the Stasi on the political, economic, and social situation of their host 
countries. Specifically, Bruchhäuser’s mission consisted of collecting “operational 
intelligence regarding offensive economic activities in the economic realm, the 
infiltration of the adversary structure, intelligence of adversary companies and their 
centers of interference, accumulation of scientific-technological information and 
documents from non-socialist countries, recruitment of western economic cadres, and 
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intelligence on operationally interesting persons from non-socialist countries.”359 
Paranoia over external, mischievous “interference” in the GDR economy seemed to take 
precedence over uncovering foreign industry secrets. But informant Bruchhäuser 
provided the Stasi mostly with technological information about West German businesses, 
especially in the field of polyurethane chemistry. He also went to the Cologne Furniture 
Fair in 1970 and 1972 to evaluate the international standards and the technological 
development of furniture production more generally.  
In 1972, however, after Erich Honecker succeeded Ulbricht, the entrepreneurial 
situation in the GDR took a turn for the worse. Already majority-owned by the state, the 
Bruchhäuser family business became expropriated under the auspices of the new 
collectivization policy. Having endured partial expropriation in 1960, this was more than 
the Bruchhäuser family was willing to accept.360 A few weeks after the announcement of 
the collectivization policy, the Stasi inadvertently sent both father and son on trips to 
western countries. This negligence on part of the intelligence service created an 
opportunity for the Bruchhäusers to flee the GDR. They reunited in West Germany, 
where they joined forces with an old business contact in Lauenförde, Lower Saxony. 
They proceeded to take over a furniture company called Tecta and continued to produce 
furniture, now specializing in Bauhaus designs and other high-end furniture.361 Taken by 
surprise, the Stasi wanted to force the Bruchhäusers back into the GDR by holding the 
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rest of the family, Axel’s mother and his three sisters, hostage. For two years the Stasi 
tried to follow their every step but eventually gave up in 1974.  
This episode shows to what length the GDR went to catch up technologically with 
the West, and the Federal Republic in particular. The Stasi took the risk of involving 
father and son in their IMS program, providing transportation, and finances to enable the 
duo to deepen their business contacts in the West. Bruchhäuser’s mission also illuminates 
the paranoia with which the GDR leadership made policy vis-à-vis the FRG. They 
suspected manipulation and offensive behavior at every turn of the road. Such hostile 
projections hardened the lines of the Cold War competition time and again throughout the 
later decades, often without having any solid basis. However, to a certain extent the 
investment paid off. Bruchhäuser did report back on new ideas about how to combine 
chemical components that could substitute scarce natural resources, such as wood or 
fillers for cushions.362 Among the projects that his expert knowledge and industrial 
espionage enabled were the new synthetics works in Schwedt. In a letter that he sent 
home to a friend in Güstrow after his flight, Axel Bruchhäuser pointed out that the 
technological standard in Schwedt was tremendous, and that people in the West were 
“pulling their hair seeing how little such technological expertise was put to use.”363  
Espionage surely informed and perhaps even expedited technological 
development in the GDR furniture industry, though taking real advantage of these 
advances depended on the visionary entrepreneur. But such a figure had been lost to the 
other side due to the expropriation policies of the state. The planned economy suppressed 
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the entrepreneurial spirit, dissuading company owners from working colaborating with 
economic planners. Whether middle-class industrialists actually physically emigrated to 
the West like Bruchhäuser or retreated into “inner emigration” by refusing cooperation, 
in the end the government lost a crucial building block of the national narrative.364  
 
“Wir bitten um Ihre Beurteilung”: Consumer Opinion and Market Research 
Postwar national branding established a direct link between production and 
consumption by inscribing a narrative into products. In the case of West Germany, the 
brand was particularly national by design, but it shared its modern edge with other 
European countries. In the East German case, branding changed from serving as keeper 
of German culture to articulating a socialist synthetic modernity more international in 
character.365  The narrativity of material culture can explain consumer choices based on 
fashions, personal tastes, and projections of self-image. Accordingly, consumers purchase 
the representation of values, “a narrative, in the form of a desk or a chair, that they 
circulated to others by displaying the items in their homes or offices.”366 The act of 
consumption, then, symbolizes the population’s acceptance or rejection of the national 
                                                 
364 The term “inner emigration” (innere Emigration) is part of a larger discussion about individual political 
responsibility under authoritative governments. German author Frank Thiess coined the term in 1945 when 
he defended German writers who decided to stay in Germany. It describes an internalized critical attitude 
toward political elites that is rarely addressed in public. See for example Hoffmann, Charles W. 
“Opposition und Innere Emigration: Zwei Aspekte des ‘Anderen Deutschlands’.” In Exil und Innere 
Emigration II: Internationale Tagung in St. Louis. Ed. Peter Uwe Hohendahl and Egon Schwarz (Frankfurt: 
Athenäum, 1973), 119-140.  
365 Paul Betts notes that the styles referenced in the making of national aesthetics in GDR furniture design 
were ironically international by definition, for example Chippendale. However, these past and even 
bourgeois styles “could be safely rediscovered under the umbrella of a broadly defined ‘socialist style’.” 
Paul Betts, “Building Socialism at Home: The Case of East German Interiors,” in Socialist Modern: East 
German Everyday Culture and Politics, ed. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2003), 106. 
366 Per Hansen, “Networks, Narratives, and Markets: The Rise and Decline of Danish Modern Furniture, 
1930-1970,” Business History Review 80, no. 3 (2006): 452. 
  
152 
brand. In this way, consumption became an integral part to the success or failure of 
official aesthetics in interior design in East and West.  
From the early days of the German Democratic Republic design educators made a 
great effort to include the population in the branding of postwar East Germany. Interior 
design shows offered an opportunity for direct interaction between design visionaries and 
the general public. In 1952, the Institut für angewandte Kunst, the later Zentralinstitut, 
organized an exhibition presenting the official vision of the GDR leadership, asking the 
population to judge the displayed products. This evaluation by the masses, the catalog 
informed visitors, constituted an “important democratic cultural task,” as the public 
judged the current industrial production “with the goal of influencing their further 
development and of scrutinizing those distributers and buyers who brought the mediocre 
and the bad instead of the best into retail.”367 The GDR thus fortified the chain between 
production and consumption by actively fostering the participation of consumers in 
writing a national narrative. Yet the Formalism Debate and its aesthetic diktat curtailed 
this initial conversation between the population and institutions that created objects of the 
human environment. Eventually, public opinion polls proved to be an outlet for 
participatory democratic expectations among the population rather than a true attempt to 
integrate consumer opinion in the realities of production.  
Shortly after the Formalism Debate, the Institut put together exhibitions that often 
stood in stark contrast to the official style guidelines, for example in cooperation with 
furniture companies that kept a modern outlook such as Hellerau. Angry comments in the 
guestbook of the 1956 show “Industrial products - functional and beautiful” 
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(“Industriewaren - zweckmäßig und schön”) at Alexanderplatz in East Berlin attested to 
the customers' disgruntlement. Seeing beautiful and modern sample furniture at the 
exhibit highlighted the drab reality in stores where the stylistic mix of German socialist 
historicism held sway. One guest even called the exhibition a “smoke screen” hiding the 
real state of the socialist interior design industry.368 
The result of visitors’ frustration with the inability of the leadership to organize a 
more modern economy touched a sore spot of the GDR during the 1950s. It resulted in 
eastern pilgrimages to West Berlin, the island of capitalism surrounded by socialism. “It’s 
always the same. Retail, that is the government, has only to blame itself if we go to the 
West to see or even buy well-designed products!” one visitor remarked disappointedly, 
knowing that the GDR had the potential to produce modern items after seeing them 
displayed in the exhibition. “This [exhibition] is proof that we also have such things. 
Where can I buy the nice little upholstered lounge chairs from Hellerau?”369  To engage 
the economic planners, consumer comments used ideological rhetoric: “Fulfilling 
personal needs is the best cultural education (Kultur-Erziehung). How can we benefit 
from the most beautiful exhibition if everything is destined for export?”370 The 
aggravation of the population jumps out at the reader of these remarks. Most of the 
commentators signed their critique with full name and address, which indicates that they 
neither feared repression nor punishment for their candor. “This book with its contents 
can be described as an ‘arraignment;’ an arraignment because it uncovers openly and 
consistently the idleness of retail and partially even that of the industry,” one of the last 
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comments summed up the general tone of the guestbook.371 This document offers early 
testimony to the way in which the GDR leadership increasingly managed popular 
discontent by the late 1960s once it became clear that the reconstruction-period promises 
of delayed gratification would not come true.372 
Indeed, ten years later, the critique had not changed. At the occasion of the 
modern living design exhibition Modern Dwelling (Modernes Wohnen) in Hoyerswerda 
in 1965, similar comments about retail’s failure to embrace modern furniture distribution 
appeared in the guestbook. Visitors of the show placed special blame on the retail buyers 
and proposed that “the HO [Handelsorganisation] and Konsum buyers of Hoyerswerda 
should acquire good taste by seeing the original [in this exhibition]. Hopefully then there 
will be good products available in our stores.”373 Against the backdrop of the Formalism 
Debate and the consecutive oft-changing style directives from the leadership, though, the 
public also understood insecurities on part of the buyers urging them “to buy and act 
bravely!”374 Here it became evident that many GDR citizens preferred modern idioms to 
the opulent kitsch of socialist historicism. In the 1950s, there existed no agreement 
between the leadership and the populace about the “look” of German socialism. 
Middlemen, industrialists, and buyers grew insecure and often simply followed their 
personal taste or tried to stay true to the company’s style. In the 1960s, when the branding 
slowly changed to a “socialist modern,” production and retail had to undergo a complete 
restructuring in order to fulfill this new vision. Structural problems in the organization of 
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the GDR economy seemed to be the true cause of consumption disruption and the 
incomplete modernization of GDR workshops and homes in the long run. 
The subdivision of the economy into districts hindered a sustainable consumer 
product supply to the population. Mainly, the mismatch between production and 
consumption resulted from the GDR’s high standard of “societal division of labor and the 
resulting positioning of production sites for specific consumer goods.”375 The industry in 
each district was supposed to cover the consumption needs of the entire region, which 
posed no problem in regard to foodstuffs or articles of personal hygiene and clothes. 
However, in regard to furniture, the situation became more difficult. Despite efforts to 
streamline the furniture assortment in the GDR, each of the furniture combines 
maintained a specific style, divergent from others. Oftentimes, regional production and 
consumption did not overlap. This problem persisted until the final days of the GDR. 
Interdistrict exchange of goods was extremely limited, which in turn negatively affected 
the availability of specific furniture sets and add-on systems across the country.376 If 
somebody who had set up house in the district of Dresden with ready access to the very 
particular furniture of Hellerau moved to Schwerin at the Baltic Sea coast, he or she was 
left with two options. Either start over, furnishing the home with new furniture, which 
would be extremely costly, or add pieces of furniture produced in the new home district, 
which might compromise their aesthetic vision. No matter how trivial these problems 
might seem, they affected the quality of living in the GDR and the support of the national 
brand by a disgruntled population.  
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In line with the scientification of socialism under Khrushchev, the GDR 
established Market Research mechanisms to coordinate supply and demand starting in 
1962. This new insterest in consumer behavior originated with the “consumer turn” of 
1958, which heralded an ideological shift away from an economy exclusively based on 
heavy industry to an increasing consideration of consumer demands.377 This ideological 
turn predated the restructuring of economic policy in Ulbricht’s NES by five years. As 
paradoxical as conducting market research in a centrally planned economy might sound, 
the Institut für Bedarfsforschung (Institut für Marktforschung after 1967) contributed 
tremendously to the configuration of Five-Year Plans. Conducting polls among 
consumers, comparing past production rates with actual demand, and calculating and 
analyzing the predicted consumption of goods belonged to its tasks. The institute saw its 
mission as one of “understanding and explaining the antagonism between production and 
consumption, supply and demand, communal and individual interests, communal and 
individual consciousness” via consumer motivation research.378 In this fashion, market 
researchers searched for ways to redress discrepancies in the socialist “planning of the 
market” – a contradiction in and of itself. Foreseeing business landscapes for five-year 
intervals based on this data presented an insurmountable task, yet the planning apparatus 
continued to attempt to reach budget conclusions and anticipate demand despite recurring 
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proof that the estimates were off on both the consumer and the producer end of the 
equation.379  
Nonetheless, the presence of a market research institute in a planned economy 
illustrates how the GDR tried to balance ideological boundaries and the uniformity of 
standardized materiality with the appeasement of consumer demands.380 By 1971, a 
period when prefabricated housing high rises had become the preferred way of building 
in the GDR, consumers continued to prefer functionality over pomp and ornament.381 
According to a market research survey, half of the population liked the new add-on 
furniture systems, such as MDW. More than 40 percent of the population liked the idea 
of extra storage for clothes in the living room. Among consumers who had a one-
bedroom apartment, where the parents used the living room as their bedroom, this 
number almost doubled. In regard to their interior design taste, the population was split 
down the middle. While 49 percent favored a cohesive style of their living room 
furniture, 44 percent preferred to have different styles or shapes in supplemental small 
furniture, such as side tables or flowerpot stands. Regarding dining tables and chairs, the 
percentage of consumers preferring aesthetic cohesion with their storage furniture 
(Behältnismöbel) was even higher at 53 percent. 82 percent indicated a preference for 
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natural materials in their furniture, preferably real wood.382 For the economic planners, 
the study’s findings indicated that the population had specific ideas about their living 
environments, requesting modern design idioms that enabled the consumer to achieve 
maximum flexibility and practicality. Though synthetic surfaces, increasingly applied in 
accordance with the modernization concepts of the mid-sixties, were not on the list of 
preferences, which shows that the narrative of synthetic modernity failed to find full 
support among the GDR population. Antiques and inherited wooden furniture continued 
to be a substantial part of GDR interiors. However, the government also encouraged this 
trend when raw materials and consumer products became scarcer in the 1980s.383 
Attempts to include these variations into the narrative can be found in Kultur im Heim, a 
GDR interior design magazine. In reports titled “Biedermeier im Neubau?” and “Möbel 
aus zweiter Hand,” design journalists promoted the integration of old furniture into 
appropriate socialist living environments.384 The key to keeping the home “socialist” was 
to avoid treating the piece as ornamentation, no matter how historic or precious, and 
rather to assign the furniture a specific function. Second-hand furniture, it was pointed 
out in 1985, helped to mitigate the gaping holes in market saturation. 
GDR consumption analysis illustrates how general popular attitudes towards 
home furnishings changed over time (see table 3). The number of households that wanted 
to replace their furniture more than doubled from 21 percent in 1971 to 43 percent in 
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1984. While this figure is still comparatively low, it indicates the growing expectations of 
material wellbeing among the East German population in the later years of the GDR. 
Erich Honecker’s consumption-oriented promises of Einheit von Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialpolitik at the Eight Party Congress in 1971 likely spurred expectations. 
Nevertheless, the planned economy failed to fulfill these hopes for improved material 
conditions because of the non-fulfillment of past production quotas and fast progress in 
prefabricated housing.385 The public housing programs of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 
started a large migration from decaying historical inner-city housing to new, sometimes 
bigger high-rise apartments on the outskirts of cities, which often necessitated the 
purchase of additional furniture.386 Whereas the production capacity in East Germany 
would have been large enough to cover the unexpected demand, the economy became 
increasingly dependent on export revenues, and a large percentage of the national 
production was sent abroad, as will be described in more detail later.  
Percentage of households (%) GDR households with the 
following opinion on furniture 
consumption 
1971 1975 1981 1984 
One should only buy once 34 31 33 29 
One should renew parts 36 30 24 17 
One should renew everything 21 32 37 43 
No opinion 9 7 6 11 
Table 2: Development of Demand for Furniture and Upholstery in the GDR, 1971-1984.387 
 
The population grew increasingly upset about these gaps in supplies. In Eingaben, 
complaint letters to the communal, regional or national leadership, consumers made their 
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individual plight with the retail sector known.388 Since Eingaben were not consistently 
retained, it is difficult to extract a true sense of popular opinion from these letters. The 
population mainly used them to criticize and not to complement the consumer supply, 
which leaves these letters to over-represent negative opinion.389 These letters provided 
citizens with the illusion that they could bring their concerns directly to the people in 
power, an emulation of direct participatory democracy and another “smoke screen” that 
the government implemented to maintain domestic stability.  Just like the guestbooks at 
design exhibitions, Eingaben functioned as pressure valves to release consumer 
frustrations, which the Party invented to prevent civil unrest without actually having to 
change anything in the slow-moving economic system.390 Prisma, a popular GDR 
television program that had “taken upon itself” to achieve justice for the wronged in the 
East German economy, continuously featured complaints and forwarded Eingaben to the 
responsible places, which annoyed economic planners and policymakers.391 Ironically, 
Prisma did more of a disservice to consumers, because it took the focus away from the 
wrongs in the system and directed it instead toward individual cases that, after some 
moralizing on national TV, industry and retail were able to fix. With little effort, the 
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promises by the late 1980s. More than 100,000 petitions in 1989 contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the 
GDR leadership. Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 286-320.    
391 See DG5/6054-6059, BAB. Ina Merkel analyzed Eingaben for their rhetorical methods and found that 
self-presentation as a righteous socialist citizen, open threats to appeal to higher levels of the 
administration, and references from the political leadership to legitimize appeals constituted the repertoire 
that GDR citizens employed to negotiate their (material) dissatisfaction. Merkel, “Wir sind doch nicht die 
Mecker-Ecke der Nation,” 24-27. 
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leadership could create the impression that the socialist economy was able to fulfill 
demands, although the reality was the crass opposite. 
In the Federal Republic, consumer demands necessarily shaped attempts to forge 
a cohesive aesthetic in the market economy. In 1954 the Institut für Demoskopie 
Allensbach conducted a survey about consumer tastes in furniture among females over 18 
years of age (see table and image below).392 This survey exemplified the challenge of 
diverse tastes that West German industrialists and design politicians faced in their quest 
for aesthetic revival. The overwhelming majority, 60 percent of the women interviewed, 
preferred flowered kitsch, dark woods, and curved lines on living room buffets and 
recliners. 30 percent liked what could be described as subdued modern or Swedish style 
with clear lines, blonde woods, and unadorned surfaces. Only 7 percent of the 
respondents, mostly younger women between the ages of 18 and 29, showed interest in 
the organic shapes of 1950s American-influenced, “international” design. A further 
breakdown of this group reveals that better educated female wage earners and 
entrepreneurs from mid-sized towns favored the modern idioms (the Swedish and 
International styles). These numbers revealed a slowly growing trend toward modern, 
abstract aesthetics among consumers. The industry intended to speed up this trend by 
shaping consumer taste with the initiatives enumerated above, such as the 
Wohnberatungen and industry-sponsored permanent exhibitions of well-designed objects.  
                                                 
392 “Wohnstil (1): Einrichtung, Möbel, Lampen,” Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1954, Zsg 132, 
BAK. 
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“Of the four living rooms depicted here, which one of these rooms do you like best, I mean, which 
one would you choose to live in if money wasn’t an issue?” 
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I like best (%) 
 Living room 2 Living room 1 Living room 4 Living room 3 I don’t know  
All women 60 29 7 2 2 
18 – 29 years 54 34 10 1 1 
30 – 44 years 62 29 6 1 2 
45 – 59 years 65 26 6 2 1 
60 years and 
older 
61 26 4 5 4 
Education 
Primary School 67 26 4 2 1 
Secondary School 38 40 16 1 5 
Town Population 
Under 2,000 69 23 4 2 2 
2 – under 20,000 60 29 7 2 2 
20 – u. 100,000 51 35 8 3 3 
100,000 and more 56 31 8 2 3 
Profession 
Worker 69 25 3 2 1 
Farm Hand 71 22 5 0 2 
Farmer 71 18 5 3 2 
Employee 41 41 13 2 3 
Civil Servant 60 29 5 5 1 
Entrepreneur  53 32 12 1 2 
Table 3: West German Survey, Wohnstil (1): Einrichtung, Möbel, Lampen. 1954.393 
 
Yet the Rat für Formgebung’s attempts to streamline West German taste in 
interior design had little success. In 1963, sociologist Alphons Silberman conducted a 
study in Cologne and Bergneustadt, in which eight different pictures were shown with a 
more gradual difference than the earlier survey in 1954. All the same, the preferred 
aesthetic was bulky and ornamented, especially in the higher-income brackets.394 A few 
years later in 1969, the Rat für Formgebung started a quality initiative similar to the 
economic levers employed by economic planners in the GDR, awarding outstanding 
design that reflected official aesthetics with a government-endowed prize – curiously 
                                                 
393 “Wohnstil (1): Einrichtung, Möbel, Lampen,” Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1954, Zsg 132, 
BAK. This survey has already been used by several historians as it provides great visual evidence for 
popular tastes in the 1950s. 
394 Alphons Silbermann, Vom Wohnen der Deutschen: Eine soziologische Studie über das Wohnerlebnis 
(Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1963), 68. 
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named “Good Design” as well.395 A jury appointed by the Rat evaluated submissions 
from industry and design students. Many of these prized designs were assembled in a 
traveling exhibition that the design council sent around western and eastern Europe. 
Contrary to the intent, the prize did not reach a larger German audience and was often 
confused with the much older Good Industrial Design (Gute Industrieform) quality seal 
awarded annually at the Hanover Fair.396 
Aside from policies, design, and production, retail played an important role in 
creating or undermining the national brand. Just like in the GDR, much of the availability 
of modern designs depended on their distribution through buyers and retail organizations. 
One of the largest German retailers was the Neckermann mail order business, which had 
sent out catalogues to 10 million West German homes by the early 1970s. Asked how 
Neckermann conceptualized its product line, Eckart Rittmeyer, the head buyer at 
Neckermann, responded that despite accepting its responsibilities as an active factor in 
furniture consumption, Neckermann did not perceive itself as an educator. Instead, 
demand simply dictated the choices in the catalogue. Unfortunately, he continued, 
designer furniture and low prices seldom matched up, but even if they did, he thought 
that the Rat für Formgebung’s jury for the Good Design quality seal was too avant-garde 
in its award practice, missing the mark with respect to both the needs and demands of the 
population.397 Gerhard Krahn, the general manager and partial owner of the small 
furniture store Gessmann and the larger furniture center Europamöbel in Frankfurt shared 
                                                 
395 Annual report, Rat für Formgebung – Tätigkeitsbericht ‘70, n.d., Darmstadt, RfF. 
396 Interview with designer Rolf Heide, “Wunschtraum: Einfache Möbel für einfache Leute,” in 
Grundbedürfnisse im Wohnbereich, ed. Rat für Formgebung  (Darmstadt: Rat für Formgebung, 1973), 31. 
397 Interview with Eckart Rittmeyer, “Beim Versandhaus: Abneigung gegen avantgardistische Designer,” in 
Grundbedürfnisse im Wohnbereich, ed. Rat für Formgebung (Darmstadt: Rat für Formgebung, 1973), 26. 
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this view in his observations about consumption in both stores. Whereas the typical 
Gessmann customer was usually well off, the Europamöbel center catered to the low-
income strata. Asked to speculate about the promises of functional furniture design at 
affordable prices, Krahn said that the center would not change low-income consumer 
behavior, “because this furniture with clear lines doesn’t offer enough on an emotional 
level.”398 He also pointed out that even the affluent often preferred style furniture 
(Stilmöbel) over functional furniture. However, Krahn observed that the functional 
avantgarde styles at the Gessmann store sold eventually, and with increasing speed, at the 
Europamöbel center.399  
In the end, despite all the effort put into the education of consumers about Good 
Design, West German policymakers never succeeded in completely eradicating the 
typically bulky-style furniture, commonly known as Gelsenkirchner Barock, an opulent 
Biedermeier of sorts, which came to embody German popular taste like no other. In her 
acclaimed photographic study of the West German living room, Herlinde Koelbl captured 
diverse lifestyles and their corresponding home decors during her 1980 travels through 
the Federal Republic.400 Not one living room looked like the next, yet some of them 
subscribed to certain conventions. Next to a couch and a coffee table, the typically 
German shelf and storage system Schrankwand overpowered the room and its inhabitants 
in most every picture. The otherwise diversified tastes seemed to originate with the idea 
of the living room as a representative space furnished to receive visitors, a room that 
                                                 
398 Interview with Gerhard Krahn, “Der Möbelhändler: Kein Stilapostel,” in Grundbedürfnisse im 
Wohnbereich, ed. Rat für Formgebung (Darmstadt: Rat für Formgebung, 1973), 27. 
399 Ibid., 28. 
400 Herlinde Koelbl and Manfred Sack, Das deutsche Wohnzimmer (München: List, 1980). 
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symbolizes social status and ambitions while taking into account needs for comfort.401 
Especially the middle-income groups liked to demonstrate their affluence with heavy, 
wooden furniture, elaborate patterned fabrics and various knick-knacks. To this social 
group, functionalism and Good Design represented the scarcity of the postwar years, a 
time of poverty and shame of which most Germans did not want to be reminded. While 
the Federal Republic understood the centrality of prosperity in its postwar narrative of 
national branding, the selected furnishing style just did not fit the self-image of a large 
segment of the population.  
 Accordingly, there can be no single answer to the sociological analysis of taste 
and consumer behavior in the two German states. By the early 1970s, though, a 
noticeable change in tastes took place among the larger consumer base and the increased 
demand for modern furniture would eventually lead to a sinking price structure, as 
evident in the international success story of Ikea. This went along with an increasing 
design presence as lifestyle expression in West Germany.402 In the East, the boom in 
prefab housing that created demand for practical, smaller furniture can surely account for 
some of the fascination with modern design.  
 
Conclusion 
Due to the high number of contributors, the narrative of national branding created 
a challenge in both German states. The vision of a modern, advanced West Germany that 
embodied technological precision and durability, yet at the same time also progression 
                                                 
401 Joachim Pietsch, “Gelsenkirchener Barock und Drittes Reich,” in Gelsenkirchener Barock, ed. Stadt 
Gelsenkirchen Städtisches Museum, 71-81 (Heidelberg: Edition Braus, 1991), 74; Silbermann, Vom 
Wohnen der Deutschen, 242. 
402 Aynsley, Designing Modern Germany, 188. 
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and mobility, was juxtaposed to an East Germany that branded itself the keeper of 
German cultural heritage, espouser of a backward-looking historicism that only gradually 
gave way to a more international vision of a modern socialist consumer society during the 
restructuring of the economy. Yet policymakers, designers, industry, retail, and 
consumers came to the market with different expectations. Even the education of retailers 
and consumers did not result in the desired cultural streamlining under the umbrella of a 
national brand or a style, one representing an ideologically and culturally consistent 
narrative through which people east and west of the German-German border furnished 
their homes. 
An analysis of both German economies through the lens of centralism and 
regionalism uncovers factors that undermined and changed the national brand narrative. 
The design institutions in both Germanys tried to influence cultural and economic policy 
centrally, despite, or sometimes because of, their lack of authority and legitimate powers 
at regional administrative levels. Although the decision-making powers in cultural 
matters lay with the regional government rather than the federal government, the West 
German Rat für Formgebung enjoyed far-reaching influence in cultural and economic 
circles through corporatist structures. Meanwhile, the central organs of the GDR and even 
the first party secretary Ulbricht could not force their aesthetic and economic principles 
on individual enterprises whenever regional identity trumped official visions for a 
socialist material culture. While previous explanations of popular conduct under the GDR 
dictatorship such as the concept of a  “niche society”403 find acts of non-conformity 
                                                 
403 West German diplomat and head of the FRG permanent representation in East Berlin Günter Gaus 
coined the phrase “niche society” to describe a population that followed policies just to fulfill the 
appearance of good socialist citizens, but did not really care about the concept of socialist new man in the 
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mostly in the private sphere of the home, my analysis of economic structures and the 
relatively limited extent of cultural streamlining clearly indicates that, instead of 
retreating into the private, disobedience happened in plain sight – even in one of the most 
significant political arenas of state socialism: the command economy. 
Elitist efforts to affect the self-conception of consumers went astray. In the West, 
design furniture instilled with the clarity and simplicity of a functional, modern style 
remained only affordable for the higher and upper-middle classes. Since the majority of 
consumers did not see their emotional needs reflected in the official aesthetic in the West, 
industry and retail followed aesthetics that proved successful in the market in order to 
compete in the expanding trade in lifestyle consumption during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Gelsenkirchner Barock survived among an abundance of different styles, catering to the 
German notion of Gemütlichkeit. In the East, the command economy prepared its own 
pitfalls with Five-Year plans that usually yielded results one could adequately title 
“planning ahead and falling behind.”404 Even as large parts of the population longed to 
buy modern furniture for the limited spaces in prefab housing across the GDR beginning 
in the 1960s, the demand could not be satisfied due to the guiding concept of “division of 
labor,” which ironically fractured rather than centralized the East German economy. All 
of these factors contributed to mixed styles in German homes, creating a trans-border 
traditionalism of sorts as an alternative to the states’ modern visions for the everyday. 
Unintentional aesthetic convergence of East and West German domestic culture then 
                                                                                                                                                 
privacy of their homes, their niche. Günter Gaus, Wo Deutschland liegt: Eine Ortsbestimmung (Hamburg: 
Hoffmann und Campe, 1983). 
404 Sleifer, Planning Ahead and Falling Behind. 
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started with the GDR’s and Federal Republic’s similar struggles over a centralized 
cultural policy, regional economic organization, and consumer tastes.  
Remarkable in the Cold War context is the fact that neither Germany’s furniture 
production imitated or culturally identified with the United States or the Soviet Union. 
Few facets in furniture production acquired an air of German-ness. Emphasizing 
durability over modishness is a feature with which German design and engineering has 
become synonymous (even if GDR production failed to uphold these principles, officials 
continued to demand them). The Schrankwand as an example of extraordinary detail and 
organizational efficiency embodied typically German values and found broad acceptance 
on both sides of the Wall. In the end, the efforts to create national brands by infusing 
German homes, East and West, with styles that conformed to their respective narrative 
met the same fate as Weimar’s Werkbund and the Bauhaus broken dreams of 
democratizing Good Design. Until Ikea disseminated its neo-functional, modern product 
line in Germany, designer furniture that deserved the name could only be found in the 
homes of the rich and in government buildings. 
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CHAPTER 4: DEALING CULTURE ACROSS THE WALL:  
INTRA-GERMAN TRADE AND AESTHETIC INCENTIVES  
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET  
Introduction 
At the 1963 Leipzig Trade Fair, West German designer Friedrich Koslowsky 
approached leading GDR politicians and economic planners with his idea for a “House of 
Life” in East Berlin. This furniture store project, which the designer described as a 
“consumption site with sample show,” would offer GDR producers the possibility to 
present their products to West German buyers, thus facilitating trade contacts. Based on 
the hope that a shared Wohnkultur and reciprocal trade would overcome the German 
division, he sought to “build bridges” between the GDR and the Federal Republic.405 
While Koslowsky never realized his idea for the House of Life, his notion of cultural 
rapprochement through trade suggests that external economic contacts affect the product 
landscape of a national brand.  
After examining the undermining influence of associational and ideological 
factions, regional diversity, and consumer tastes on cohesive national aesthetics, the 
question arises then how industrial design helped the two German states in their endeavor 
to reclaim international significance. Economic historian Sidney Pollard has shown that 
exports were a fundamental part of Germany’s economic foreign relations.406 As the two 
German states tried to establish themselves as trading partners for the capitalist West, 
their special situation complicated trade relations. The Basic Law and West Germany’s 
“German Policy” (Deutschlandpolitik) claimed the territory of the GDR as part of the 
                                                 
405 Friedrich Koslowsky, “Wohnen heißt Leben – Das Haus des Lebens,“ Frankfurt am Main, 10 September 
1963, DF7/3084, BAB. 
406 Sidney Pollard, “Probleme für europäische Integration im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Wirtschaftliche 
und politische Intergration in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 10, ed. 
Helmut Berding (Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1985), 9-33. 
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postwar German state. Bonn’s position in the German Question relied on two principles: 
the Federal Republic’s claim to sole representation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) and its 
policy of non-recognition (Nichtanerkennungspolitik) vis-à-vis the GDR. Of course, 
Soviet tanks guaranteed the territorial integrity of the GDR. In terms of trade and 
economic development, however, GDR officials often looked toward the West, playing 
into West German policies when it served their own economic interest. This chapter 
traces how export trade triggered a renegotiation of Wohnkultur on both sides of the 
border.  
With the fulfillment of immediate postwar needs for housing, furnishings, and 
clothing behind them, both German states shifted their political and economic attention to 
export industries. This change of focus in economic policy had two opposing effects on 
German-German relations. On the one hand, it pitted the two economic systems directly 
against each other in a competition for economic superiority. On the other hand, due to 
the interconnected economic infrastructure, the in “intra-German trade” between the two 
states glossed over the division of the Cold War stalemate. The Federal Republic 
welcomed economic interactions with East Germany precisely because they offered an 
opportunity for East-West dialogue that did not necessitate official political recognition 
of the GDR. Like Koslowsky, Bonn regarded trade as a transfer of cultural ideas. It 
recognized the potential to impress principles of democratic political culture upon the 
East German population. 
This unidirectional understanding of cultural transfer limited to the two German 
states, however, became more complex when the Federal Republic entered the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Commitment to a future of Western European 
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unity eventually conflicted with German attempts at upholding connections between its 
two parts. The contested territorial situation and the special nature of intra-German trade 
made the GDR practically an unofficial member of the Common Market, which caused 
tensions between the Federal Republic and the EEC member states. At the same time, 
European economic integration brought with it cultural change that culminated in a 
convergence of German aesthetics in the 1980s. Rather than corroborate the usual mutual 
Cold War rhetoric of economic superiority and cultural difference vis-à-vis an “other” 
Germany, this process ultimately led both to adapt their aesthetics to changing economic 
and political climates on the international markets, connecting them to broader European 
ideas of modern culture. Attuned to German-German competition and collaboration in the 
realm of trade and exports, this chapter explores the aesthetic convergence of East and 
West German design in the Mittelstand (small and medium-sized) furniture industry 
within the European context. It will show that German-German economic cooperation 
undermined the Cold War division of Europe and presents the GDR as an early example 
of cultural Europeanization that reached beyond the Iron Curtain and thus beyond the 
borders of the Common Market.407 
Traditionally, historians have discussed Europeanization as the colonial impact of 
European values and technology on other regions of the globe.408 But with the increasing 
                                                 
407 This analysis is inspired by political science scholarship on Europeanization. See for example Tanja A. 
Börzel and Diana Panke, “Europäisierung – ein politikwissenschaftliches Laboratorium,” in Les identités 
européennes au XXe siècle: Diversités, convergences et solidarités, ed. Robert Frank and Gérard Bossuat 
(Paris: Sorbonne Press, 2004), 53-71; Luisa Passerini and Hartmut Kaelble, “European Identity, the 
European Public Sphere, and the Future of Europe,” in Nationale Identität und transnationale Einflüsse, 
Amerikanisierung, Europäisierung und Globalisierung in Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. 
Reiner Marcowitz (Munich: Oldenbourg 2007), 90-99. 
408 For recent examples of this debate see Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds., Tensions of 
Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and 
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interest in the structural and political growth of the European Union, debates about 
supranational policy-making and its effects on member states relocated the concept 
within the borders of the European Union.409 Historians have joined this debate on 
Europeanization, yet they are usually less interested in the institutionalized Europe and 
more attracted to long-term social and cultural processes.410 Ulrike von Hirschhausen and 
Kiran Klaus Patel, however, point to the analytical limitations of Europeanization when it 
is exclusively understood as a normative implementation of specific concepts closely 
associated with Europe, such as Roman law or Christianity.411 Instead, they suggest a 
socially constructive approach that takes pointers from concepts of cultural nationalism 
and sees Europe as an imagined community.412 As such, Europe is constructed and 
imagined by different actors as a social and cultural formation in constant flux. This 
approach examines discourse and social practice in an effort to understand Europe as an 
experience community (Erfahrungsgemeinschaft) and a cultural space that is not limited 
to the borders of the European Union.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 
1971-1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 2004). 
409 See Paolo Graziano and Maarten Peter Vink, eds., Europeanization: New Research Agendas (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Gunnar Folke Schuppert, ed. The Europeanization of Governance 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Robert Harmsen and Thomas Wilson, “Introduction: Approaches to 
Europeanization,” Yearbook of European Studies 14 (2004): 13-26.  
410 Ute Frevert, “Europeanizing Germany’s Twentieth Century,” History and Memory 17, no. 1-2 (Spring-
Winter 2005): 87-116; Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch, eds., Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der 
Europäer: Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europäisierung im späten 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2008); Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds., Europeanization in the 
Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Silvio Vietta and 
Micheal Gehler, eds., Europa – Europäisierung – Europästik. Neue wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden 
und Inhalte (Wien: Böhlau, 2010). 
411 For a critique of the institutional approach to Europeanization from a historiographical point of view see 
Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran Klaus Patel, “Europäisierung,” Version: 1.0, in Docupedia-
Zeitgeschichte, 29 November 2012, URL: https://docupedia.de/zg/Europ.C3.A4isierung?oldid=76143. 
412 The main representative of this school of thought on nationalism is Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 1991). 
Over the past three decades, cultural tradition and a shared vernacular have become guiding principles in 
the study of nationalism around the globe. Yet this concept has its limitations as it fails to explain the 
existence of multi-ethnic and multi-language nations, such as Switzerland.  
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Similarly, although this study looks at European identity formation in industrial 
design from a standpoint closely tied to European economic integration, it goes beyond 
the border of the EEC. It extends the analysis of processes of Europeanization to consider 
the mutual transfer of cultural values in economic interactions with the GDR. The 
concept of Europeanization marks an interactive process that includes institutions, 
political processes, political programs and individual actors at the European level as well 
as at the level of the nation. In the realm of design, this approach examines how European 
economic integration affected material culture as an expression of national identity. At 
the end of this process, both German states contributed to a modern European aesthetic 
that did not follow one distinct style, but rather substituted stylistic dogmatism with 
diversity.  
Claiming that cultural Europeanization completely cancelled out national identity 
would be going too far. European identity should not be understood as a variation of its 
national predecessor.413 Unlike national identity that represses regional or international 
identity, scholarship on European identity perceives of it as being based on the 
recognition of a multitude of identities.414 Therefore, while the two German states 
maintained their special relationship in intra-German trade and used it as a medium to 
                                                 
413 This nascent notion of an overarching European culture in the late 1980s has since morphed into 
repeated efforts to create museums and exhibitions that offer a narrative of European identity. Among some 
of the most prominent projects are the Musée de l’Europe in Brussels, the (failed) Bauhaus Europa in 
Aachen, and the European Parliament’s own House of European History, soon to be realized. Christine 
Snekkenes and Magnus Bognerud, “Exhibiting Europe: The Development of European Narratives, in 
Museums, Collections and Exhibitions,” Conference report, 07.04.2011-09.04.2011, Oslo, 
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=3644&count=11&recno=1&sort=datum&order=down&search=Displaying+E
urope, accessed on 22 October 2011. 
414 Passerini and Kaelble, “European Identity, the European Public Sphere, and the Future of Europe,” 97-
98. 
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influence the population on the other side of the border, they also changed their cultural 
outlook through interactions with Western Europe. 
 
When East Meets West: Encounters at the Leipzig and Cologne Fairs   
It was no coincidence that Koslowsky proposed his plan for the House of Life at 
the Leipzig Fair. Ever since the German partition, trade fairs had functioned as sites of 
East-West encounters. In the Cold War climate of ideological competition, the fairs also 
gained political significance for the two German states as places for comparison between 
their alternative visions of modern material identity and technological advancement. At 
the same time, cultural considerations accompanied political motivations as they used the 
fair to keep the transfer of ideas open. For the furniture industry, the Leipzig Fall Fair and 
the International Furniture Fair in Cologne evolved into important arenas for the 
promotion of East and West German Wohnkultur, on which both based claims to political 
legitimacy and economic preeminence. This interplay between aesthetics and ideology is 
crucial in understanding what Leora Auslander has termed the “communicative capacity 
of objects.”415 It instills material culture, in this case interior design products, with the 
ability to communicate cultural values and social relations that go beyond the mere 
exchange value of the objects in question. In this way, purely economic transactions gain 
cultural and political significance.   
As a locus of concentrated encounters between consumer products and the general 
public, fair displays could thus achieve a visual effect that combined economic and 
representative interests. In the early twentieth century, fairs had undergone a modal 
                                                 
415 Leora Auslander coined this term in Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996). 
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change: a shift from sale fairs (Warenmesse) to sample fairs (Mustermesse). Whereas 
trade remained the main incentive for holding a fair, producers increasingly limited 
themselves to exhibiting samples instead of selling on site.416 As a result, exhibitioners 
paid more attention to the composition of their product displays, which showcased 
advances in design and technology. In the Cold War years, this shift encouraged aesthetic 
competition whenever East and West met at the fair. Appealing displays advertised 
goods, however, they also functioned as representations of the political order that had 
brought them forward. While economic considerations surely played a significant role in 
an individual company’s decision to present its products at the fair, both German states 
were aware of the larger issues at stake. Entrepreneurial deliberations did not eclipse the 
political implications of product displays. Accordingly, the visibility of their products 
made producers the ambassadors of either East or West German cultural identity, which 
gave cause for concern about the message conveyed to the public at large. For example, 
during a stroll across the 1960 Cologne Furniture Fair, West German intra-zonal trade 
representatives noticed displays of GDR system furniture for their sufficient quality and 
aesthetics.417 The price range of this furniture was decisively below that of West German 
production, causing not only surprise, but also unease among Bonn’s trade specialists. 
Without the capitalist pressure for high profit margins, the GDR pricing policy made 
                                                 
416 Marcus Schüller, Wiederaufbau und Aufstieg der Kölner Messe, 1946-1956 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1999), 33. 
417 Memo, Baum (HDH), Besprechung betreffend Interzonenhandel mit Möbeln auf der Internationalen 
Kölner Möbelmesse, 24.2.1960, B102/20344, BAK. 
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commodities available to the masses, thus possibly convincing West German consumers 
of the GDR’s socialist promises of material egalitarianism.418  
Hosting a commercial event that advanced capitalist principles was quite a leap 
for the socialist East Germany of the immediate postwar years. To circumvent this 
problem, the GDR provided the fair at Leipzig with a politico-economic connotation.419 
During the early years of German division, the GDR leadership claimed that Leipzig was 
of paramount importance in bringing about a unified German economy (deutsche 
Wirtschaftseinheit). A pamphlet published in 1947 by the fair organization attested an 
“export compulsion” if the reconstruction and the revival of economic life in Germany 
should be a success. To reach this goal, the two German states needed to work together 
because preproduction for export products on the respective other side of the zone border 
tied the two economies together. If fair activities and economic promotion continued 
broken down by occupation zone, the pamphlet argued, it would inadvertently hurt the 
“German product” and contradict all-German interests.420 The pamphlet offers early 
evidence of East German pragmatism regarding the looming German division, knowing 
that only a unified economic policy could secure its survival and reemergence as a brand 
on the global markets. To drive the point home, the brochure offered anecdotal evidence 
for the GDR’s true efforts for German economic unity from the prior fair: “Passengers on 
                                                 
418 For a discussion of the “lack of meaningful prices” in East German economic planning see Sleifer, 
Planning Ahead and Falling Behind, 31-36. 
419 The history of the Leipzig fair began in 1165, when Otto the Rich, Margrave of Meissen, gave the town 
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special trains from all parts of Germany understood their unhindered passing at the zone 
borders as a symbolic act: a dividing line was crossed and, finally, there was space for 
dealings and action once again.”421 Such spatial analogies connecting East and West 
persisted throughout the pamphlet, culminating in the exclamation “Contemplation of the 
whole!” (“Besinnung auf’s Ganze!”) that paid lip-service to East German commitment to 
German unity.422 Likewise, West German economic representatives welcomed Leipzig’s 
all-German activity as a way to improve intra-zonal trade, because it complemented 
similar efforts toward preserving economic ties at Western trade fairs, such as Hannover 
or Cologne.423  
While the reopening of the Leipzig fair immediately became a political issue in 
the East-West conflict, the fair in Cologne seemed to emerge in a less contentious, but 
related context. Cologne faced two structural challenges. When Cologne opened its doors 
to fair visitors in the fall of 1947 for the first time after the war, it not only competed with 
the Leipzig fair that, with Soviet support, had managed to open the year before, but also 
with other cities in the Western zones of occupation such as Frankfurt or Hanover.424 In 
contrast to the Leipzig fair, Cologne received no financial support from the occupation 
authorities. The necessity to be self-sustaining eventually led to the discovery that 
specialized fairs brought in more revenue for Cologne. Therefore, cities in the West 
German zones of occupation divided up these special-interest fair events between one 
another to ensure sufficient attendance by the general public and to attract specialists. The 
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International Furniture Fair, introduced in the spring of 1949, became one of the few 
postwar trade events that still exist today.425 The early years of German division thus saw 
a flurry of activities on both sides of the border that not only aspired to maintain 
economic ties, but also to create spaces for East-West encounters. While the economic 
incentive to participate in both the Leipzig and the Cologne fairs was high for industry, 
national interests and Cold War diplomacy complicated seemingly apolitical trade. 
With the severing of German-German economic unity in the aftermath of the 
introduction of the West German currency Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1948, these 
communal efforts reversed course. The Soviet Union reacted to the separationist policy 
by American and British occupation authorities with a blockade of western access to the 
eastern zone. Faced with this hostile Soviet countermeasure, the West German economic 
administration decided to withdraw its representatives from the Leipzig fair, although 
officials feared that it could lose the status of an all-German trade institution.426 Yet 
exactly this scenario came true: after the blockade ended in 1949, Leipzig developed an 
exposition-like character, providing the Eastern bloc with a platform for self-
representation. The contemporary Cold War description of Leipzig as a “GDR 
performance show” embodied this notion well, and the barriers that the fair put up to 
limit access for western companies in successive years only affirmed it. 
Once German unification slipped out of reach, the GDR joined the COMECON in 
1950 and subsequently built its own economy independently of the Federal Republic. 
East Germany funded its industrial development mostly through trade. Accordingly, the 
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mid-1950s saw an aggressive internationalization of the fair, which was closely 
connected to the GDR’s quest for political recognition.427 In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the GDR increasingly used the fair to display the reputed superiority of the 
socialist order, not least in contrast to the commodities of the West German 
Wirtschaftswunder. This deliberate politicization of Leipzig also raised questions about 
the political symbolism of West German participation in the context of its non-
recognition policy vis-à-vis the GDR. Allowing businesses to go to Leipzig contributed 
to the fair’s success and could be interpreted as West Germany’s unofficial recognition of 
the other German state. Furthermore, trade relations would stabilize the weaker East 
German economy. But on the contrary, the Federal Republic supported these economic 
interactions precisely because they offered an opportunity for East-West dialogue that did 
not necessitate official political recognition.  
In the absence of official treaties, the principle of reciprocity regulated German-
German affairs, such as fair-based trade. However, the GDR used fair participation as a 
political and economic lever. In order to guard the interests of East German industries, 
the leadership made strategic decisions about which industries received permission to 
participate at the fair. The domestic furniture industry, at the time a vibrant and important 
crafts industry on the verge of mechanization, was unable to withstand western 
competition. Consequently, the government denied Western furniture producers access to 
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Leipzig. In contrast, West German officials did not take similar actions to guard domestic 
industry and trade against GDR competition at the Cologne fair. This imbalance upset 
West German industry. For example, constituents of the National Lumber Industry 
Association (Hauptverband der Deutschen Holzindustrie und verwandter Industriezweige 
e.V.) complained about the large presence of East German furniture businesses at the 
1960 International Furniture Fair. In a letter to the Federal Ministry of Economics, the 
association pointed out the lack of state-implemented regulations for East German 
exhibitors in Cologne, while the GDR government systematically excluded certain West 
German producers from the Leipzig fair.428 By 1960, only one West German furniture 
company had gained permission to exhibit its products in Leipzig, allegedly thanks to its 
low price range. Sales of approximately 200,000 DM made it worth their while.429 
Quickly it became evident that these imbalances in trade fair representation 
signaled as much Bonn’s economic decision-making as political strategy in the context of 
the German Question. When spokespeople for the West German lumber industry urged 
the Federal Ministry of Economics to intervene on their behalf in Cologne, the ministry 
responded that the state chose to refrain from regulating the private enterprise that 
organized the fair because of the liberal principles of the social market economy. Up to 
that point, the ministry explained, it had only advised the organizers of the fair to admit 
exhibitioners from the Soviet zone in the interest of expanding the inter-zonal trade, 
provided that Eastern traders did not abuse the fair event for provocative political 
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demonstrations.430 Despite this reasonable caveat, the Federal Republic knowingly 
established intra-German trade relations as a political rather than an economic interest. In 
the early years of German-German trade, its volume and revenue remained relatively low, 
which rendered it insignificant to the overall welfare of the West German economy. 
Accordingly, Bonn knew how to exploit the liberal-capitalist division between productive 
civil society and the state, tailoring it to the political requirements of the German 
Question.  
Indeed, prior corporative attempts to balance out intra-German trade on an 
economic level had failed. In meetings between representatives of the furniture industry 
and the Federal Ministry of Economics at the Cologne furniture fair in February 1960, the 
delegates ascribed the mismatch between East and West German furniture exports to the 
fact that the ministry did not prominently feature furniture in trade agreements with the 
GDR. The ministry offered to solve the problem by listing furniture separately in the next 
trade agreement, and by invoking the principle of reciprocity at the intra-zonal 
negotiations.431 This was a well-meaning attempt to appease national industry, but 
separate negotiations between the West German furniture representation and the GDR 
revealed that solving the matter of reciprocal furniture trade to the satisfaction of all 
parties involved would be difficult. Hiding behind the mechanisms of the planned 
economy and putting their national interest first, the East German delegates exploited the 
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differences between the two economic systems to complicate the principle of reciprocity 
in intra-German trade.432  
In a meeting with the East German agency for intra-German trade (DIA) the 
following day, West German furniture industry representatives learned that the GDR 
furniture industry was incapable of covering the needs of the East German population. 
Theoretically, the DIA claimed, exports to the West should be offset with imports from 
the West to close the gap. Unfortunately for industry in the Federal Republic, the 
economic planners usually allocated import quotas to raw materials, confirming that 
GDR trade policy generally avoided importing finished products like furniture. In order 
to redress this imbalance in intra-German trade, the East Germans ironically advised the 
West German furniture industry to participate more frequently at the Leipzig fair. To 
advertise their goods and create demand, the DIA recommended, Western producers 
should furnish a collective display with products “of average pricing and average taste” 
(mittlere Preislage und mittlere Geschmackslinie). Only with a demand in place did the 
DIA see the possibility of receiving a budget allocation for furniture in the next economic 
plan. However, it would take the DIA at least a year of negotiations and planning to win 
this privilege at the Leipzig fair for the West German furniture industry.433 As puzzling as 
this charade played between fair officials and the DIA may seem, the West German 
furniture industry unexpectedly gained greater access to the Leipzig fair via these intra-
German trade negotiations. Whereas the need to protect domestic industry remained, the 
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GDR did not want to damage the economic exchange with the West and possibly lose 
access to Western currency.  
While East German companies did promote their products at the Cologne 
Furniture Fair, their primary focus lay on the semi-annual Leipzig fairs. There they 
enjoyed the full support of official policy. In 1964, the GDR Council of Ministers 
decided to award gold medals to “heighten the political prestige of the Leipzig Fair and to 
underpin its significance as an international trading center.”434 These gold medals at 
Leipzig allowed the national industry to set higher prices for domestic retail as well as for 
exports. Furniture combines could thus reach their annual value quota faster if their 
products met the DAMW’s gold-medal criteria of functionality, style, premium materials, 
and “highest international development level.”435 With the economic reorientation toward 
consumer goods under Ulbricht’s New Economic System in 1963, GDR design 
politicians and economic planners thus shifted focus away from developing a German 
socialist domestic culture toward modeling aesthetic policy to compete with Western 
advanced production techniques. Nonetheless, the award system benefitted most directly 
the state, namely by furthering its international reputation as a leading industrial nation. 
In fact, the Party instituted a ratio for medals awarded, distributing awards between the 
GDR, other socialist countries, and the non-socialist countries, often presenting East 
German industry in a favorable light.436 At the 1970 Leipzig Fair, the GDR awarded its 
own industry 35 gold medals for outstanding and technologically progressive products. 
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The Soviet Union received the second most medals with 12 awards of excellence.437 That 
year’s official (and hence confidential) fair report, however, contradicted outright the 
East’s propaganda show of socialist economic prowess: “The number of new and 
enhanced designs is completely insufficient, and their quality is at the most equivalent to 
world standard.”438 By overemphasizing its achievements, the GDR attempted to 
convince the international community that the East German planned economy could keep 
up with the innovations in design and technology displayed by capitalist competitors. To 
that extent, the Leipzig fair fulfilled the state’s diplomatic goals as the image of the GDR 
began to change in Western countries: “The state between Elbe and Oder was not simply 
the ‘Zone’ anymore, but was noticed as a modern industrial society – indeed without 
democracy, though still successful in its own ways.”439 
Willy Brandt’s New Eastern Policy (Neue Ostpolitik) of the late 1960s 
contributed to the increased economic exchange across the inner-German border. 
Changing course from the conservative Adenauer government’s “policy of strength” to 
cooperation and accord, the Federal Republic utilized German-German exchange in the 
realm of culture, economy, and humanitarian aid for rapprochement in the German Cold 
War.440 With the ink on the Four Power Agreement that secured the status of a divided 
Berlin still wet, the euphoria of peaceful coexistence spilled over to the trade fair. West 
German furniture became a staple at the Leipzig Fall Fair, thanks to three special 
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exhibitions on human environment – the Interscola for school furniture, the Intacta for 
interior home design, and the Expovita for sports and leisure-time activities 
(Freizeitgestaltung) – that served as venues for Western products.441 Already in the fall of 
1971 the combined display area of all represented industries from the Federal Republic 
and West Berlin had reached 19,000 square meters. This rendered the FRG the second-
largest participating nation, second only to the GDR itself.442 Overall, the atmosphere at 
the fair that year was described as “thoroughly friendly” (durchaus freundlich).443 For the 
first time since 1946, politicians refrained from the traditional polemics against the 
Federal Republic in official speeches. Another “first” was the official invitation of the 
West German state secretary to the reception that GDR Minister of Foreign Trade Horst 
Sölle held at the Leipzig city hall.444 The conciliatory spirit of the 1972 Basic Treaty 
prolonged the German-German détente for another year. 
After 1973, the GDR fell back into a more habitual pattern of deep distrust and 
paranoia in its relationship to the Federal Republic. Representations of Western culture 
and economic successes grew more threatening by the mid-1970s when Honecker 
initiated his consumption program Unity of Economic and Social Policy (Einheit von 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik). Integrating capitalist market incentives into the socialist 
Plan, Honecker’s program emulated Ulbricht’s defunct New Economic Policy in an 
attempt to cure the shortcomings of central planning. Already a couple of years into this 
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new policy, economic planners realized that the early emphasis on heavy industry had 
compromised the structures of consumer good production. Because of East Germany’s 
difficulties in fulfilling consumer demands, it feared that displays of the Western lifestyle 
would threaten the stability of the socialist economy and promote the perks of capitalism. 
In subsequent measures aimed at minimizing ideological impact, the GDR leadership 
quickly sequestered the population from the lure of the West. In 1974, the East German 
government explicitly prohibited fairgoers from exploring western stands in Leipzig.445 
Exclusively specialists, with the express permission of a company or combine director 
(Kombinatsdirektor), and only in the company of their staff, could visit exhibitions of 
Western companies. The GDR admitted to taking such measures in confidential talks 
with the West German GDR Trade Committee, reasoning that the general foreign 
currency shortage (Devisenknappheit), warranted tight control of demand.446 However, 
these complex relationships between political aesthetics and everyday consumption that 
developed within the realm of intra-German trade cannot be sufficiently explained by 
looking exclusively at individual encounters at the fair. Rather, the complexities between 
political and economic goals require a macro-analysis of intra-German trade and its 
impact on political aesthetics, a field that has not received much attention from design 
historians. Postwar design scholarship has focused on the historical development and 
meaning of aesthetics within one social and political order. Stepping out of the national 
frame allows insights into external economic influences’ impact on the development of 
industrial design.  
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Dealing With the Devil: German-German Trade 
In order to appreciate the full extent of the ideological struggle aesthetically 
displayed at the trade fairs, it is important to understand the nature of intra-German trade. 
The trade fairs as such only served as the stage for a constant back and forth in the 
economic relations of the two states that was going on behind the scenes. Intra-German 
trade became an increasingly important tool in the German Question over the course of 
the 1960s and 1970s. Its handling and implementation on either side of the border tells a 
story of steady political antagonism that concurred with growing economic 
interdependence.447  
The Federal Republic’s refusal to acknowledge the GDR remained the guiding 
principle in its dealings with the eastern part of Germany. To assure its claim, the 
Ministry of Economics demonstratively handled intra-German trade through an extra 
body, the Treuhandstelle für Interzonenhandel (TSI), rather than the foreign trade 
administration.448 Meanwhile, the GDR, denying the Alleinvertretungsanspruch of the 
FRG and claiming nationhood, handled intra-German trade through the Ministry for 
Foreign Trade. These structural demonstrations of diametrically opposed politics in 
regard to German unity provided an ongoing bone of contention, but did not prevent the 
two German states from trading with each other. In the West German case, the 
disagreement even spurred Bonn’s engagement in economic cooperation as Bonn hoped 
to undermine East Germany’s demarcation policy. Both German economic systems 
mutually depended on each other for the rebuilding of viable economies after the Second 
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World War because they were interlinked by the production of pre- and semi-finished 
goods. Relatively poor in natural resources, they developed strong export industries 
whose success was based on finishing processes by adding to product value. Naturally, 
industrial and trade relations worked quite well during times of economic prosperity, but 
times of economic downturn, such as the oil crisis of 1973, put the political opportunism 
of intra-German trade and the goodwill of Western entrepreneurs to the test. 
Until 1971, the GDR avoided imports of finished products like furniture, to save 
scarce foreign currency for much-needed raw materials.449 Instead, the planners of the 
GDR economy pushed exports to the West to earn foreign currency. By 1958, East 
German exports of furniture numbered only 835,000 accounting units, yet they increased 
steadily over the course of the 1960s.450 This growth of the GDR as a furniture export 
nation can be traced back to the collectivization of 1958, which created enormous 
production capacities for bulk goods.451 Meanwhile, the West German furniture industry 
remained unsuccessful in procuring orders from the GDR, a trend that persisted 
throughout the Cold War period. As the Federal Ministry of Economics’ hesitance to 
enforce the principle of reciprocity in trade fair participation showed earlier, rather than 
pursuing domestic economic interest, the Federal Republic integrated German-German 
trade policy into an overall strategy for maintaining relations with the GDR. The low 
economic pay-off for the West indicates the political nature of West Germany’s trade 
with the East. In the process, the GDR economy “accidentally” grew dependent on West 
German trade in order to support struggling consumption-oriented industries. While the 
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Federal Republic perhaps had not calculated this dependency of the GDR as the outcome, 
it was surely not an unwelcome one. 
 The Berlin Agreement of 1951 established the basis for intra-zonal trade, more 
commonly known as intra-German trade (innerdeutscher Handel). Aside from the 
political decision to fix the exchange rate between the Ostmark and the D-Mark at 
equivalency, so-called Swing credits served as a financial instrument to overcome the 
economic oddities of German division.452 These credits were interest-free, short-term 
intergovernmental loans aimed at stabilizing trade between the two German states. While 
relatively insignificant until the 1970s, the Swing credits became an instrument of 
political bartering once Honecker introduced his consumer-geared program Unity of 
Economic and Social Policy in 1971. As Jonathan Zatlin has shown, West German goods 
and money started to seep into the East German economy, devaluing German socialism 
by undermining its currency first and its political legitimacy second.453 Because it was the 
GDR’s second largest trade partner after the Soviet Union, goods and loans from the 
FRG became a crutch to a planned economy, which failed to fulfill consumer demands on 
its own. 
During the negotiations in advance of the German-German Basic Treaty, the FRG 
reconsidered the effectiveness of its trade policy toward the GDR. Trade by credit had 
become the law of the land, which created mutual dependencies: the GDR depended on 
West German money to finance its imports, and West German companies wanted the 
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business, which is why the FRG required the GDR to procure exclusively West German 
products for the credits. Accounting units usually documented the exchange, which 
eliminated most of the actual money flow. In this way, the GDR received 2.5 billion DM 
worth of raw materials, preproduction and subassembly parts, and services from the FRG 
in 1970 alone.454 However, to keep up this level of trade in 1971, the TSI estimated that 
the GDR had to raise its debts by another 500 million accounting units that year, because 
it had received 418 million units more than it delivered to the FRG in the previous 
year.455 East German short stockage, the incapability to deliver certain in-demand 
products, partially caused this imbalance. Meanwhile, GDR purchases of finished 
products were small in number, which illustrates the fundamental difference that marked 
East-West trade: the GDR exported finished products to profit from high added value, 
while it imported semi-finished products and raw materials such as steel (32.4 percent of 
the annual imports) and subassemblies (34.6 percent of the annual imports) from the FRG 
that contained less or no added value.456 Finished products only constituted 6.3 percent of 
the GDR’s annual imports in 1971.457 Had the business community at large known this 
statistic, the West German Ministry of Economics would likely face renewed complaints 
from domestic industrial associations. Bonn thus tried to mask this imbalance by utilizing 
separate statistical methods for German-German trade and foreign trade. Although the 
ministry claimed that this was to politically contrast the two kinds of export on paper, 
these statistics constituted a form of manipulation. While Bonn’s trade statistics on the 
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GDR offered information about the industrial origins of products, they did not specify the 
degree of finishing, thus obscuring the fact that the West German side delivered goods of 
lesser worth, and thus more of them, to East Germany, while the GDR delivered mostly 
finished products of higher worth, and thus less of them.458 Despite all of these favorable 
conditions for the East, by 1971 the GDR had accumulated a debt of 1565.9 million 
accounting units, or 1565.9 million DM. West German officials privately welcomed these 
debts as a solid political guarantee for the persistence of German-German relations.459  
Despite an increase in consumer products after Honecker’s promises of June 
1971, the GDR continued to be pressed to fulfill demands.460 The earlier reliance on 
heavy industry had resulted in underdeveloped consumer goods and capital equipment 
industries, which included machine construction, shipbuilding, and electrical engineering. 
Bonn knew that the GDR would not have the funds to buy the machines necessary to 
continue building up the capital equipment industry to further develop the consumer 
goods program. In a prognosis, a FRG economist looked skeptically at alternative 
solutions to East Berlin’s dilemma, pointing to the traditional interconnectedness of the 
two German economies and the GDR’s dependency on West German spare parts and 
fittings. Consumer goods production relied heavily on machinery originally built in the 
Federal Republic.461 Without natural resources to sell for foreign currency, the GDR 
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faced the dilemma of financing increased consumer goods production with the export of 
finished products, thus sending abroad the very objects that its own population needed.462 
Yet in the end, these funds financed imports of steel and other construction materials for 
Honecker’s second ambitious project: the housing program.463 Well aware of these 
simultaneous and contradictory investment projects for 1972, the West German Ministry 
of Economics estimated that the GDR needed to reduce its imports by 100 million DM in 
order to avoid further debts. At the same time, its iron and steel purchases had to 
decrease, that is, from a West German perspective this would have been a plausible 
reaction, if the economic planners wanted to import western consumer products in a 
quantity that would even come close to covering the demand for commodities among the 
East German population.464 Instead, furniture exports to the West continued to increase, 
with the FRG as the main receiving market. In the first quarter of 1972 alone, trade with 
West Germany grew by 18 percent in comparison to the same time period in the previous 
year. But the domestic shortage of consumer products was not the only unwarranted 
effect of Honecker’s ambitions. The export-oriented nature of East Germany’s furniture 
production eventually worked at the expense of national aesthetics.  
Success on the export market meant a certain degree of adaptation to Western 
tastes. Coinciding with both Honecker’s plans to increase consumer goods production 
and relaxed German-German relations in the context of Basic Treaty negotiations, the 
Federal Republic experienced a “furnishing wave” (Einrichtungswelle), caused by a 
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general rise in wages during full employment.465 Large buyers, such as the Kaufhof 
department stores and the Neckermann mail order business, increasingly relied on large 
production capacities in the Eastern combines. Although the mail-order businesses had 
direct connections to East German furniture combines, the West German Ministry of 
Economics oversaw these trade relations and monitored their progress closely.466 Noting 
that in the past the GDR had seldom serviced special orders, Kaufhof representatives 
remarked in a meeting with the ministry that this attitude changed in the early 1970s, 
when the GDR became more receptive to western aesthetic taste. It was mostly bedroom 
furniture of the lower-middle price range that fulfilled the necessary quality standards and 
attracted West German consumers. Kaufhof would have ordered also sofas, armchairs, 
and desks, but the Plan proved inflexible in responding to its specialized demands in 
these branches of the furniture industry. In addition to the East German industry’s 
inflexibility, the GDR transportation system was unreliable. For example, Deutrans, the 
GDR cargo company, delayed deliveries to the FRG in 1971 because of the fall harvest. 
Allegedly, their trucks had to transport potatoes from the fields to the towns. Under such 
circumstances, standardized, easily transportable wooden furniture turned out to be the 
most consistent – both in availability and quality.467  
The dialectic aesthetic of intra-German trade, that is the interplay between 
demand and subsequent aesthetic reorientation of production, affected the guidelines for 
industrial designers. As the GDR economy increasingly opened up to export markets in 
the West, East German designers found their vision of socialist industrial design 
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jeopardized by the aesthetic requirements of export. In a 1975 interview, designer Horst 
Michel pinned the demise of GDR materiality on West Germany’s mail-order giants such 
as Neckermann or Quelle.468 Their buyers, he was convinced, undermined his and his 
disciples’ efforts to create a morally responsible product culture in the GDR. With this 
observation, he indirectly criticized the cultural and economic leadership for turning the 
GDR production system into a magnet for western bulk buyers. Collectivization and 
regional organization of industry had created large combines that became viable only 
with mass production. These production clusters, however, presented ideal conditions for 
Western retail chains. Michel complained that large businesses like Neckermann were 
only after the cheapest price, thus requiring that East German industry use low-quality 
materials, which compromised the aesthetic as well as the functionality of the products.  
Michel forgot, however, that the backward production standards of the East 
German furniture industry limited the clientele specifically to those Western large 
retailers that targeted the low-income population. High-end furniture producers and 
retailers usually refrained from cooperation with East German combines because their 
customers demanded expensive woods and state-of-the-art production methods. The 
GDR economy could not offer either. Even Hellerau, despite its reputation as the 
successor of the turn-of-the-century Werkstätten movement and its skilled workers, could 
not keep up with Western standards. In the 1980s, the combine cooperated with the 
luxury brand Interlübke by mass-producing wooden chair designs for the West German 
company. However, Hellerau was unable to produce one of the two designs contracted by 
Interlübke, because it did not own the machinery necessary to mill the required details on 
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bent parts.469 While Michel astutely spoke to the creative potential of industrial designers 
and the skills of the furniture workers, the interplay between East German technological 
backwardness and the resultant request for low-end furniture ended in the mass 
production of low-quality goods.    
The picture of East-West placidness and trade cooperation changed abruptly with 
the global economic downturn during the oil crisis of 1973. The crisis hit the West 
German economy hard, but especially industries that relied on oil and chemicals derived 
from it – such as cushion foam for seating furniture – suffered greatly. As a consequence, 
these industries turned territorial vis-à-vis their East German counterparts. In 1974 the 
Bavarian Upholstery Association sent a complaint letter to West German Minister of 
Economics Hans Friderichs to point out a new set of imbalances in intra-German 
furniture trade.470 Specifically, the Bavarians demanded to be granted the same tax 
advantages that the federal government provided for East German companies. GDR 
export goods enjoyed a turnover tax reduction of 6 percent, while it was applied in full to 
West German products, thus relatively increasing western prices. In its response to the 
Bavarian Upholstery Association, the Ministry of Economics attributed this competitive 
advantage in favor of East German products to the “special quality of the intra-German 
trade.”471 The turnover tax reduction served as a means to create incentives for Western 
buyers to order eastern products. This measure originated with the reevaluation of the 
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DM in 1970, which had negatively affected intra-German trade.472 Because the Berlin 
agreement had fixed the exchange rate between the Ostmark and the DM at 1:1, the 
prices for East German exports remained stable while they should have gone down. From 
the perspective of the ministry, the turnover tax reduction was just a measure to even out 
the playing field for GDR export industries.473 Because of “budget concerns, the tax 
system, and European Community agreements,” Friderichs explained, such a turnover tax 
reduction could not be applied to domestic industries, even if they were in financial 
distress.474 Friderichs furthermore pointed out that the East German exports of upholstery 
products only constituted 1.8 percent of domestic production, which, he assumed, would 
not affect the market. Whereas the ministry refused to financially support individual 
branches of domestic industry, implementing the competitive laws of capitalism and the 
European Common Market, the federal government had no qualms about changing the 
rules of the game for East German competitors. Upholding good trade relations with the 
GDR became a guiding principle in Bonn’s economic policy, even if that entailed 
financial losses or breaking European trade agreements, and took precedent over creating 
competitive advantages for domestic industry. 
Nevertheless, West German industry, especially in federal states neighboring the 
GDR, such as Bavaria, did have cause for concern. The erratic nature of trade between 
the GDR and the FRG by the early 1980s shows how Friderichs’ generalizations about 
upholstery import based on trade statistics could amount to misinformation or only 
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momentary truths. Because of bulk production and differing Plan priorities, the 
availability of specific furniture lacked consistency. Nevertheless, the furniture sector 
was the fastest-growing entry in the lumber product trade between East and West 
Germany (see table 4).  
Jan.-June 1980 1981 1982 
In mio. VE 110,9 135 150.8 
Real increase in mio. 
VE 
 + 24.1 +15.8 
In percent  22 12 
Table 4: West German Imports of East German Lumber Products, 1980-1982.475  
 
Jan.-June 1980 1981 Real increase 
in mio VE 
In percent 
Sofas and divan beds 14.7 29.0 + 14.3 97.3 
Wardrobes 0.3 4.4 + 4.1 - 
Chests of drawers 1.9 4.6 + 2.7 142.1 
Living room furniture 
systems 
5.3 6.4 + 1.1 20.8 
Kitchen chairs 5.4 6.0 + 0.6 11.1 
Armchairs 20.8 12.4 - 8.4 40.0 
Table 5: West German Imports of East German Furniture, 1980-1981. 
 
Jan.-June 1981 1983 Real increase 
in mio VE 
In percent 
Armchairs 12.4 31.5 + 19.1 + 154 
Add-on Furniture - 23.8 + 23.8 - 
Kitchen Tables - 11.9 + 11.9 - 
Wooden Bed Rests 8.1 11.5 + 3.4 + 42 
Sofas and divan beds 29.0 14.9 - 14.1 - 49 
Table 6: West German Imports of East German Furniture, 1981-1982 
 
The tables above provide a small glimpse of the flexibility that West German buyers had 
to demonstrate in dealing with the GDR planned economy (see tables 5 and 6). 
Inconsistencies in the Plan could result in the overproduction of certain furniture in any 
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given year. In 1981, this happened to be sofas, which resulted in a growth of sofa exports 
to the Federal Republic by 97.3 percent. The following year the pattern changed to 
armchairs with an increase of 154 percent, while the purchase of sofas balanced itself out 
with a decrease of 49 percent. Seeing that giant furniture retailers such as Ikea and RKL 
Möbel found themselves on the receiving end of these gyrations makes one wonder how 
they could calculate their product range while dependent on GDR production.476 Yet 
small and medium-sized furniture producers, such as the clients of the Bavarian 
Upholstery Association probably suffered most when GDR furniture flooded the West 
German market. The fact that Bonn did not take action on behalf of their industry and 
played along with the GDR inconsistencies confirmed West Germany’s political interest 
in the intra-German trade.  
In a self-justificatory gesture, the GDR turned some of the western trade partners’ 
concerns on their head. At a conference on the “situation of the global economy” in the 
fall of 1981 in Hamburg, Jürgen Nitz, a representative of the East German Research 
Institute for Politics and Economy, explained to a surprised western audience how the 
capitalist path in the global economy continued to disappoint the socialist nations.477 The 
disconcerting results, he explained, threatened GDR trading interests: the slowing-down 
of industrial growth; the relatively slow accumulation of capital after the oil crisis; 
chronic inflation in capitalist countries that redounded to the detriments of socialist 
economies; stagnant wages which throttled down demand for import products from 
socialist countries; and the increasing instability of capitalist currency, which made credit 
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negotiations difficult for the GDR.478 That these developments negatively affected trade 
between East and West, Nitz proposed, ought to be a logical conclusion. East Germany, 
as well as other socialist countries, Nitz continued, would not accept the blame for the 
consequences and would fight against attempts to pin these crises and inflationary 
tendencies on the GDR. While pointing to the shortcomings of capitalism, the GDR 
displayed little concern in regard to the structural quirks in the planned economy and its 
focus on political goals that negatively affected the Western European countries.  
For a political advantage in trade negotiations, the GDR did not shy away from 
manipulating Plan statistics to blind-sight western countries to the real extent of its 
economic situation. To the West German Ministry of Economics manipulated Plan 
production goals presented similar problems to those, which the undefined course of the 
capitalist economies posed to the GDR. Usually, the ministry looked to the Plan in 
combination with GDR foreign and intra-German trade to leverage West German trade 
policy diplomatically. Yet the Plan often reflected political aims rather than economic 
probabilities, leaving the ministry to rely on GDR trade policy patters to estimate real 
outcomes. For example, in the 1981-85 Plan directive, the Planning Commission 
allocated an impossible growth in the production sector, which, Western economists 
realized, was a statistical trick to balance and conceal the import purchases necessary to 
uphold the current standard of living in the GDR on paper. Over the course of the 1970s, 
supplementing domestic consumer good industries with imports on credit had become a 
standard solution in GDR economic planning in order to create the impression that the 
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population’s standard of living had indeed improved.479 But even these imports could not 
completely fill the gaps in supplies. Buying on credit changed the focus of the GDR 
economic policy from long-term growth through investments to the short-term policy of 
borrowing and, subsequently, to the “immediate exigency of debt reduction” by the 
1980s.480 As a consequence, the Federal Republic in fact partially financed Honecker’s 
economic reform of Unity of Economic and Social Policy. Western trading partners, first 
and foremost the FRG, continued to grant the GDR loans and credits until the entire 
system came close to collapse under enormous debts in 1988-89.481 
The significance of the financial and economic cooperation between the two 
German states lies in the fact that their collaboration clearly undermined the division of 
Europe in the Eastern Bloc and the partners of the transatlantic alliance. A nascent 
undoing of socialist aesthetics in furniture design heralded the cultural effects of East 
Germany’s trade with the West. Cheap mass production for export became took 
precedence over the morality of socialist material culture, which contributed to a quality 
decline in both aesthetics and materials. In the end, the Iron Curtain proved permeable 
from the Bay of Mecklenburg to the Vogtland. Through intra-German trade, West 
German money and consumer products increasingly seeped into a socialist Germany that 
desperately tried to gain popular support by creating a hybrid economy. The GDR, 
though, won a reliable source of foreign currency, which increasingly stabilized the 
                                                 
479 Dr. Volze, “Zur DDR-Plandirektive 1981/85,” 16 June 1981, B102/236619, BAK. 
480 Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism, 126. See also Jeffries and Melzer, “The New Economic System of 
Planning and Management,” 37. 
481 Zatlin claims that Günter Mittag, the GDR and Honecker’s long-serving Minister of Economics, forged 
trade statistics and inflated the debt on purpose to impress on the party leadership the notion that his 
planning strategies were extremely successful at decreasing the debt. The Federal Republic, on the other 
hand, profited from the inflated debt during unification, because a scared population and the shocked Krenz 
and Modrow governments rushed into the union on Western terms to be saved by the D-Mark. Zatlin, The 
Currency of Socialism, 124. 
  
202 
economic policies of the SED leadership and contributed to the smoke screen of a 
flourishing consumer society in the East.  
 
Creating the Common Market 
The specific characteristics of intra-German trade, such as the high degree of 
interdependence in production industries and special tax cuts, differed greatly from 
international norms of foreign trade. Settled in the 1951 Berlin Agreement, the special 
relationship created by the Cold War division of Europe influenced the handling of 
economic and financial transactions between the two German states. While this intra-
German development seems a logical progression of prewar territorial unity and 
economic embeddedness, the playing field changed once other parties became involved. 
When the Federal Republic joined the European Economic Community, intra-German 
trade caused problems in the Common Market. This triangular relationship between East 
and West Germany, West Germany and the EEC member states, and the member states 
and East Germany spun a complex web of economic and political interests dominated by 
the German Question. It is impossible to understand the cultural dynamism of this export-
import triangle and the aesthetic market incentives without examining Germany’s 
political goals in conjunction with the economic interests of the EEC member states first. 
They formed the basis on which the two German states engaged culturally in the most 
profit-oriented manner with other European nations and thus contributed to the making of 
a modern European identity.  
German furniture, with its legacy grounded in interwar modernism, remained a 
contender on the global market and continued to be an important export good for both the 
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GDR and the FRG after the Second World War. It is thus not surprising that the annual 
Cologne International Furniture Fair grew to become the most important furniture 
marketplace in the world. Within intra-German trade, the furniture traveled mostly from 
East to West, but on the global market, both countries gained important positions as 
furniture export nations. Already in the early 1960s, the GDR proclaimed itself the 
world’s largest furniture export nation, if only in percentage of total annual production 
rather than real profits. It exported 40 percent of its furniture production to twenty 
countries, at a time when the standardization and mechanization of the GDR furniture 
industry had only started to gain momentum.482 If nothing else, this high percentage is 
telling about the chronic state of East Germany’s domestic under-provisioning in the 
realm of household goods and domestic culture. Instead of securing supplies for its own 
population, the GDR sent critical percentages of its products abroad. In comparison, West 
Germany reached the status of the world’s largest furniture exporter in absolute numbers 
alongside Italy by the early 1980s, with three billion DM in sales, which was about 17 
percent of its annual furniture production.483 As the Federal Republic imported the same 
amount of furniture from other countries, its market was saturated.  
The European Market has been paramount for West Germany’s foreign economic 
relations. France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took about 35 percent 
of Germany’s exports in the 1950s.484 Meanwhile, the vivid economies of these nations 
also presented competition. In 1955, the Federal Republic identified Italy, Belgium, 
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Norway, and Sweden as its main competitors in the furniture export market. A market 
analysis by the Federal Ministry of Economics found that the rate of export orders for 
furniture slowly picked up, mainly from Western Europe, but also from overseas, where 
the demand for seating furniture was especially high. Unfortunately, rising packaging and 
shipping costs made trading goods overseas less lucrative, which would keep the number 
of successful competitive contracts low. In Western Europe, however, the demand for all 
kinds of furniture was high after the war had wreaked havoc there. Yet economic analysts 
worried especially about German furniture’s inability to “jump over the tariff wall” 
within Europe.485 The fact that the German industry had cut itself off from the 
international market between 1933 and 1945 had encouraged other nations to build their 
own industries to compensate for the loss of their German trading partner (see table 7 for 
West German furniture trade statistics). As a byproduct of this process, the report stated, 
these countries had developed strong national tastes that rendered any mention of “a 
global furniture market situation” that corresponded to distinctive aesthetics pointless. 
Under these circumstances, particularly Italy and Belgium emerged as the main 
competitors, which, although they did not produce more cheaply from a technological 
standpoint, nevertheless had lower costs of labor. Analysts saw the only chance to 
overcome these hurdles in “exporting especially high-quality products, that neither the 
national industry of the target markets could produce nor Italy, Belgium, Norway or 
Sweden could export there at the same qualitative level and with the same design 
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aesthetic.”486 This national approach to export goods developed alongside the FRG’s 
early attempts to create a national aesthetic in industrial design. 
  Quarter or Month 
Product Year I II III Oct. Nov. 
Furniture (Wooden and 
Wicker) 
1953 3.3 3.9 4.6 2.6 1.4 
 1954 4.1 6.3 3.9 3.1 3.3 
Table 7: Development of West German Furniture Trade in Million DM, 1953-1954.487 
 
Despite such visions of a national path, the Schuman Plan brought German-
French rapprochement in 1950, paving the way for German economic integration in 
Europe. Instead of isolating Germany in fear of its reemergence as a dominating power in 
Europe, France changed course and relied on the stabilizing effects of cooperation for 
lasting peace in Europe. Paris hoped to influence German foreign policy and tie West 
Germans to a larger European idea rather than traditionalist concepts of national interest 
whose violent potential had been proven in the recent German past.488 The Franco-
German rapprochement enabled economic cooperation in the realm of coal and steel that 
included Italy and the Benelux.489 These first steps toward a shared European economic 
sphere enabled West Germany’s economic success story as an export nation that excelled 
with the establishment of the European Economic Community on January 1, 1958. The 
integration into the Common Market solved most of West Germany’s furniture export 
problems by abolishing tariffs between EEC members, leveling the playing field between 
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German, Italian, and Belgian furniture production in the European market, and rendering 
the Scandinavian countries less competitive. The destruction of the war coupled with 
initial dismantlement of industrial structures, which were drastic prior to Cold War 
rearmament, put the production of consumer goods for the West German domestic 
market first. However, the open Common Market accelerated industrial modernization 
with the support of American money and technology, which was only one reason for the 
Federal Republic’s later superiority in the EEC. Social stability under the conservative, 
welfare-oriented Adenauer governments promised foreign investors safe profits and 
offered them a gateway into the Common Market.490 Furthermore, at the time of the entry 
into the EEC, the national economy of the FRG was well equipped and organized with a 
dense network of railways and highways, an outstanding communication system, and 
possessed, with the Rhine River, the most efficient inland waterway in Europe.491 These 
favorable infrastructural conditions turned the Federal Republic into a true competitor in 
the EEC, compelling German industry to acquire more capital and accelerate its 
(peaceful) expansive strategies.  
From the very inception of the EEC, the German Question stood at the center of 
Bonn’s relations to other member states. The FRG demanded special stipulations for 
intra-German trade, a cause for concern to other EEC members who feared that German-
German interests could affect the community.  Accordingly, the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
contained a “Protocol on intra-German trade and related issues” stipulating that German-
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German trade remained unaltered by the EEC agreements.492 However, paragraph 2 of 
the protocol required all EEC states to relate any trade with “German territories outside of 
the territory of the Basic Law,” that is to say the GDR, to the other members and to take 
precautions that any agreements with the GDR would not contradict the principles of the 
Common Market.493 Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the agreement stated that each member 
state was allowed to take action against injurious interaction between another member 
state and East Berlin.494  
While trade with the GDR theoretically counted as foreign trade, the GDR could 
not be treated as just another third party. Its special status due to the open German 
Question and West German non-recognition required bilateral agreements signed at the 
level of non-state actors, such as foreign trade associations. Its special status foreclosed a 
common EEC trade policy toward East Germany by definition. In theory, the principles 
of paragraphs 2 and 3 applied to the Federal Republic as well, but Bonn exempted itself, 
claiming as its guiding foreign policy the notion that “in all of its actions, the government 
of the Federal Republic assumes the political and economic unity of Germany, whose 
realization is only obstructed by factual, but not legal reasons.”495 For the FRG, the 
protocol regulated all trade between East Germany and the EEC, interpreting it to mean 
equal treatment for all German territories. From this point of view, trade between the 
GDR and any of the EEC members did not constitute foreign trade. When the EEC 
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Council of Ministers attempted to include EEC-GDR trade relations under Article 111 of 
the Rome Treaty that regulated foreign trade in 1961, the Federal Republic demanded a 
clause exempting it from all of the council’s decisions vis-à-vis the GDR.496 Time and 
again, Bonn prioritized the wellbeing of German-German relations over European 
agreements, affirming the political nature of intra-German trade. 
Not surprisingly, one of the first foreign trade disagreements in the EEC came 
about in relations to the Eastern Bloc and European trade credits. The Berne Union had 
implemented the limit of state-backed credit to five years with a gentleman’s agreement 
between western countries to create fair trading conditions across the Iron Curtain.497 In 
accord with western containment policy, this agreement strove to prevent the Soviet-led 
bloc from playing western trade partners against one other for political or financial gains. 
Together with the United States, the FRG had been timid about overstepping the Berne 
Union rules, admittedly because in its special geographic situation, West Germany 
already consistently ranked first in trade statistics with the Eastern Bloc in general and 
the GDR specifically (see table 8).498 By 1964, a number of western countries, among 
them Japan, the UK, Italy, and France, broke the Berne agreement and granted the East 
European socialist countries credits ranging from seven to fifteen years. Worried about 
keeping its prominent status in the “Eastern trade” (Osthandel), the Federal Republic 
started an initiative to streamline EEC foreign trade policy regarding the East. The 
Federal Ministry of Economics stated explicitly that “intra-zonal trade is an instrument of 
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reunification policy,” thus emphasizing the special nature of the German-German 
relationship.499 While Bonn felt no need to justify its special interest in these trade 
relations, the government feared that the GDR could find favorable financial support 
elsewhere, thus jeopardizing the carefully crafted dependencies and interconnections 
between the two German economies. In conference with other EEC members, West 
Germany put two options on the table that would apply to all members: granting a seven-
year liquidation limit or upholding the Berne Union agreement. By creating unity among 
the EEC members, Bonn attempted to shape Europe’s global trade policies in protection 
of its own special relationship to East Berlin.500 However, Italy preferred to debate these 
matters immediately in the Berne Union or the OECD in order to come to a binding 
agreement for all western nations. The archival documentation of German involvement in 
the question of western state-backed credits ends here and it is therefore plausible to 
assume that these matters continued to be discussed in one of the two other 
organizations.501   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
499 Dr. Heise, betr.: Grosse Anfrage der Abgeordneten Freiherr von Kühlmann-Stumm und Gen. betr. EWG 
Politik, 10 June 1966, B102/180605, BAK. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Sach (BMWi), Fernschreiben 188. Tagung des EWG-Ministerrats am 13./14.6.66, 15 June 1966, 
B102/180605, BAK. 
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 Exports/Deliveries to the GDR Imports/ Deliveries from the GDR 
Country 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Belgium/ 
Luxemburg 
11.52 13.68 14.28 8.76 11.88 14.16 16.92 19.68 22.92 26.36 
Denmark 12.36 21.84 14.40 18.36 24.60 15.84 16.32 17.04 20.76 23.88 
France 21.48 15.96 18.12 26.28 69.00! 8.4 8.52 12.60 14.28 15.96 
Greece 6.48 4.56 4.92 6.57 9.50 2.64 3.96 4.80 6.11 8.42 
Iceland 0.96 0.72 0.96 0.36 1.68 1.92 1.68 1.20 2.40 2.88 
Italy 10.80 7.92 12.96 13.32 16.08 14.28 11.52 12.36 14.88 14.16 
Netherlands 16.08 9.24 12.12 15.60 19.92 17.2 17.64 23.28 30.24 32.76 
Norway 6.0 6.12 7.32 15.96 10.08 8.40 7.68 6.00 9.84 11.88 
Portugal 0.36 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.60 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.56 0.36 
Turkey 4.68 1.32 5.64 4.92 9.24 6.12 4.32 5.76 8.16 9.36 
Great 
Britain 
27.48 27.00 22.44 17.04 23.16 18.72 18.48 21.12 29.04 33.60 
NATO 
Europe (w/o 
FRG) 
118.2
0 
108.7
2 
113.6
4 
127.6
5 
195.7
4 
108.2
4 
107.3
4 
124.0
8 
160.1
9 
179.6
2 
Canada 1.56 0.12 1.20 10.92 14.04 0.96 0.84 1.08 1.37 1.44 
USA 2.76 1.68 6.36 19.92 12.60 2.52 3.00 3.24 6.72 6.48 
FRG (intra-
zonal) 
216.7
5 
213.5
3 
214.8
9 
287.1
3 
297.7
8 
235.6
2 
228.6
2 
255.5
8 
257.1
1 
315.6
9 
NATO 
total 
339.2
7 
324.0
5 
336.0
9 
445.6
2 
520.1
6 
347.3
4 
339.8
0 
383.9
8 
425.3
9 
503.2
3 
Table 8: Trade Results between NATO States and the GDR (in Million US $).502 
 
 While Bonn protected its political goals regarding intra-German trade against 
rivaling European interests, the East German economy greatly profited from integration 
into the European market. In 1970 an inter-German public exchange about how the GDR 
benefited from West Germany’s economic cooperation with France, the Benelux 
countries, and Italy created disharmony between usually amicable trading partners. The 
Federal Minister for Intra-German Relations Egon Franke estimated publicly that the 
GDR earned 400 to 500 million DM per year because of its economic relationship to 
West Germany.503 By trading with Western Europe through West German middlemen, 
the GDR enjoyed the same tariff conditions as EEC members after internal tariffs were 
                                                 
502 Results of Trade between NATO states and the GDR (in Mio US $), B102/245208, BAK [exclamation 
point marking the 1965 jump in France’s trade with GDR in original]. 
503 Mitteilung des Ministerrats der DDR, “Zu den Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen der DDR mit der BRD,” 3 
June 1970, DF5/5041, BAB. 
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abolished in 1968. With Franke’s official statement, the Federal Republic hinted at the 
GDR’s dependence on West Germany for economic prosperity. Moreover, his remarks 
suggested that it would be prudent for East Germany to stop pushing for recognition 
under international law. In this way, European integration not only shaped economic 
relations between East and West Germany, but also influenced debates on the German 
Question in the early 1970s. 
Not surprisingly, the depiction of East German economic growth as an outcome 
of West German European integration politics offended the GDR government. In a public 
note, the Council of Ministers defended the socialist economy against the “capitalist 
imperialism” of the Federal Republic by pointing to its trade relations with the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries.504 Indeed, the Soviet Union was East Germany’s 
biggest trade partner. However, it should be stressed that commodities within the scope 
of the eastern bloc’s Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) exchanged 
exclusively for kind, not money. In the COMECON’s exchange system, just like in the 
intra-German trade, every product was assigned accounting units. Accordingly, no hard 
currency found its way into the GDR via trade in the COMECON. For foreign currency, 
East Germany had to depend on credits and trade with the West.  
Just like Minister Franke had foreseen, the Eastern Treaties (Ostverträge) of the 
Federal Republic with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR threatened East 
Germany’s special status in the EEC statutes. The question of a unified EEC eastern trade 
policy resurfaced in 1970 immediately with the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw 
treaties. The EEC thought that if the Soviet Bloc recognized European cooperation not 
                                                 
504 Mitteilung des Ministerrats der DDR, “Zu den Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen der DDR mit der BRD,” 3 
June 1970, DF5/5041, BAB. 
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only de facto but also de jure, a more cohesive and effective European economic policy 
would be viable, which could possibly contribute to the EEC’s extension to other 
Western European countries. With the East-West détente and the GDR’s international 
recognition on the horizon, West Germany’s EEC partners wanted to renegotiate the 
status of intra-German trade.505 Once the Basic Treaty was signed in 1972, the other 
member states grew increasingly impatient with the special status of intra-German trade. 
Pushing for the abolition of the “Protocol on intra-German trade,” the EEC 
acknowledged the new political reality of two German states. West Germany meanwhile 
maintained that the Basic Treaty had not deepened the German-German division any 
further. The question of German unification remained open, Bonn argued, because the 
two German states still considered each other foreign territory (Ausland) and thus intra-
German trade would remain an important bond between them.506 In order to ease 
European concerns, however, Bonn pointed to trade statistics: the percentage of intra-
German trade in contrast to West German EEC trade was small; the trade between the 
EEC partners and the GDR had decisively increased in recent years; intra-German trade 
was unlikely to grow because of the GDR’s problems to deliver; and the ruinous danger 
of GDR price-dumping practices was negligible for the Common Market, since East 
Berlin kept prices high to reap larger profits.507 Accordingly, from the West German 
                                                 
505 Brüssel Eurogerma to BMWi u.a., betr Bundesaussenminister beim EP am 16.9.1970, 18 September 
1970, B102/301093, BAK. 
506 Memo, Einleitende Aufzeichnung für die Sitzung der Staatssekretäre für Europafragen am 21. Februar 
1973, 16. Februar 1973, B 102/180511, BAK. See also Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 
“Handelsbeziehungen mit der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” (Mitteilung von der Kommission an 
den Rat) 18 April 1973, B102/180511, BAK. 
507 Memo, Einleitende Aufzeichnung für die Sitzung der Staatssekretäre für Europafragen am 21.2.1973, 16 
February 1973, B 102/180511, BAK. 
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point of view, there existed no reason to nullify the protocol. Then again, the advent of 
Honecker’s consumer turn changed the course of intra-German trade. 
As the earlier discussion of German-German trade has shown, trade between East 
and West Germany grew exponentially after Honecker’s accession to power in 1971. As 
a parallel development, EEC skepticism about the stoical West German claim to a special 
relationship between Bonn and East Berlin grew. In 1974, Belgium demanded that the 
community implement instruments to monitor intra-German trade.508 The same year, the 
Netherlands complained that the Federal Republic interrupted the free-trade zone, 
stopping imports of GDR products sent through other EEC countries into West 
Germany.509 Bonn reacted strongly, insisting on upholding the regulations of paragraph 1 
of the protocol on intra-German trade. The FRG justified this stance with the continued 
political interest of keeping German-German economic exchanges direct and as frequent 
as possible in order to thicken contacts between East and West.510 When bilateral 
negotiations failed to produce agreement, the Benelux countries began a grievance 
procedure in accordance with paragraph 3 of the protocol on intra-German trade, which 
allowed states to take measures if the trade of a member state with East Berlin hurt their 
interests.  
While the Benelux coutries rightfully questioned Bonn’s loyalties for the way it 
handled intra-German trade, the real bone of contention was the tariff exemption for East 
                                                 
508 Dr. Schreiber (BMWi) Vermerk betr. Sitzung der Gruppe Handelsfragen des Rates am 19. November 
1974 in Brüssel, 21 November 1974, B102/180512, BAK; Fernschreiben aus Brüssel an AA, betr. EWG-
DDR, 20 November 1974, B102/180512, BAK. 
509 Dr. v. Arnim (BMWi), Vermerk betr.: Verhältnis EWG-DDR Hier: Niederländische Beschwerde über 
Abschirmung des Marktes der Bundesrepublik gegenüber in die Niederlande aus der DDR eingeführte 
Waren, 2 December 1974, B102/180512, BAK. 
510 Meeting with Benelux-Delegation (Erläuterungen unserer Delegation), February 1975, B102/180512, 
BAK. 
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German products. The European Court of Justice had declared these to be products “not 
of German origin” for the purpose of EEC trade policies after the GDR’s formal 
recognition by EEC members had made it a “third country.”511 Due to the special nature 
of intra-German trade the GDR paid no tariffs for crossing the border into the Federal 
Republic.512 Once inside the EEC zone East German goods could continue to move 
around the EEC without further taxation, skewing the principles of the Common Market 
and hurting national industries as well as dealership networks. Consequently, the West 
German position that connected the German Question to intra-German trade came under 
close scrutiny by the EEC. The Benelux furthermore hinted at the FRG’s economic 
profiteering from inter-German trade as a transit layover for distribution of Eastern 
products. Because of the tax exemption and established dealership networks, West 
Germany could sell East German goods to other member states with higher margins. As 
the system of intra-German trade was rooted in product bartering tied to exclusive credit 
agreements, the method necessarily conflicted with the free trade of the Common 
Market.513 Had the products entered the Common Market under the usual tariff laws 
through other EEC member states, they would not have enjoyed this competitive 
advantage. In order to avoid legal action while guaranteeing the uninterrupted political 
priority of intra-German trade, the Federal Republic proposed a compromise: a license 
agreement that allowed for 10 million DM worth of GDR products to be brought into 
                                                 
511 The EEC countries signed trade agreements for 10 years with the GDR in the aftermath of the Basic 
Treaty. Commission des Communautes Europeennes, Accord de Cooperation bilateraux entre des Etats 
Membres et la RDA signed by France on 19 July 1973, England 18 December 1973, Italy 18 April 1973, 
Belgium/Luxemburg 31 August 1974, Netherlands 12 June 1974, Denmark 21 February 1974.  
512 Dr. Groß, Vermerk betr. Freiverkehrsfähigkeit von im innerdeutschen Handel bezogenen Waren, 11 
April 1975, B102/180512, BAK. 
513 Dr. v. Arnim (BMWi), Vermerk betr.: Verhältnis EWG-DDR Hier: Niederländische Beschwerde über 
Abschirmung des Marktes der Bundesrepublik gegenüber in die Niederlande aus der DDR eingeführte 
Waren, 2. December 1974, B102/180512, BAK. 
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West Germany through other EEC countries. This proposal represented a maximum 
amount that, so Bonn hoped, would neither enable East Berlin to supply West German 
demand exclusively through third countries, nor possibly create a political lever for the 
GDR.514 At the same time, the national dealership networks of its European partners 
would get a piece of the pie and acquire leeway that they desired in trading with the 
GDR. 
Despite the risk of disagreement in the EEC, the Federal Republic upheld intra-
German trade as a policy toward unification. This rapprochement policy triggered 
widespread domestic critique from liberal and conservative quarters. In a public hearing 
before the parliament in 1977, sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf described the lack of clarity in 
Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik in combination with European integration as “explosive.”515 
Active pursuit of European political unity would necessarily preclude German 
unification, Dahrendorf maintained, because none of West Germany’s neighbors had a 
strong political or economic interest in seeing Germany reunite. Political scientist Hans-
Peter Schwarz criticized the policy of rapprochement, noting that the Basic Treaty had 
taken the German Question out of the East-West conflict and German policies had fallen 
by the wayside.516 Yet the analysis of intra-German trade in relation to the EEC 
integration shows the political power and economic significance of the unresolved 
German Question, which lasted well beyond the Basic Treaty. Looking at the cultural 
effects triggered by EEC trade policy, the FRG under the leadership of the Social 
                                                 
514 Meeting with Benelux-Delegation, Erläuterungen unserer Delegation, February 1975, B102/180512, 
BAK. This was twice the amount of GDR goods that had entered the Benelux via the FRG in the previous 
year. 
515 Public Hearing, Sachverständige zur Deutschlandpolitik, 11 October 1977, B288/75, BAK. 
516 Ibid. 
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Democrats achieved its goal of deepened German-German economic and cultural ties 
precisely because of European integration. Through the circulation of East and West 
German goods in the EEC, both product cultures interacted on the same market.  
 
Aesthetic Convergence in the Common Market 
The integration of the EEC increased the interaction of East and West German 
import and export economies through the loophole of intra-German trade, permeating the 
Iron Curtain with capitalist market principles and Western aesthetic styles. West German 
stubbornness thus not only worked to uphold bonds between Germans, but also 
contributed to a convergence of aesthetics between East Germany, the Federal Republic, 
and EEC countries. Although both German states had developed strong notions of their 
own national identity in design during the reconstruction years, other countries’ styles 
and tastes affected German material culture in turn with growing trade.  
In the GDR, the aesthetic incentives of the Common Market worked mostly 
through export goods production, slowly undermining socialist material ideals. To the 
East German office for quality control, the DAMW, the fact that exports to the West 
increasingly determined the appearance of commodities in East Germany was even more 
disturbing than the obvious gap between the claims and the realities of its production. 
East Germany’s inflexible planning mechanisms made the production of export furniture 
and domestic design inseparable. Once set on a furniture model, the regional industry 
structured the distribution of raw materials and ordered the machines needed to realize 
only these designs. Changing the design meant a halt in production until the supply sector 
responded and the necessary technological changes were made. This crippled innovation 
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to the degree that industry reports after 1970 regularly included remarks on the old-
fashioned look of GDR furniture.517 While these products should not have been awarded 
the official seal of quality – a measure that the DAMW and the Central Institute used to 
encourage “socialist” design – they made exceptions for poorly designed furniture in the 
export business. The DAMW’s realistic assessment that earning foreign currency was 
more important “because we cannot force our design principles on the foreign buyer” 
exemplifies how economic necessities suppressed socialist fervor, designers’ creativity, 
and innovation.518  
The furniture at the 1970 Leipzig Fair, in particular, failed to live up to the 
DAMW’s expectations: “The requirements of a socialist living culture cannot be met 
with these [export] models.”519 While the East German upholstery section at the Leipzig 
fair did display joy of experimentation (Experimentierfreudigkeit), it was often a result of 
foreign, that is to say Western European, customers’ requests.520 Indeed, archival 
evidence suggests that the GDR actively pursued Western European customers. For 
example, by the 1960s the Zentralinstitut had sent its staff to trade fairs in the West to 
report on the technological quality and design of the capitalist competition.521 The new 
travel agreements of the Basic Treaty facilitated the task of the Zentralinstitut in this 
regard. Short trips to West Berlin to visit exhibitions at the newly opened International 
Design Center or to view the range of products at West German furniture stores increased 
tremendously after 1972. Most of the documented visits to the Cologne International 
                                                 
517 See for example Dr. Lindenhayn (DAMW) to Köppen (chair of the economic council Neubrandenburg), 
4 June 1971, DF5/5082, BAB. 
518 Dr. Lindenhayn (DAMW) to Köppen (chair of the economic council Neubrandenburg), 4 June 1971, 
DF5/5082, BAB. 
519 DAMW fair report, Leipziger Herbstmesse 1970, 4 September 1970, DF5/5041, BAB. 
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Furniture Fair fall into this time period as well. Ironically, this observational activity 
entailed a certain degree of adaptation to Western aesthetics. In 1974, the Bavarian 
Upholstery Association accused East German combines of “slavishly” imitating West 
German designs and selling their furniture at cut-rate prices.522 West German producers 
feared the eastern economic competition on the European market. The FRG government, 
however, saw this transfer of cultural ideas as a way to impress Western aesthetics upon 
the East German population and thereby to propagate the principles of capitalist 
democracy. 
Indeed, the Zentralinstitut’s successor, the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung, 
started a product card index in 1974, in which it cataloged furniture systems 
predominately from Scandinavia, the Federal Republic, Switzerland, and Italy, with an 
occasional Russian model thrown in to inspire the export models that headed east.523 The 
western firms in the card index were extreme examples of classy, high-priced designer 
furniture like Interlübke – nothing one would expect in a workers and peasants’ state. In 
the process of cataloging the West’s furniture, GDR industrial designers compared their 
products with those of the West, which, ultimately, hindered the development of a 
distinct East German aesthetic. The tendency towards comparison stood in stark contrast 
to the GDR’s cultural-economic goal of convincing the West of the East’s superior 
quality and comfort of life. The GDR intelligentsia incorporated this Westernization of 
style into the socialist framework of the state without hesitation. Cultural critic Karin 
Hirdina hurried to make the form fit the ideology in 1975:  
                                                 
522 Weinbeer to Hans Friedrichs, Betr.: Beschaftigungslage in der Polstermobelindustrie – 
Wettbewerbsverzerrung durch DDR-Billigimporte, 9 August 1976, B102/206958, BAK. 
523 Product index, Produktkartei Wohnraummöbel, DF7/534, 535, 536, 537, 538, BAB; Produktkartei 
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In fact, defined as a program and a method, not as a style, functionalism 
represents a Utopian vision of a non-capitalist order of relationships between Man 
and his environment. Strictly speaking functionalism does not work in the 
capitalist system. It does not affirm capitalism, it transcends it.524  
But all too often the natural look of Sweden, the functionalist purism of West Germany 
and Switzerland, and the playful avant-gardism of Italy meshed together in the cheap 
export furniture offered in West German mail-order catalogs. 
Nevertheless, modeling production after popular western brands still seemed like 
the most promising strategy to East German economists. To gauge the Western markets, 
not only the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung, but also the larger combines sent their 
research and development staff to Western trade shows. In 1979, Dresden-Hellerau, for 
example, visited both the International Furniture Fair in Cologne and the International 
Furniture Salon in Paris.525 Aside from neo-functionalism, the designs, especially in 
France, displayed a strong tendency toward ornamentation, while homeliness and comfort 
dominated in Cologne. The GDR with its style specialists in Zeulenroda and other 
combines around the country could easily design such items. Yet, the most important 
lesson learned from these visits in the West pertained to materials rather than design. 
Upon his return, Gert Großpietzsch, the head of Hellerau’s research and development, 
recommended in a report that the combine should produce expensive furniture to 
maximize its revenues and to target the unexplored parts of the western market.526 In 
                                                 
524 Karin Hirdina quoted in Georg Bertsch, Ernst Hedler, and Matthias Dietz, SED – Schönes Einheits 
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design journal Form und Zweck. 
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terms of materials, he reported, the trend went back to the natural with a high demand for 
solid woods and wooden veneers, the exact materials that the Chemical Program had 
abolished. Instead, the East German synthetic alternative to veneers, so-called decorative 
foil, which went through multiple varnishing and polishing processes after its application 
on chipboard, compromised the overall aesthetic.527 With the shortfall of Honecker’s 
Unity of Economic and Social Policy program, the material dreams of Großpietzsch and 
his designer colleagues remained out of reach, leaving East Germany to continue its low-
end quality production strategy. By 1985, about 8 percent of the Federal Republic’s 
furniture imports came from the GDR.528 The combines mass-produced contracted 
furniture for western clients with different stylistic demands ranging from neo-
functionalism for Ikea to style-furniture for enthusiastic retailers.529  
In the West German case, trade and a nascent collective vision of Europe as a 
cultural space worked European trends into West German designs. The Federal 
Republic’s accession to the status of the world’s largest furniture exporter, grossing three 
billion DM in 1981, developed parallel to an equally high import of foreign-made 
furniture.530 Consequently, domestic producers followed the lead of the European market 
demand in order to maximize sales. Foreign influences thus found their way into the 
department stores and homes of the Federal Republic, slowly affecting the overall 
national aesthetic. While consumption shaped and reproduced dominant ideas about the 
                                                 
527 The author saw a number of modern storage furniture from the 1970s and 1980s at the 
Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR in Eisenhüttenstadt. Close up, despite the neo-functionalist 
design, the Schrankwände looked cheap because of the decorative foil technique and the poor construction. 
528 Lauber, Wohnkultur in der DDR, 42. 
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appearance of material culture, artistic influences brought new ideas into the Common 
Market. The Federal Republic’s domination of the international furniture market 
coincided with the “designer decade” of the 1980s, which brought the aesthetic value of 
material culture back to the forefront.531 Cultural events, such as the Venice Biennale of 
1980, greatly impacted industrial furniture design again and in a magnitude that had last 
been seen in 1958 at the Brussels world exposition. The Venice Biennale marked the 
arrival of postmodernism in Europe. Although postmodernism focused on architecture, 
most of its participants were engaged in interior design as well. Debates resulting from 
this epochal event thus extended beyond the sphere of architecture into the field of 
applied arts. Through the mushrooming of lifestyle design stores, in particular, design 
entered back into public discourse on consumption. Moreover, design infiltrated all areas 
of public and private life via collaborations of traditional brands, such as Alessi or WMF, 
with the most creative minds that the applied arts had to offer.532  
A radical design movement from Italy illustrates the playfulness of this 
postmodern decade and its implications for West German furniture design.533 Inspired by 
Art Deco and Pop Art, the virtuoso movement Memphis (1981) entered the design scene 
under the leadership of Ettore Sottsass, who achieved an alienation of products through 
the deconstruction of silhouettes. While the extreme shapes did not meet enthusiasm 
among the population because of their limited functionality, their influence is still visible 
in German museums to this day. Wolfgang Flatz’ lightning chair and table (1982), 
                                                 
531 Aynsley, Designing Modern Germany, 204. 
532 The Italian company Alessi exemplifies this turn to “designer wares.” In the early 1980s, the company 
collaborated with designers, turning everyday utility objects into design objects that henceforth shaped the 
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displayed in Hamburg’s Kunstgewerbemuseum, drew inspiration from the movement 
(see figure 11). Furniture mass production referenced these exaggerated shapes, for 
example emulating urban skylines in top pieces of wardrobes and shelves. Especially in 
West Germany, this playful movement broke down into geometric forms that are well 
exemplified by Peter Maly’s Zyklus furniture (1984), pieces that have become German 
classics (see figures 12 and 13). In the GDR, similar shapes emerged with Herbert Pohl’s 
Metropol furniture (1986) for the East Berlin furniture combine, which the Amt für 
industrielle Formgestaltung approved and recognized with the prize “Gutes Design” at 
the Leipzig fair in 1988 (see figures 14, 15 and 16). Unfortunately, the Metropol program 
never entered mass production, because the GDR collapsed before the model could be 
integrated into the next Plan.534 Nevertheless, opening up to European influences further 
increased similarities between the two German states as well as between them and the 
rest of Western Europe (see figure 17).  
Germany’s own take on postmodernism drew pronouncedly on historical 
elements.535 Rather than following the experimental path of deconstruction, Germans in 
East and West rehabilitated urban apartment buildings dating back to the nineteenth 
century. The rediscovery of the classic architecture of an aesthetically untainted German 
                                                 
534 Herbert Pohl (architect and designer) in discussion with the author in Berlin on 13 January 2009. Design 
historian Gert Selle claims that the playful, Italian-influenced furniture style did not exist in the GDR. 
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as a return to the past. The title of Jean-François Lyotard’s epoch defining work The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) was translated into “The Presence of the Past” in both Italian 
and German. Design historian Aynsely has shown how these translation questions started a debate about 
“the ‘return’ to history” in architecture and design with significant implications for European countries. 
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past came alongside a postmodernist critique that aimed at the core of postwar German 
national design. In this rejection of modern aesthetics, which encompassed the 
Werkbund, the Bauhaus, Ulm, and the late functionalism of large-scale housing programs 
and city transportion systems, the strong sense of continuity that they represented came 
under attack again.536 Such critique of functionalist modernism affected German furniture 
designers as well. In 1982, an East German report from the Cologne fair explained that 
the Spartan aesthetics and rigid lines of West German functionalism had been overcome 
in the West. Instead, “lines of emphasized elegance with a tendency to individualism” 
attracted the consumer.537 Successful West German furniture producers such as 
Interlübke and Hülsta recovered elements that evoked the mass appeal of Art Nouveau 
(see figure 18). Within Europe, this furniture style was historically one of the most 
successful aesthetic concepts that straddled the divide between crafts and mass 
production. Its many international names alone indicate the vibrancy of style in the fields 
of architecture, art, and decorative arts as well as the scope of its circulation: Jugendstil, 
Stile Liberty, le style moderne, arte nova, arte joven, and Nieuwe Kunst to name but a 
few. The return to historical styles, as shown earlier in regard to GDR Socialist Realism, 
did not constitute a novelty. It rather brought the postmodernist and the style enthusiast in 
Germany closer together while creating bridges to the French and Italian cultures that 
prefer opulence to asceticism. In the process of European economic integration, then, 
awareness of a European culture and identity began to emerge.  
                                                 
536 Aynsley, Designing Modern Germany, 205-206. 
537 Gerhard Wetzig, Dienstreisebericht Möbelmesse Köln 19.1. - 22.1.1982, 1 February 1982, DF 7/1072, 
BAB. 
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For the first time in its comparatively short history, the EEC awarded an industrial 
design prize in 1988. The award recognized small and medium-sized industrial firms that 
excelled in the categories of quality design and corporate identity. This prize illustrated, 
first, that design had become by the late 1980s a critical factor for the success of 
European products of Mittelstand businesses that continue to constitute the backbone of 
European national economies today. The design prize marked, second, the culmination of 
cultural-economic competition for markets within the European Community that 
encouraged the acceptance of other national aesthetic concepts. In the call for 
submissions to the 1988 EEC design prize, organizers underscored the pan-European 
nature of this event. In particular, the competition’s three objectives emphasized the 
concept of a shared European design culture: (1) To stimulate interest in design in 
European/EEC industries; (2) To illustrate the nature of the design process and how it can 
be used as a tool for industrial innovation; and (3) To promote European/EEC design 
outside of Europe.538  
The 1980s were a turning point in the effort to forge a European cultural space. 
As plans for a cultural TV event illustrate, industrial design served as a building block for 
European identity. The pan-European project “La Casa Europea – European Design Day 
on European TV” aired on the same day in all EC member countries. This connected and 
coordinated program about European design consisted of different elements like 
discussions, lectures about objects, interviews, and design presentations. Several of the 
goals for this event listed by the organizers pushed for a cohesive European aesthetic that 
communicated the “growing together” of the Western European countries. Among other 
                                                 
538 Danish Design Council to Jörg Bieberstein (BMWi), The European Design Prize, 23 February 1987, 
B457/8, BAK; Statutes for the European/EEC Design Prize, 21 February 1987, B457/8, BAK. 
  
225 
things, they used the event to promote the “idea and the reality of European design, to 
demonstrate the essential quality of design for European development, to inform about 
the innovative perspective of design for Europe, and to offer design as a European 
identity.”539 Aiming to prove to a European audience that Europe had grown into a tight-
knit network of different European locations and activities, exemplified by the 
telecommunication that this event utilized, the TV program proposed Europe as an open 
space. Industrial design helped to create this European public sphere, serving as a 
framework for European innovation to explain “Europe as a real and artificial world.”540 
This conception of Europe as a cultural space and its integrative force even brought about 
deliberations for a communal EC cultural policy vis-à-vis the GDR.541  
Yet not everybody shared the excitement about European design. In 1989, the 
West German Rat für Formgebung restructured itself under new leadership. Dieter Rams, 
a design personality known as the mind behind the rebranding of Braun and its evolution 
into one of the leading technological design companies worldwide, volunteered as 
president of the orphaned and disheveled design council. In an effort to bring the Rat to 
its rightful place at the core of West German industrial design policy and to fight off 
regional competition from the Chambers of Commerce, he started a fundraising campaign 
among industrialists and entrepreneurs. In a letter asking for financial support, Rams 
pointed to other countries’ design activities and the integration of the European market as 
a motivation to reorganize the design policy of the Federal Republic in defense of the 
                                                 
539 Project conception, “La Casa Europea – European Design Day on European TV, Anhang zum summary 
of the meeting of the expert-group ‘La CASA Europea” day in Luxembourg am 18.12.1989, n.d., 
B457/150, BAK. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Ambassador Juan J. Rubio de Urquia, “Culture in the GDR: Possibilities of EC Cultural Activities in the 
GDR,” 2 March 1989, pg. 8, B288/256, BAK. 
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West German brand. The goal was to heighten awareness for German design by 
increasing its presence abroad, thus giving German design its rightful recognition as an 
important export factor.542 Rams intended to continue the Rat’s thrust for a national 
identity predicated on its industrial design, however, these activities, while not 
unfounded, already seemed outdated at the time. The Federal Republic’s long-term 
policymaking in the European Community was based on continuous growth, both in the 
breadth and the depth of the union. For the inclusion of new member states and the 
aggregation of supranational powers, the EEC needed popular support. One way to create 
that support was indeed cultural Europeanization toward a European identity. Since the 
EEC had started out as a purely economic cooperation, it seemed only natural that these 
cultural bonds would be forged in a field that straddles the economic and the cultural: 
industrial design. 
 
Conclusion 
Friedrich Koslowsky never built his “House of Life.” But his vision to erect 
cultural bridges via product exchange materialized through the integrative forces of intra-
German trade and the European Common Market. The combination of diplomatic and 
economic politics with the interests of the Federal Republic at its core initiated a process 
of Europeanization that reached well beyond the Iron Curtain. 
Trade fairs functioned as early testing grounds for German-German economic and 
cultural contacts, which grew over the course of the 1960s and boomed in the 1970s. 
Despite non-recognition of the GDR, the FRG traded with the East and continued the 
                                                 
542 Dieter Rams to MAHO AG, 7 September 1989, B457/129. 
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pretense that economic exchanges did not imply de facto political recognition. 
Meanwhile the GDR aligned itself through trade with the fortunes of capitalist 
economies. The GDR utilized intra-German trade to increase exports and to yield more 
foreign currency. In order to establish and survive in an international market, the East 
German production aesthetic converged with Western ones. The malfunctioning parts of 
economic planning increasingly sabotaged any internal aesthetic policies as the export 
orientation of the furniture industry worked against delineation from the West.543 
Meanwhile, the Federal Republic profited politically from product scarcity in the GDR. 
Exhibiting progress and abundance at the fair and through trade, Bonn promoted the 
capitalist lifestyles and created demand for western product aesthetics among the East 
German population. Although the economic payoff for West Germany was negligible, the 
federal government had a continued interest in the East-West dialog to maintain ties 
between the two German states, even risking disagreement with other EEC members. The 
story that unfolds in this chapter suggests that only after the resolution of the German 
Question could the Federal Republic fully commit to Europe.  
Yet this is not to say that the EEC was of no significance to the German-German 
rapprochement process. Quite the opposite is the case. European economic integration 
and cultural European trends paved the way for a cultural convergence between East and 
West Germany. The initial moments of German aesthetic convergence towards a 
European design can be found in the integration of the Common Market and the 
incentives it gave to pursue “European” tastes and styles, no matter how diverse. This 
study has examined this process in the realm of the furniture industry and industrial 
                                                 
543 See Sleifer, Planning Ahead and Falling Behind for a comparative analysis of East Germany’s 
command economy. 
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design; however, there are probably other areas in which this phenomenon can be 
observed. Early attempts at establishing an “East” or a “West” design aesthetic gave way 
to aesthetics based on market incentives to compete in the expanding trade of lifestyle 
consumption during the 1970s and 1980s. What is remarkable, given the Cold War 
context, is the fact that neither Germany’s furniture production directly imitated or 
culturally identified with the United States or the Soviet Union. Instead, each drew on the 
creative strength of their immediate European neighbors, a process that was accelerated 
by the integration of the European Community.  
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CHAPTER 5: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: 
COLD WAR DIPLOMACY OF GERMAN DESIGN  
Introduction 
German-German relations during the Cold War represented a piecemeal effort to 
“coexist” in a geopolitical situation marked by rising superpower tensions. Both 
Germanys fiercely competed for legitimacy and recognition in the international arena.544 
Faced with deadlocked ideological positions, Germans eventually realized that they 
needed new avenues of interaction in order to salvage what was left of social, cultural, 
and economic (not to mention familial) bonds between the two Germanys. The following 
chapter explores East and West German cultural-diplomatic strategies that sought to 
negotiate a German-German modus vivendi through the medium of industrial design and 
connects these efforts to the complex diplomatic history of the Cold War. 
Part of what allowed material culture to mediate German-German relations was 
the deeply ingrained self-understanding of Germany as a “nation of culture” 
(Kulturnation) that survived the division. Both sides utilized aesthetics to overcome the 
horrors of the Third Reich and to display moral improvement. This operational 
understanding of aesthetics was the (least) common denominator upon which 
communication between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic 
functioned. While both Germanys shared one cultural heritage with the illustrious names 
of Schiller and Goethe, Beethoven and Wagner, Albrecht Dürer and Caspar David 
Friedrich, the ideological Cold War shifted focus from “high culture” concerns to 
                                                 
544 In 1949, only 11 countries had recognized the GDR, and all of them were communist. William Glenn 
Gray summarizes GDR diplomacy as follows: “From the early 1950s through the late 1960s, the GDR 
labored to persuade even one noncommunist government to grant formal recognition. Such precedent 
would, it was hoped, generate an avalanche of further recognitions and result in a more general acceptance 
of the GDR as an independent state.” William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to 
Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 3. 
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questions of lifestyle and Wohnkultur. Intended to demonstrate the superiority of the 
respective economic systems, industrial design as an expression of material progress and 
membership among modern nations turned into a competitive field in the German-
German struggle. Dating back to the turn-of-the-century arts and crafts movement, 
German design philosophy sought social improvement through aesthetic reform of the 
human environment, public as well as private. This tradition of aesthetic progress through 
material culture resonated with German politicians after the war.  
The Federal Republic held an aesthetic advantage over its eastern neighbor. From 
the beginning West German design politicians pursued a modern style in interior design 
that they shared with other members of the Atlantic community. Its fresh and functional 
aesthetics placed West Germany among the advanced and progressive nations that held 
leadership in engineering, technology, and design. Meanwhile, the GDR aligned itself 
with the Soviet Union by adopting cultural Stalinism while also retaining strong German 
national influence. As interpretations of aesthetics and ideology changed more or less 
with every Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party, however, East Germany 
slowly emancipated itself from the cultural wardship of its Big Brother. Impelled by the 
economic logic of export markets, discussed in the previous chapter, the GDR made great 
progress in the production of furniture that looked more contemporary and thus was able 
to find customers in East and West. Nevertheless, in comparison with the Federal 
Republic, by the late 1960s the GDR still did not belong to the leading nations in the 
development of human environments – the workplace, public spaces, and the home.  
The story unfolding in this chapter is not just one of another Cold War race for 
superiority, although it takes place against the backdrop of inter-German competition. It 
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is also a story of rapprochement: while the East Germans employed culture as a soft-
power means to promote humane aspects of socialist ideology with the goal of 
progressing from the status of a pariah state, West Germany used cultural diplomacy to 
foster human interactions between both German populations. Although their diplomatic 
goals differed, both Germanys used similar strategies that developed in three phases: 1) 
diplomacy within the framework of international design organizations, 2) international 
exhibitions of their respective industrial designs, and 3) direct German-German 
negotiations about cultural exchanges. In an effort to look at German postwar history 
from a cultural perspective, this study examines the actual cultural events resulting from 
political negotiations at each of these stages. The main actors of this chapter are trained 
designers or representatives of design organizations, who, in one way or another, engaged 
in cultural politics on behalf of their states. Accordingly, it follows their exhibition 
activities to uncover the political motivations inscribed in East and West German material 
culture.545  
Withn the context of the Cold War, the political significance of aesthetics in 
everyday objects has been well established.546  For example, historian Greg Castillo has 
analyzed the “soft power of mid-century design” to evaluate its influence on German 
design competition as a “culture battle” (“Kulturkampf”) between Americanization and 
                                                 
545 Heretofore unseen documents from the East German Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung and the West 
German Permanent Representation (Ständige Vertretung) in East Berlin provide new insights into the 
nature of German-German cultural competition and cooperation. 
546 The political inscription of German commodities has been discussed by Paul Betts, The Authority of 
Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004) and Eli Rubin, Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German 
Democratic Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). The diplomatic use of 
American-style consumerism in the Cold War setting has been explored by Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible 
Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2005) and Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury 
Design (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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Sovietization.547 By taking the focus off the superpowers to interrogate the specifically 
German cultural politics behind the aestheticization of separate identities – proletarian in 
the East and cosmopolitan in the West – I hope to provide a better picture of German 
interests in the global Cold War. The design history literature on Germany has not 
touched upon the topic of material culture’s operationalization for diplomatic purposes in 
the context of the German Question. If we take the significance of Berlin as the 
“frontline” of the Cold War and the “shop window” to the West seriously, German-
German interaction around trade and cultural diplomacy warrants closer examination. 
 
Encounters of Foreign Design: The Tug-of-War over ICSID Membership 
On January 9, 1965, Mia Seeger, the grande dame of West German industrial 
design, received a strictly confidential letter from her Belgian colleague Josine des 
Cressonnières. The Secretary General of the International Council of Societies of 
Industrial Designers (ICSID) wanted to know if Seeger had heard of the Zentralinstitut 
für Gestaltung in Berlin and what she thought about its merits as a design institution. Des 
Cressonnières did not even know whether the Zentralinstitut, which had applied for 
ICSID membership, was in East or West Germany and depended on her German friend 
for an evaluation.548 This rather innocuous letter started a two-and-a-half-year-long West 
German campaign to prevent the GDR from joining the ICSID and to preserve West 
Germany’s membership as the sole representative of German interests in the international 
body.  
                                                 
547 Castillo, Cold War at the Home Front, xv. 
548 Des Cressonnières to Mia Seeger, 9 January 1965, 10-11-1, DAB. 
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In the case of ICSID membership, however, the worlds of Cold War diplomacy 
and cultural politics collided.549 The campaign to isolate the GDR in the world of 
industrial design was in accord with the Federal Republic’s diplomatic maxims regarding 
the eastern part of Germany: the Hallstein Doctrine, which prescribed the severing of 
diplomatic relations with countries that extended diplomatic recognition to the GDR, and 
the West German claim to exclusive representation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) for all of 
Germany in international organizations. To influence third parties, West German 
diplomacy as well as East German countermeasures often utilized economic incentives 
and foreign aid packages.550 Similar issues were at hand here.  
The ICSID had been created in 1957 as a purely professional organization 
dedicated to globally advance and organize the new field of industrial design.551 Only 
professional associations, not nations themselves, were eligible for membership. A 
founding member, the Federal Republic of Germany acted as the sole representative of 
German interests. The organization quickly became the dominant international body in all 
things design, especially for Eurasia. Among the most important of the ICSID’s tasks 
were the editorship of an international design bibliography and the organization of 
biannual design congresses. The West German Rat für Formgebung began editing the 
international bibliography in 1961. These efforts overlapped with a longstanding program 
                                                 
549 The ambiguous concept of cultural politics, emerging from the field of cultural studies, has been defined 
by Peter Jackson as “the view that ‘cultural’ questions of aesthetics, taste and style cannot be divorced from 
‘political’ questions about power, inequality and oppression. Conversely, the concept refers to the way that 
contemporary politics haven been ‘aestheticized’, with a whole range of new issues apparently replacing 
traditional class-based ones: issues around gender and sexuality, food and the environment, health and 
body-politics, ethnicity, nationalism and ‘race’.” Peter Jackson, “Towards a Cultural Politics of 
Consumption,” in Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, ed. John Bird and others 
(Oxford/New York: Routledge, 1993), 208. 
550 For an example of West German diplomacy to isolate the GDR in the Third World see William Glen 
Gray, Germany’s Cold War. 
551 ICSID Constitution, adopted 17 September 1959, p. 2, 03-1-2, DAB. 
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that cultivated and maintained an interdisciplinary, multi-lingual design library in 
Darmstadt. In soliciting information about eastern European design publications from its 
GDR counterpart, the West German design council built first contacts with the East 
German Zentralinstitut (later renamed Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung) years before 
the latter applied for ICSID membership. However, these contacts were contained within 
the special domain of German-German relations.552 With the ICSID’s pending extension 
into the Eastern Bloc, these intangible relations would receive a novel quality. German-
German interaction would become official, because it would take place within an 
international framework that accepted representatives from diplomatically recognized 
countries, which would force the West Germans to share German representation with 
East Germans, chipping away at the Federal Republic’s Alleinvertretungsanspruch.  
The GDR received provisional membership in 1967. Mia Seeger’s successor, 
Fritz Gotthelf, thereafter intensified efforts to exclude the East Germans from the ICSID. 
He turned repeatedly to its executive board, explaining the delicate German diplomatic 
situation, but to no avail. The ICSID board assessed the German-German situation in the 
context of the East-West dualism, but had neither the interest nor the power to challenge 
the Cold War status quo of German division as a non-governmental organization. In July 
1967, Gotthelf received a confidential letter from des Cressonnières, who stated that, 
after careful consideration, the board had decided to grant East Germany full 
membership. She encouraged Gotthelf to keep trying to “find the precedents necessary to 
satisfy the mind of our West German friends, because the Executive Committee has 
                                                 
552 For details on the limited extent of German-German relations see Stefan Creuzberger, Kampf um die 
Einheit. Das gesamtdeutsche Ministerium und die politische Kultur des Kalten Krieges 1949-1969. 
Schriften des Bundesarchivs 69 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2008). 
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concluded that it was not possible to come to a decision, against all existing facts, about 
the re-unification of Germany!”553 Des Cressonnières ended her letter pointing to the fact 
that the ICSID had already granted provisional membership to a design society from the 
People’s Republic of China and would have to extend the same to the East German 
Zentralinstitut. Without the necessary diplomatic precedent, Gotthelf could do little else 
but accept the ICSID’s decision. After more than two years of string-pulling and 
backdoor diplomacy, he downplayed the importance of the matter in his response: “One 
Germany or two; we aren’t politicians.” Nevertheless, Gotthelf announced that West 
Germany would abstain from the vote on East Germany’s membership by being absent 
from the next congress “in an elegant manner.”554 But this last minute effort to save face 
could not cover up the fact that the FRG and its cultural representatives had suffered a 
significant loss in the battle for sole German representation in international bodies.  
The ICSID’s extension eastwards followed typical Cold War diplomatic patterns 
(see figure 19). The first socialist member, Yugoslavia, only joined the ICSID in 1961, 
followed by the Soviet Union’s VNIITE design council in 1965. The novelty of eastward 
expansion both encouraged the West Germans to protest it and, at the same time, 
prepared the Eastern Bloc for possible diplomatic fall-out. While there is no evidence 
suggesting that the Eastern Bloc retreated to the same kind of lobbying done by Gotthelf 
to gain ICSID membership, these Eastern European states took a strong position against 
discrimination from the West. Yuri Soloviev, the head of VNIITE, sent the Executive 
Board a long appraisal of the role of industrial design in socialist societies. The paper 
defended the fact that Eastern Bloc design councils were often centralized state 
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institutions and not professional associations.555 Despite initial hesitation on part of the 
ICSID board, the desire to grow from a transatlantic into a global organization won out 
over ideological reservations. As a result, an adjusted ICSID constitution allowed 
national members into the organization. Eventually, most of the eastern European 
industrial design institutions were admitted as member societies rather than 
“professional” members.556 The same applied to the Zentralinstitut when it requested 
membership at the Vienna Congress of the ICSID in 1965.557 The executive board passed 
the application in February 1967 for confirmation by the General Assembly in Canada in 
the fall of 1967.558  
As the West Germans pushed forward their last intervention against GDR 
membership in the summer of 1967, tensions between the Zentralinstitut and the ICSID 
board rose. From the very beginning, the GDR took a “no nonsense” position vis-à-vis 
the West German attempts to exclude them from this organization. As a result of having 
encountered the Federal Republic’s Alleinvertretungsanspruch in other international 
bodies, the SED leadership suspected Western conspiracy behind the smallest diplomatic 
slip-up, and the East Germans became adamant about the correct representation of their 
country in name, flag, and national hymn. When the program for the ICSID Congress in 
Ottawa failed to identify the Zentralinstitut as an East German institution, its head Martin 
Kelm threatened to boycott the congress altogether.559 ICSID Secretary General des 
Cressonnières sent him a telegram to calm the situation, affirming that the nomination of 
                                                 
555 Yuri Soloviev, “Le Design et la Politique d’Etat dans les Pays Socialistes (sur l’Exemple de l’Union 
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557 Des Cressonnières (Secretary General) to Kelm, 17 January 1965, 10-10-1, DAB. 
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the Zentralinstitut would be listed with the addendum “German Democratic Republic 
(GDR).”560  
What seems like an unnecessary severing of relations with the ICSID to an 
outsider actually represented a fundamental building block of GDR foreign policy to gain 
formal recognition from the West as a legitimate state. For the GDR, membership in 
supposedly apolitical organizations was a stepping-stone towards attaining full 
membership in the international community and a seat in the United Nations. Moreover, 
as the tug-of-war over ICSID membership shows, both Germanys knew that each of these 
stepping-stones raised the stakes in the German-German Cold War over ideology, 
division, and international recognition. The ICSID eventually granted the GDR 
membership in Ottawa together with that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, in 
October 1967.561 At this point, all of the Eastern Bloc countries with significant industries 
employing industrial designers gained membership in the ICSID, thus leveling the 
diplomatic playing field between eastern and western Europe.  
Although West Germany’s diplomatic circles were not pleased with East 
Germany’s membership in the ICSID, the industrial design community certainly was. 
The West German design journal Form, a leading publication with significant influence 
on aesthetic discourse in the Federal Republic to the present day, considered the 
unfortunate diplomatic outcome as a blessing in disguise: “We welcome this step 
because, despite its admittedly similar mode of operation, the foundation of GDR design 
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is ideologically different. The membership of the GDR in the ICSID might perhaps offer 
more opportunities for knowledge exchange.”562 It is striking that in the previous thirty-
nine volumes of this design publication, there is not one major article about East 
Germany to be found.  
A sudden spike of western interest in GDR design after its acceptance into the 
ICSID suggests that the logic of East German cultural diplomacy actually worked. The 
international validation of GDR design redirected the attention of designers in the Federal 
Republic. From this day forward projects from the other side of the wall became relevant 
to West Germans. In the same issue, Form directed attention to the leading East German 
design publication Form und Zweck. The article recognized the design journal “as an 
auxiliary bridge to compensate for the lack of personal exchange of experiences between 
East and West.”563 After ignoring Form und Zweck for ten years, West German designers 
thus began to take GDR design seriously and eventually discovered eastern publications 
as a means to stay informed about design developments there.  
 
International Exhibitions and the Diplomatic Significance of Material Culture 
The initial integration of Eastern European countries into the ICSID established 
official avenues for the Federal Republic and the GDR alike to pursue contacts on the 
other side of the Iron Curtain. Consequently, both the East and West German design 
councils worked their way toward establishing more formal relations with those nations. 
An air of competitiveness marked this second stage in German design diplomacy in 
which both parts of Germany tried to display material progressivism and economic 
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prowess to the other camp. The lingering German Question and East Berlin’s 
legitimization efforts put FRG and GDR material culture face to face. 
Prior personal and professional friendships facilitated this new task for the FRG. 
Mia Seeger, together with her Polish counterpart Zophia Szydlowska, the head of the 
design council Instytut Wzornictwa Przemyslowego, proposed the first West German 
exhibition in the Eastern Bloc.564 The two industrial design personalities had met at the 
1960 Milan Triennial, where the German and Polish displays had adjoined one other. 
When Seeger saw the final blueprints for the exhibition space, she noticed a wall that 
demarcated the Polish exhibition from the German one. She immediately wrote to the 
Polish person in charge, “If I read your layout correctly, then you have erected a wall 
against the German section, your section against ours. This would greatly hinder the flow 
of visitors. In no way do we need a wall.”565 The wall was never mentioned again and a 
lifelong friendship between the grandes dames of design ensued. The contribution that 
these women made towards constructive East-West exchanges in industrial design cannot 
be overestimated. For example, Szydlowska met Martin Kelm in East Berlin where she 
informed the head of the GDR design council about the industrial design work done in 
West Germany.566 The first FRG design show in the Eastern Bloc presented thus only one 
of many ways in which the two influenced Cold War design relations. 
In 1967, this first West German exhibition in the Eastern Bloc that resulted from 
the friendship of Seeger and Szydlowska, titled Industrial Design from the FRG 
                                                 
564 Private and professional correspondence from Zophia Szydlowska to Mia Seeger, 1965-1967, Mia 
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(Industrielle Formgebung aus der BRD), traveled to the Polish towns of Warsaw and 
Krakow first, and then moved on to Sofia in Bulgaria, and Zagreb in Yugoslavia. The 
West German organizers promoted this event as part of a series of Western European and 
Scandinavian exhibitions that had traveled the Eastern Bloc. Yet it took “cautious and 
balanced good will” on all sides to make this project happen.567 Once the exhibition had 
opened its doors to Polish visitors, more imponderable aspects specific to the FRG’s 
relations with the East surfaced. The underlying tone of the show was that of Western 
abundance and technical superiority consistent with Cold War competition for the 
people’s “heart and minds.” In a design journal review, Peter Frank, an exhibition 
supervisor and staff member close to Mia Seeger, reported his uneasiness regarding the 
excitement that Polish visitors expressed when seeing the exhibition objects: “As 
exhibition custodian, I receive the admiration of visitors with somewhat ambivalent 
feelings. The exhibition is more than simply a specific design show.” And he elaborated: 
“It is, like every documentation of a country’s national design standards, understood as a 
representation in its broadest sense. Perhaps design exhibitions are especially fitting for 
this purpose, particularly if they make evident that industrial design expresses more than 
just the immediate technological and economic niveau.”568 Not a design politician, but a 
rather young and eager design enthusiast, Frank only realized the show’s effect once it 
was on display.569 Observing the Polish reaction and trying to put it into perspective, 
Frank noted the historical and sociological dimensions of design evaluation. The West 
German products either were complete novelties in Poland or representatives of a 
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different economic and social pedigree. A bachelor kitchenette, embodying a particular 
Western lifestyle, exemplified this socio-historical difference.570 To the astonished Polish 
audience, both from a communist and a Catholic viewpoint, this single-person kitchen 
must have seemed like a waste of resources and a social oddity. 
Two incidents heightened the West Germany’s diplomatic advantage that derived 
from this event. Informational visits between GDR and Polish designers fell conveniently 
into the two-week period of the FRG exhibition in Warsaw. This afforded East German 
designers the opportunity to acquaint themselves with West German products that they 
had only before seen in print.571 West Germany could once again demonstrate its 
superiority in product design. And while the unexpected visit surely caused great 
satisfaction to the Rat für Formgebung, the friendship between Seeger and Szydlowska 
yielded an even bigger success for West German diplomacy. After the show opening, 
Szydlowska organized a dinner party to honor her dear German friend. It was at this 
occasion that the Federal Republic’s chargé d’affairs in Poland, who did not enjoy 
diplomatic status and had not secured formal recognition, was invited to an official Polish 
event for the first time.572 Made possible by the ICSID and facilitated by the friendship of 
two extraordinary women, the FRG not only showed its material culture but also fortified 
relations in the Eastern Bloc. 
West German engagement in the Eastern Bloc triggered East German concern 
about its position as one of the more developed industrial countries in the Soviet sphere 
of influence. If it were to be trumped by the Federal Republic in the realm of production 
                                                 
570 Peter Frank, “Westdeutsches Design in Polen,” in Werk und Zeit, July 1967. 
571 Ibid.. 
572 Kirsch, “Mia Seeger 1908-1991,” 252 
  
242 
and consumer culture in front of its socialist friends, the East German politicians feared a 
loss of prestige and leadership in the COMECON. Within months of the West German 
traveling exhibition, the Zentralinstitut put together its own concept for a traveling 
exhibition that would feature GDR state-of-the-art interior design. The show Function – 
Shape – Quality (Funktion – Form – Qualität) traveled through the Eastern Bloc for two 
years, imitating the route of the West German exhibition by starting in Warsaw and then 
progressing to Krakow. The Zentralinstitut modeled the size and the concept of the 
exhibition after what the Federal Republic had presented just months earlier.573 Instead of 
stressing difference and superiority, as the Federal Republic’s exhibition had done, the 
GDR attempted to win over their Polish audience with a “people-bonding” 
(völkerverbindend) message: “The prognosis, planning, management and regulation of 
industrial design weighs heavily on the control of the socio-technological organism of a 
nation and the community of socialist people.”574 Situating industrial design as a common 
challenge for all socialist nations, the GDR clearly sought its inclusion in the ideological 
and practical problem-solving process within the COMECON. The intended audience, 
however, included professionals beyond the Eastern Bloc as invitations went out to 
numerous Western design councils and design schools.575 Consequently, this exhibition 
served two purposes. First, it declared the state of industrial design in the GDR – in 
practice and theory – to both friends and foes. Second, it signaled the communalities with 
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other socialist nations. This exhibition later toured through the Eastern Bloc for the years 
to come, although it was never exhibited in the West. 
As the title “Function – Shape – Quality” suggests, the show’s focus linked 
aesthetics to functionality. It was the first GDR display that featured design as an 
important quality factor of industrial production. More than 150 objects and group 
displays, thirty photographic displays, and eight models provided a comprehensive 
overview of East German industrial design.576 An introductory display on German design 
history between 1900 and 1933 greeted visitors, deliberately excluding the Nazi period 
(see figure 20). The next part of the exhibition introduced attendees to the German arts 
and crafts tradition and provided an overview over design education in the GDR. The rest 
of the exhibition directed attention to significant aesthetic challenges in socialist 
societies: design solutions that “integrated the cultural and the utility value of the 
product” for work environments, domestic spaces, and leisure, mirroring the categorized 
and state-organized life of the socialist citizen.577  
The ideological component of the exhibition was especially apparent in the 
accompanying catalogue. It explained the role design ought to play in socialist societies. 
“The world that humans shape has a shaping influence on them in return. The properties, 
benefits, and shapes of man-made objects stimulate peoples’ behavior and relationship to 
the world.” This “stimulation” was further explained: “Their usage, that is the experience 
of the objects’ material, construction, and function, which come together in the design, 
leads in the end to the unlocking new human senses and to the activation of satisfaction, 
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pleasure, and joy of living.”578 Although the explanation may sound like the definition of 
hedonistic consumption, this relationship between humans and their material environment 
was central to the mid-1960s understanding of production and consumption in the GDR. 
The idea of “humanistic Socialism” placed humans at the center of design with the goal 
of creating an environment that served the needs of the population. The degree to which a 
product fulfilled these needs determined its ideological value. This attitude represents a 
decisive shift away from the heavy-industry emphasis of the early GDR connected to 
Ulbricht’s New Economic System policies that had opened up the East German economy 
to a more consumer-oriented planning in 1963. 
Generally speaking, the catalogue revised many of the more extreme ideological 
stances that the GDR had taken in the 1950s and early 1960s. The historical section even 
exonerated the Bauhaus, which had been vanquished from the GDR’s cultural heritage 
during the Formalism Debate in the early 1950s. Instead of the previous critique labeling 
Weimar modernism as cosmopolitan, the Zentralinstitut changed course by 1967 and 
crowned the Bauhaus as the highest developmental stage among a series of design 
initiatives coming from the East German territory, including the Deutsche Werkstätten 
and the Werkbund. The catalog text for the Function – Shape – Quality exhibition in 
Moscow two years later even integrated the Bauhaus into leftist, that is socialist, 
opposition to the Hitler regime pointing out that the Nazis closed down the design school 
as a “hotbed of cultural Bolshevism.”579 One of the pieces displayed, a furniture program 
developed by Rudolf Horn, designer and lecturer at the School for Applied Arts Halle – 
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Burg Giebichenstein for the furniture combine Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau, 
epitomized the newfound sense of modernistic tradition and a humanistic outlook on 
production. Providing a series of furniture pieces that could be added as needed, the 
Möbelprogramm Deutsche Werkstätten (MDW) offered individual furniture elements that 
the consumer could combine to accommodate individual needs and changing personal as 
well as spatial living situations. This furniture program completed the idea of a 
rationalized and standardized production, as all the pieces of the program, whether a 
bookshelf board or a couch element, fit perfectly together whereever the consumer 
decided to put them. 
Polish media extensively advertised the show during its run from December 11, 
1967 until January 20, 1968. Numerous Polish politicians and designers visited the 
displays. Newspaper reviews reveal that the exhibition’s novelty, unlike its West German 
counterpart, was not the display of unfamiliar products, since these were mostly available 
on the Polish market. Rather, the fascination lay with the process described in the 
displays: the development of a design culture and its subsequent appropriation by 
industry.580 Especially the integration of design into the economic planning process found 
wide admiration among the Polish press, as illustrated by the Zentralinstitut’s relocation 
from the Ministry of Culture to the German Office for Standardization and Product 
Testing (Deutsches Amt für Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW) in 1965. It is here 
that the contradiction between the ideological superstructure and its practical application 
in the realm of production lies. While the catalogs stressed the cultural and utility value 
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of industrial design, GDR presenters emphasized its economic benefits at the symposia 
framing the exhibition.  
The mid-1960s were a moment in which the GDR repositioned its aesthetic and 
functionalist outlook. Socialist ideology and the stylistic and social considerations 
surrounding industrial design merged in humanistic socialism after a decade of 
divergence and ideological contradiction. The new interest in individual needs over the 
collective economy increasingly contributed to a more consumer-oriented way of design 
and the rediscovery of the Weimar modernism as leftist aesthetics. At the same time, the 
individual solutions such as the MDW furniture program enabled increasing 
standardization of production, which in turn helped preserve resources. Yet, as discussed 
earlier, the mismanagement of the planned economy would eventually ruin this moment 
of sublime convergence. The GDR economy remained an “economy of scarcity” 
(Mangelwirtschaft), in which consumers waited for years to attain coveted furniture, cars, 
or other technical equipment. The rehabilitation of the Bauhaus tradition in East Germany 
signaled once more the GDR’s determination to competing aesthetically with Western 
Europe in general and with the Federal Republic in particular.  
To truly engage the West German activities abroad and claim a place among 
modern industrialized nations, the GDR showed their design presence and expertise in 
Western countries as well. In this regard, ICSID membership decisively opened western 
doors to GDR design. After the success in this international organization, East Germany’s 
next step towards diplomatic recognition established bilateral cultural and economic 
relations with western democracies. After a failed attempt at displaying industrial design 
at a 1967 multinational ICSID exhibition project in Barcelona, the Zentralinstitut focused 
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its efforts on an exhibition in London, whose goal was to combine political and economic 
aims in a cultural event. By displaying products that fulfilled the highest international 
standards of quality and design in combination with the clear and unwavering usage of 
GDR insignia, the exhibition planners wanted to impress a strong notion of the 
characteristics of their socialist economy on Great Britain.581 They further envisioned 
broad coverage in design publications as well as an involvement of the ICSID. Yet what 
sounds like a straightforward event demanded much diplomatic skill. At first, the general 
idea of a GDR design exhibition found fertile ground in England. Sir Paul Reilly, the 
head of the British Council of Industrial Design (CoID) and an active member of the 
ICSID, had visited the East German design council in April 1970 and knew about the 
state of design there.582 But the difficulties started with negotiations between both parties 
about an exhibition venue that might accomplish two things at the same time: first, the 
location had to be humble enough to avoid the impression that the British government 
entertained quasi-official relations with the socialist GDR; and second, the venue needed 
to be representative enough not to humiliate the guests. In the end, the Ceylon Tea 
Center, a Sri Lankan trade forum, served as the exhibition space.  
After finalizing the diplomatic intricacies and the exhibition layout, the staff of 
the GDR design council began writing texts that described the exhibition objects. Upon 
receiving the texts for the placards and the catalog, both loaded with socialist language, 
Sir Paul Reilly retracted his agreement to open the exhibition, a personal favor through 
which the East Germans had hoped to gain semi-official British endorsement. At the 
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outset, he made it clear that he “was happy to open an exhibition which was entirely on 
the subject of Design and did not contain any political or ideological allusions, however 
slight.”583 As head of a government-supported organization, he could not be in a position 
to open an ideologically inscribed event. If the GDR wanted him back on board, Sir Paul 
Reilly demanded that the Zentralinstitut change the texts. From this point on, opinions 
within East German official circles diverged extremely. On one side stood the quasi-
diplomatic body that managed relations with London, the German-British Society. The 
society favored changing the texts over losing Sir Paul Reilly. “If opened by SPR [Sir 
Paul Reilly], the exhibition ‘GDR Design 70’ would gain a denotative official character 
in contrast to similar GDR events in Great Britain. It would hence represent an important 
precedent for future activities toward the GDR’s diplomatic recognition by Great 
Britain.”584 On the other side, the DAMW, the Zentralinstitut’s superior governmental 
institution, opposed any alterations on the grounds that “the revisions would mean 
abandonment of our class point of view (Klassenstandpunkt) in the conflict with 
theoreticians of late-bourgeois design conceptions.”585 Beyond the ideological issues at 
play, the DAMW also pointed to the possibility that others, especially West German 
officials, could utilize such altered texts politically against the GDR. In the end, the 
possible diplomatic gains won out over ideological concerns. The Zentralinstitut revised 
the entirety of the texts and thus completely re-inscribed socialist material culture with 
new meaning – a meaning that would cater to Western European sensibilities about 
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individuality and that erased any trace of open state socialism from the displays. The 
quote in the original read as follows: 
New standards for the quality of industrial products are derived from the 
development of the socialist order in the GDR. Manufactures are an essential part 
of our environment. They influence people’s way of living within every area. The 
quality of material and ideological needs also depend on product design.586 
The revised, English translation purged the Marxist language and over-simplified the 
texts:  
New standards of quality have been set for industrial products. It is recognised 
that as an essential part of our environment these influence man in all spheres of 
his life. Ideally, every product should be an expression of certain requirements, 
both physical and aesthetic.”587  
The exhibition now underlined the humanistic aspects of GDR design culture. As Martin 
Kelm stated in his opening remarks: “It is the goal in our society to positively influence 
all of the factors affecting human beings and to create an environment in which one can 
experience the challenging notion of humanism.”588 Yet Kelm tried to reinsert ideological 
messages on a middle ground between Marxist ideology and humanism: 
As you know, we abolished the hurdles of private ownership of property as well 
as means of production in order to undertake planning that serves across societal 
interests. The people own everything. The people can determine their own 
fortunes. Hence, we have the potential to design an environment that serves the 
people’s interests. We work on utilizing these opportunities and on putting 
industrial design to work in creating a complexly designed humanistic 
environment.589 
As seen in the catalog for the 1967 Warsaw exhibition, the concept of Marxist 
humanism was not entirely new. In the mid-1960s, “socialist humanism” became a key 
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term in the rapprochement of eastern and western Marxists.590 This school of Marxist 
thought opposed the structural mechanisms of state socialism and instead emphasized 
subjectivity and human agency in socialist theory. Socialist humanism mitigated the 
ideological opposition between Western democracies and socialist groups, parties, and 
even states. It also contributed to a period of western Eurocommunism in the 1960s and 
1970s by enabling the cooperation of bourgeois and leftist parties in western democratic 
governments, such as the Labour governments in Britain and the Great Coalition in West 
Germany.591  
At the London exhibition, the GDR thus strategically, if inconsistently, employed 
the concept of socialist humanism, which opposed the very nature of the centrally 
structured SED state. To convey this humanistic approach materially, the exhibition 
consciously minimized the heavy industrial sector – which, in reality, constituted the real 
strength of the GDR economy – and instead displayed more objects that related to the 
everyday.592 It especially featured leisure-time objects, such as patio furniture and toys 
(see figures 21 and 22): “These items are not only excellently designed, but also 
pedagogically valuable and fulfill therapeutic requirements. The colorful, imaginatively 
arranged, and multiform toys bestow the entire exhibition with a friendly and casual 
                                                 
590 In the mid-1960s, leftist writers from East and West came together by invitation of Erich Fromm to 
contribute to the publication of An International Symposium of Socialist Humanism (1965) to stimulate 
Eastern-Western dialogue. Among the contributors are Herbert Marcuse, Raya Dunayevskaya, Ernst Bloch, 
T.B. Bottomore, Lucien Goldman, Maximilien Rubel, Eugene Kamenka, Oskar Schatz, Irving Fletcher, 
Mathilde Niel, Ernst Florian Winter, Wolfgang Abendroth, Norman Thomas, Bertrand Russell, Stephen 
King Hall, and Calvano della Volpe from the West and Predrag Vranicki, Gajo Petrović, Mihailo 
Marković, Veljko Korać, Danilo Pejović, Rudi Supek, Karel Kosík, Ivan Sviták, Milan Prŭcha, and 
Bronislaw Baczko from the Communist countries as well as Léopold Senghor and Nirmal Kumar Bose 
from the Third World countries.  
591 Jean-François Revel, “The Myths of Eurocommunism,” Foreign Affairs 56, no. 2 (1978). 
592 Ekkehard Bartsch, “DDR-Design am Londoner Piccadilly Square,” Sonntag 43 (1970), 15. 
  
251 
atmosphere.”593 A color slide presentation about Karl-Marx-Stadt’s reconstruction (today 
Chemnitz) transported visitors into an ideal socialist environment where public buildings, 
public art, the health establishment, and urban infrastructure coalesced. Apparently, the 
message resonated with the British audience. On September 9, 1970, even the 
conservative Daily Telegraph titled its story on the GDR design exhibition “Humane East 
Germans.”594  
In the end, the London exhibition far exceeded the expectations and hopes of 
diplomatic circles in the GDR. East German products ranging from pictures of heavy 
work equipment to displays of prized china and glassware created the impression of a 
progressive material culture. Yet visitors not only saw industrial design on display but 
also GDR literature and picture albums meant to foster a better understanding of this 
socialist country.595 Representatives from several eastern European countries, as well as 
the cultural attaché of the American embassy in London and a few British members of 
parliament, among other London notables, attended the opening reception. In his speech, 
Sir Paul Reilly affirmed the bilateral interest in fostering trade relations between Great 
Britain and the GDR “whether officially or unofficially.”596 Not to take advantage of this 
sizable market, he maintained, “would be ludicrous for a trading people like the British.” 
Yet he acknowledged the unusual diplomatic situation indirectly, hoping that “no-one 
here feels any compunction about being present to wish this exhibition well. It is indeed 
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innocent self-interest that brings us all together here, since trade is properly a two-way 
traffic and cannot be conducted without reasonable personal contacts.”597  
The exhibition lasted from September 7 till September 19, 1970, and turned out a 
success for GDR foreign policy.598 1067 visitors signed a guest book, but a CoID report 
suspected that more people actually saw the show.599 Visitors nominated the tea china, 
glassware, and toys as their favorite objects on display. English visitors commented on 
the good quality of GDR design and the sophistication of the exhibition system. Many 
agreed that there was much more to learn about the GDR and wanted to deepen relations 
with the country. In the days following the exhibition opening, major design 
organizations in England invited the GDR delegation to talks.600 The final Zentralinstitut 
report showed great satisfaction with the way the exhibition demonstrated the GDR’s 
capability in the field of design. It concluded that the actual design and content of the 
exhibition contributed tremendously to this diplomatic success.601 
With the establishment of official cultural relations via the ICSID, the field 
opened up for either Germany, respectively, to push for improved relations on the 
opposite side of the Iron Curtain. In this fashion, the FRG could capitalize on the 
personal contacts of Mia Seeger to set in motion the first West German exhibition in the 
East. While the West Germans scored with novelties and triggered interest with 
“unusual” objects like the bachelor kitchenette, East German designers struggled with the 
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appropriate representation of their industrial design. Using industrial design events to 
gain political recognition in the West, the GDR followed a path of cultural diplomacy and 
ideological bartering. The GDR had to sacrifice its ideological convictions in order to 
make the political message behind socialist material culture palatable to the West. The re-
inscription of GDR material culture as an expression of humanistic ideals in socialism 
signified a decisive shift in the self-conception of cultural diplomacy in East Germany: 
political goals became more important than ideological consistency.  
 
Diplomacy of German Design: the German-German Basic Treaty  
The process of gradual German rapprochement through the debates and projects 
revolving around the ICSID membership was magnified in the bi- and multilateral 
negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Accords of 1975. The early 1970s were a special 
moment in German-German relations: superpower détente policies facilitated a period of 
East-West engagement. This watershed policy change from deterrence to dialogue 
resulted in the SALT I and SALT II treaties that limited Soviet and US nuclear arsenals 
and stopped the escalation of superpower conflicts for almost a full decade, thus 
affirming the Cold War status quo.  
Intertwined with these negotiations of superpower relations was the ongoing 
German Question: the national status of a divided country and its diplomatic recognition. 
In a first step, Chancellor Willy Brandt, who had opened up FRG diplomacy to 
negotiations with the Eastern Bloc in his prior office as foreign minister, intensified these 
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efforts when he was elected in 1969.602 Brandt’s policy revised the previous conservative 
“policy of strength” that the Adenauer government had followed in western integration 
(Westbindung) between 1949 and 1966, convinced that West Germany’s rearmament and 
NATO membership would necessarily lead to reunification. Twenty years later, the 
Berlin Wall as the “anti-fascist barrier” symbolized the failure of Adenauer’s strategy 
because it exacerbated security concerns in the Soviet Union and among Germany’s 
eastern neighbors. In the absence of a peace treaty, border questions had remained 
unresolved. One of the central demands of the Eastern Bloc was the West German 
acknowledgement of the eastern German border, the Oder-Neisse-Line, as the permanent 
settlement of WWII territorial claims. Under the auspices of Brandt’s policy of 
rapprochement, Bonn affirmed these borders in 1970 in the Moscow Treaty with the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty with Poland. Brandt’s close adviser Egon Bahr put 
Bonn’s new strategy in the German Question in a nutshell when he stated “responsibility 
for Germany had to be borne by Germans themselves.”603 
The ultimate goal of Brandt’s Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik), however, was to 
reestablish some kind of national context for the two German states.604 It was therefore 
crucial “to restore at least some aspects of the pre-World War II links between the two 
halves of Germany […]”605 In this way, Brandt’s Ostpolitik differed greatly from 
superpower détente, because it sought to change the Cold War status quo. To realize the 
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eastern policy regarding East Germany, Brandt needed greater independence from 
external powers “to create living conditions far better than those enforced by Cold War 
rivalries.”606 After twenty years, the FRG thus gave up its foreign policy maxim of 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch vis-à-vis the GDR, abolished the Hallstein Doctrine, and 
entered official negotiations with the other part of Germany.607 The superpowers on both 
sides observed this German-German rapprochement with mixed feelings. On the one 
hand, the Germans had to find a way to coexist, but on the other hand, the possible option 
of German unification under the umbrella of the opposing system presented a scenario 
that neither side wanted to see unfold. Washington was especially nervous about the 
degree of independence displayed by West German diplomats and their willingness to 
cooperate with Soviet diplomats in order to achieve their political goals. The Soviets 
were less nervous about the GDR leadership, whom they kept on a short leash throughout 
the negotiation process.608 While the superpowers saw German division as a means for 
peace in Europe, Germans argued with increasing intensity that the division was a major 
cause for tension.609 
As the Moscow and Warsaw treaties still lingered in West German parliament 
awaiting ratification and the Four Power Agreement on Berlin had just been signed, talks 
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between East and West Germany commenced.610 After the signing of two technical 
agreements, the Transit Accord and the Traffic Treaty that established regulations for the 
passage of West German citizens and goods through the GDR, by the summer of 1972, 
the East and West Germans entered negotiations about the substantial issues in their 
relations: the national question, the absence of a peace treaty and the presence of the Four 
Powers, and the question of citizenship. West Germany agreed to the “two states in one 
nation” principle by acknowledging the GDR under constitutional law, but not under 
international law. Bonn added a unilateral qualification that they therefore did not 
consider citizenship to be regulated. Both sides signed the Basic Treaty (short for “Treaty 
Concerning the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic”) in December 1972 after curtailed negotiations that left 
some of the issues unresolved. Over the next two decades, the Federal Republic would 
spend millions for the Transit Accord annually, which included visa charges and tariffs. 
Bonn would also pay more than DM 3.5 billion “to secure the release of roughly 34,000 
[political] prisoners and reunite approximately 250,000 families divided by the Wall.”611 
West German willingness to pay enormous sums for the transit regulations 
highlights Bonn’s efforts to ameliorate interpersonal relations between the East and West 
German populations. It also proved Germans’ willingness to take responsibility in the 
German Question and acknowledge that the “only way of overcoming the realities of the 
                                                 
610 Egon Bahr maintained in 1983 that the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin would have not materialized 
without the active contribution of the two German states. He concluded that the four powers “could no 
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states also participating.” Bahr and Vale, “Bearing Responsibility for Germany,” 78. 
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division was to begin by accepting them.”612 At the core of this policy lay the hope that 
increased interaction between East and West would lead to the demise of the GDR and 
the end of German division. However, the SED completely controlled contacts between 
their population and the West: visas for visits to the West warranted a complicated 
application process, packages and mail from the West were searched, and – as Stasi files 
later revealed – Western visitors were monitored for the majority of their stay. Whereas 
the GDR pronounced the desired official quality of contacts between – from their vantage 
point – two separate states by sending representatives of their Foreign Office (MfAA) to 
the German-German negations, the FRG counteracted these aspirations by assigning the 
Ministry for Pan-German Affairs, thus emphasizing a national frame. This negotiation 
strategy went beyond the question of recognition and underlined western endeavors to 
break down the literal and figurative walls that the SED had erected between people that 
shared cultural and political roots. The Brandt government attempted to reach an 
agreement that deregulated human interaction between East and West Germans and 
limited institutional or official interference. Bonn hoped to strengthen the links between 
the two parts of Germany with the goal of reinforcing feelings of national unity.613 
In this light, the specifics of German-German cultural exchanges agreed upon in 
the Basic Treaty, namely the Cultural Accord (Kulturabkommen), provide an excellent 
window into the cultural policy principles of efforts to “normalize” East-West relations 
on both sides. They also reveal West Germany’s longterm goals for Ostpolitik. The FRG 
wanted a cultural agreement with an “individual component” that would deregulate 
cultural exchanges between the German populations by allowing non-state actors to 
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initiate and conduct cultural events on the other side of the border.614 The Federal 
Republic’s Permanent Representation in East Berlin, which the FRG had set up instead of 
an embassy in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty, and the GDR Foreign Ministry carried 
out the talks. Beginning in 1974, the Permanent Representation staff functioned as 
mediators for political issues, economic cooperation, and cultural contacts concerning 
both parts of Germany. Because the negotiations about the Kulturabkommen remained 
unresolved for twelve years,615 both Germanys agreed on the state-facilitated cultural 
exchange (staatlich vermittelter Kulturaustausch) as an interim solution to enable mutual 
visits of theater companies, choirs, and museum exhibitions. Several reasons account for 
this long period of negotiations. The initial five rounds of talks between 1973 and 1975 
brought no results because the GDR claimed ownership of cultural artifacts that the FRG 
had included in a new culture foundation, the Prussian Cultural Heritage (Preussischer 
Kulturbesitz).616 East Germany also contested the inclusion of West Berlin in the 
Kulturabkommen. Together, these issues brought the deliberations to a screeching halt 
until 1982.617  
The points of contention were not only a result of the hasty and incomplete 
negotiations of the Basic Treaty, but also of the souring of German-German relations in 
the aftermath of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Suddenly, the GDR changed its position 
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integral part of its diplomacy vis-à-vis Eastern socialism throughout the Cold War. John F. Kennedy once 
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from dialogue to delineation, as “internal problems increased under the influence of 
détente” and, encouraged by the Helsinki human rights stipulations, GDR citizens began 
to reject the socialist system openly.618 Frustrated by the East German change of course, 
Bonn insisted on continuing the “policy of normalization” despite eastern resistance.619 
Meanwhile, the interim solution of state-regulated cultural exchanges suited the GDR. 
With the cultural accords in limbo, the SED maintained command over contacts between 
East and West and did not shy away from leveraging this control to complicate cultural 
exchange whenever Cold War tensions between East and West arose. The FRG, on the 
other hand, participated in the state-mediated cultural exchanges because it saw this 
agreement as an opportunity to wiggle its way into the cultural calendar of the GDR – an 
opportunity to reconnect with the other Germany and to shape East German perceptions 
of the Federal Republic. Eventually, Honecker dropped the Preussischer Kulturbesitz to 
the bottom of the list in order to recommence talks in 1983. Twelve more German-
German negotiation rounds ended successfully with the signing of the Kulturabkommen 
on May 6, 1986.  
As clear as the lines of argumentation on both parts appear to be, public 
disagreement with the West German diplomacy surrounding the Kulturabkommen 
certainly grew over the negotiation period. The most prominent critic was Günter Grass, 
world-renowned author and artist. In a newspaper interview with the Rheinischer Merkur, 
Grass criticized the diplomatic aspect of the agreement because it was negotiated as if the 
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two Germanys were foreign territory to each other, like a treaty with France or Finland. 
Instead, he warned that the Federal Republic gave up the last piece of commonality 
between East and West and insisted that “the agreement should have been made on the 
basis of a shared culture and history.”620 The political and economic division had long 
been established, but the realm of culture had proven resistant against the division 
process. The agreement, in Grass’ opinion, put this resistance into question. Grass had 
previously approached the FRG government with his concerns about the cultural treaty’s 
effects between East and West Germany. As an alternative, he suggested a German-
German national cultural foundation to ensure the continuation of the German 
Kulturnation.621 “Such a solution – in the tradition of the Paulskirche – could contribute 
to the development of a new understanding of ‘nation’, which would exclude 
reunification, but, on the other hand, could assist Germans in two states to find a new, 
relaxed (unverkrampft) self-understanding. This would also preclude a renewed political 
power built-up in the center of Europe. Our neighbors in East and West needn’t fear such 
a development any more.”622 Apart from this universalist, pacifist idea for a German 
future, the main danger of these policies Grass attested for the arts and their production: 
the Kulturabkommen would promote only what was officially acceptable art on both 
sides, thus implicitly censoring the diversity of artistic expression. Grass exclaimed that 
“everywhere where art, where literature, where painting is created, it is necessarily 
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subversive, and it will thus be, perhaps even from both sides, be held back.”623 The 
Kulturabkommen, despite its intentions of enabling a cultural exchange at the level of the 
population, could possibly become a tool for state censorship of the arts. 
Despite Grass’ warnings, the Federal Republic pursued the Kulturabkommen to 
normalize German-German relations. Rather than Grass’ theoretical contemplations of 
the treaty’s meaning for the German national idea, politicians in the FRG valued its 
practical merits: they could hold the GDR leadership accountable to the signed treaty, but 
not to a, to them, lofty idea of a unified Kulturnation that would not practice or exchange 
features of this culture. 
 
German-German State-mediated Cultural Exchange and the Kulturabkommen 
The significance of the Kulturabkommen as a cornerstone of self-determined 
German Cold War policy becomes evident when we look at two industrial design 
exhibitions taking place two years before and two years after the signing of the accord: 
the FRG exhibition Design – Thinking Ahead for Humanity (Design – Vorausdenken für 
den Menschen) in East Berlin (1984) and the Design in the GDR (Design in der DDR) 
exhibition in Stuttgart (1988). The principle of reciprocity, the planning process, and the 
execution of these design exhibitions showcase the political strategies behind intra-
German cultural exchanges.  
The idea for the western design exhibition originated in 1983 against the backdrop 
of deteriorating East-West relations during the Geneva talks about stationing American 
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Pershing missiles in West Germany.624 At one point, a GDR Politburo member even 
hinted at military consequences if Geneva were to fail.625 In this tense atmosphere, Bonn 
commissioned the Rat für Formgebung to put together a concept for a West German 
industrial design exhibition. The Federal Ministry for Inter-German Relations and the 
Federal Economic Ministry jointly coordinated the planning effort so that the FRG 
government could pitch the project as part of the staatlich vermittelter 
Kulturaustausch.626 Stressing its contribution to peace in Europe, the western side made it 
clear that holding the design exhibition within the same calendar year was of “political 
significance.”627 Using every available channel, the FRG impressed the significance of 
this cultural event for German-German relations on the SED leadership. Even Economic 
Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff carried this pitch for an industrial design exhibition in his 
folder on a trip to the Leipzig trade fair.628 Only nine months after Hans Otto Bräutigam, 
the head of the FRG Permanent Representation in East Berlin, first proposed the design 
exhibition to the GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Kurt Nier on March 1984, the project 
came to fruition. The exhibition ran for two weeks in December 1984 as the fourth 
project the FRG sent as part of the Kuturaustausch.629 Bonn’s initiative signaled to the 
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international community the German determination in the 1980s to “insulate inter-
German relations from the vicissitudes of relations between the superpowers.”630 
Initially, the GDR hesitated to support the West German project. Yet after a few 
weeks of deliberations, it swallowed the bait that the Rat für Formgebung had put in the 
exhibition proposal: a symposium that would convey “specialized technical and 
professional details and suggestions.”631 For the notoriously backward economy of the 
GDR, every occasion to learn more about western product design presented a welcome 
opportunity to catch up to world standards. With the exception of the location, which was 
hard to come by on such short notice, the preparations for Design – Thinking Ahead for 
Humanity went smoothly, and the exhibition opened on December 3, 1984, in the 
International Trade Center on Friedrichsstrasse in the heart of East Berlin. High-ranking 
East and West German politicians, representatives of GDR cultural organizations, and 
designers attended the opening event.632 Even Wolfgang Schäuble, the Federal Minister 
in the Chancellery, stopped by for a short visit during his first official trip to the GDR. 
During the opening speech, Martin Kelm hinted at the political significance of German-
German rapprochement: “We regard the fact that this exhibition takes place as a positive 
sign, particularly at a time when the international situation gives reason for serious 
concerns…” “Even the best intentions and the best design achievements would make no 
sense for humanity if a nuclear inferno cannot be prevented,” Kelm continued.633 Hans 
Otto Bräutigam of the Permanent Representation also included notes on the international 
                                                 
630 Elizabeth Harvey, “The Two Germanies: Recent Publications on the Federal Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic and the German Question,” The Historical Journal 33, no. 4 (1990): 968. 
631 Exhibition proposal, attached to Bräutigam (StäV) to BMB and BK, betr. Projekt einer Design-
Ausstellung aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der DDR, 1 March 1984, B 288/481, BAK. 
632 List, Teilnehmer an der Eröffnung der Ausstellung, B 288/482, BAK. 
633 Martin Kelm, Opening Speech, 3 December 1984, B 288/482, BAK. 
  
264 
situation when he greeted the guests: “The Federal Government is determined to continue 
the path paved by the Basic Treaty and the Helsinki Accords. We want to extend 
cooperation and take advantage of every chance to improve relations. We do this 
conscious of our shared responsibility for peace and stability in Europe and in the interest 
of the people on both sides.”634 “Cultural activities such as this exhibition,” Bräutigam 
put the Western attitude in a nutshell, “are the building blocks for good-neighborly 
(gutnachbarliche) relations between the two German states.” 635 Such expressions of 
“mini-détente” in German-German relations solidified the idea of their special role in 
maintaining east-west dialog at the heart of Europe.636 Sharing vital concerns about not 
becoming hostages of the superpower arms race with other nonnuclear nations in Europe, 
a unified Germany could stand for the universal values of peace and accord, rather than 
for economic-political domination.  
The exhibition concept expressed the humanitarian goals of this show in the West 
German emphasis on interpersonal relations. From its inception, it was conceived as a 
show that displayed design’s contribution to everyday life by means of selected, 
progressive solutions.637 Humans and the social fabric stood at the center – not the 
products themselves – to aim at “deepening mutual knowledge about cultural and social 
existence” in the two German states.638 High-profile guests, diplomatic speeches, and the 
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awareness that this German-German display of harmony, standing in stark contrast to the 
tension-filled “international situation,” benefited both sides in the diplomatic arena. The 
exhibition consciously continued the effort of a self-defined foreign policy that the 
Federal Republic had begun with Ostpolitik to change the Cold War status quo. It also 
constituted a continuous effort on the part of the FRG to push for direct interaction 
between both German populations – if only via increased knowledge about each other 
(see figure 23).  
Nearly two hundred products, systems, and projects from more than one hundred 
West German businesses helped to convey the significance and evolution of industrial 
design in the Federal Republic. A historical section explained design development in the 
FRG by grounding it in the Werkbund and the Bauhaus traditions of modern, 
functionalist aesthetics.639 Visitors quickly realized that the exhibition was not a sales 
show when they saw the lavish products displayed for home interiors: the luxury 
furniture company Interlübke sent its high priced Duo-Bed, while the furniture 
cooperative Wohnkultur displayed the two-decade-long success story WK 470 furniture 
system, and Vitsoe provided an upholstery suite.640 None of the East German visitors 
could afford such expensive furniture. Instead, the exhibition clearly promoted the perks 
of the Western lifestyle with the amenities of high-end designer interiors and high-
technology standards for appliances and tools. On top of these displays of affluence, the 
placards accompanying the interior design exhibition inflamed Eastern eyes: “In a mass 
society and an increasingly depersonalized environment, the personal apartment remains 
                                                 
639 Press release, “Vorausdenken für den Menschen. Design-Ausstellung des Rates für Formgebung in 
Berlin (Ost),” n.d., B 288/482, BAK. 
640 Concept, Design-Ausstellung des Rat für Formgebung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
1984, December 1983, B 288/481, BAK. 
  
266 
one of the few areas where one can realize individual ideas.”641 Implicit provocations 
such as this critique of socialist society altered the character of the cultural exchange 
during the two weeks that the show ran. 
The initially cozy impression one gathers from the emphasis on “peace in Europe” 
and “German-German understanding” in the documents surrounding the conception and 
the opening of the exhibition is quickly revised by a closer look at the East German 
archives. Unbeknownst to the guest from the Federal Republic, the SED closely 
monitored and manipulated the exhibition. Event advertisement posters that the West 
German design council Rat für Formgebung provided were only posted in obscure places, 
if at all.642 The GDR leadership hoped to keep the number of visitors to a minimum. 
Thanks to word of mouth, the frequency of visits rose by the day.643 In a press release, the 
FRG celebrated the fact that 22,000 people had seen the show within the first week, 
mentioning the noticeably young age of the crowd.644 This average age came courtesy of 
the SED, which sent party-loyal groups and young professionals or design students to the 
West German product show. Only about two hundred visitors were “normal” GDR 
citizens on the first day of Design – Thinking Ahead for Humanity.645 The East German 
design authorities outright confiscated a number of books that the Rat für Formgebung 
provided for general information about West German design.646 Moreover, the East 
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German exhibition personnel prevented contact between East German visitors and the 
Rat für Formgebung staff, which was present to give information."647 Instead, the East 
German Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung provided its own staff with a twenty-page 
script that would enable them to downplay western accomplishments. Emphasizing the 
negative effects of competitive capitalism and profit-making on the social make-up of a 
country, the text characterized design and its institutions in the FRG as “ineffective.” 648  
Another contentious issue, related to the problem of advertising the exhibition, 
came up with the slow admission into the venue. A queue of 150-200 curious East 
Germans formed in front of the International Trade Center every day. Officials from the 
permanent representation stopped by several times and asked the Amt für Formgestaltung 
staff to open more registers to decrease the waiting time. The GDR pretended to be 
bullied, claiming that the FRG connected political profitability to attendance.649 The West 
Germans ignored this provocation. Overall attendance in eighteen days amounted to more 
than 66,000 with every one of the 40,000 available catalogs sold. After a GDR observer 
initially misevaluated the show as an expert event – based on visitors’ lack of interest in 
the placard texts – he remarked that guests increasingly showed interest in the 
information and technical descriptions provided via the placards in the following days.650 
Nevertheless, the feared spectacle of a big protest failed to appear. The staff members of 
the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung had been afraid that the displays of Western 
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affluence could cause open critique of the socialist system and its economic shortcomings 
from their fellow countrymen. Yet the concluding internal event report described visitor 
reaction as “confident and competent-critical (souverän-kritisch) with specialized design 
interest.”651 Perhaps to overstate their level of control over the event, the staff did not 
record visitors’ disgruntlement. After testing the waters of cultural exchange with the 
Federal Republic and with a public relations fiasco successfully averted, the SED 
leadership confidently finished the negotiations over the German-German 
Kulturabkommen without initiating further complications. Now that the West German 
event had ended, the GDR design institution looked forward to sending an exhibition to 
the West in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. 
After the postponement of the reciprocal industrial design show for a number of 
years, it finally materialized in May 1988. The Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung, the 
ministries for Foreign Affairs and Intra-German Trade, the combines as well as design 
schools worked together on the Design in the GDR exhibition. One of the regional design 
institutions in the West, the Design Center in Stuttgart, hosted the exhibition in its 
representational nineteenth-century building, far from Bonn. To ensure the political, 
ideological, economic, and promotional success of the event, the SED leadership 
demanded elaborate advertising strategies.652 But the FRG government quickly thwarted 
such efforts to increase the event’s significance. When the time arrived to print the 
catalog, the GDR Permanent Representation in Bonn asked for a greeting from the Chief 
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of the Chancellery of the Federal Republic.653 Pointing to the precedent set at the 1984 
exhibition in East Berlin, where Kelm and other high-ranking GDR politicians 
participated, the eastern side called on the principle of reciprocity. To their great 
astonishment, the West German government denied the demand, claiming that “these 
kinds of forewords were common during the period of rare, individual state-mediated 
cultural projects in prior years. In the light of the extensive project list agreed upon after 
the signing of the Kulturabkommen, this kind of high-level preface should not generally 
be planned on; they should be reserved for especially high-ranking projects.”654 
Diplomatic gestures such as an official greeting would only further legitimize the GDR, 
which was of no interest to Bonn. With the signing of the cultural agreement in 1986, the 
FRG had reached its goal of securing German-German exchanges on a non-governmental 
level and this exhibition presented the perfect opportunity to put this achievement into 
practice. If the East had not noticed the political effects of the Kulturabkommen at the 
time, they surely realized them in 1988.  
A loss of diplomatic significance in conjunction with the provincial exhibition 
location demoted the GDR design show from a national event of political importance to a 
regional event of purely economic interest. Accordingly, only a regional politician 
attended the opening event: the Baden-Württemberg Economic Minister Martin Herzog. 
Not even the West German Rat für Formgebung paid an official visit. The FRG design 
journal Form covered the exhibition only in a small note in its news section. Eight lines 
long, it stated matter-of-factly that 170 products from the GDR were on display in 
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Stuttgart’s design center between May 26 and July 31, 1988, providing broader historical 
as well as recent insights into GDR design development.655  
Meanwhile, the eastern side tried to make the best of a bad situation. Form und 
Zweck dedicated an entire page to the exhibition. Exaggerating the importance of the 
Stuttgart Design Center, the article described the challenges of putting together the 
exposition in such a “lavish” environment. “We could not simply present products with 
‘Design in der DDR’ because it was important to depict the way of living and culture, to 
convey knowledge about the country, its economic potential, and its people,” the author 
explained.656 In this regard, the GDR project emulated the 1984 FRG show – the event 
aimed at creating a dialogue and deepening mutual understanding, while not shying away 
from “critical comparison.”657 But the result was quite different. Over the five weeks of 
its run, a mere 18,000 people visited the exhibition. According to the East German article, 
West German visitors perceived GDR design as high quality in its usefulness and as 
“aesthetically respectable without attempting to circumvent social responsibility with 
spectacular pieces.”658 Although not exactly a rave review, the design council staff 
seemed satisfied about having proven the GDR’s prowess as an export nation. 
 
Conclusion 
Later in 1988, the FRG liaison for the GDR Permanent Representation in Bonn 
summarized the lessons learned in the German-German cultural exchange. The memo 
stated that there had been manifold possibilities for cultural contacts and exchanges with 
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persons and institutions in the GDR, especially since there was no language barrier and a 
plentitude of shared traditions. However, “Cooperation in the classical sense was very 
rare, because the GDR avoids ‘the all-German’ (‘Gesamtdeutsches’).”659 It was difficult 
for the GDR, as a socialist country, to uphold its policy of delineation after the agreed-
upon cooperation in the Basic Treaty and the Kulturabkommen. While the situation with 
the East improved over time from the Western perspective, the GDR preferred cultural 
cooperation with countries of the Eastern Bloc precisely for reasons of demarcation. 
Nevertheless, the piecemeal effort to improve German-German relations via cultural 
cooperation paid off for both sides. 
While Bonn aborted the Hallstein Doctrine as the international climate changed 
from confrontation to détente, it capitalized on this moment to emancipate itself from 
superpower politics by creating a sustainable German-German dialogue. Of course, the 
four-power agreements still decided the fate of Germany on a diplomatic level, but the 
German-German policy of rapprochement clearly improved and facilitated contacts 
between the East and West on an individual and organizational level. By pushing for non-
governmental relations between East and West Germans, especially in the realm of 
culture, Bonn achieved its long-term goal of loosening the SED’s grip on every aspect of 
East German social and cultural life. The shared cultural heritage and the significance of 
the Kulturnation concept for both German states resulted in ongoing exchanges that 
brought – in the case of industrial design – each Germany closer to the reality of the 
everyday on the other side of the border. And despite its lack of autonomy from the 
                                                 
659 Thunig-Nittner to Gerz, EC-Meeting 10. 11.1988, hier: Bereich Kultur, 9 November 1988, B 288/256, 
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Soviet Union, the GDR was able to “function as an actor on the world stage.”660 The 
Bonn-East Berlin negotiations were part and parcel of the GDR’s transition from a pariah 
state to a member of the UN. In the process, the GDR broke the West German 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch. Its claim to membership among modern nations, expressed 
and communicated through GDR material culture, now received politically 
legitimization.  
Through the medium of industrial design both Germanys turned a competitive 
situation, which could have easily been just another Cold War race between East and 
West, into a diplomatic tool for rapprochement. The aesthetization of the respective 
economic, social, and political orders in German material culture provided them with a 
lingua franca that facilitated exchange and human interaction across the Wall. With the 
German-German modus vivendi in place, stable peace in Europe became feasible. Only 
after the West German ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties did Britain, the 
United States, France and the Soviet Union sign the Four-Power Agreement of 1972; and 
only after the signing of the Basic Treaty did the Helsinki talks advance toward 
successful completion.661 
                                                 
660 Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 3. 
661 Herbert Ammon and Peter Brandt, “The Relevance of the German Question for Peace in Europe,” 
International Journal of Politics 13, no. 1/2, Germany Debates Defense (1983): 83-96. 
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EPILOGUE 
Divided by the Iron Curtain, Germany presents an ideal setting to study the at 
times accidental ways in which socialist and capitalist countries found an understanding 
during the Cold War. Although each Germany strove to integrate itself within its 
respective ideological bloc, the special situation of the German Question kept East and 
West Germans together, much like the wish to maintain peace in Europe tied their 
neighboring countries together. This work offers insights into the intricate nature of 
German-German relations by exploring German Wohnkultur. Material culture served as a 
field for competition until these exchanges developed a shared language of progress and 
security, enabling mutual projects that contributed to German growing diplomatic 
independence in respect to the superpowers. The two German states, while located 
geographically at the periphery of European integration, created a political space 
influenced by larger processes that worked to balance the East-West relationship of the 
Cold War in Europe: economic cooperation, global détente, and peaceful coexistence. 
Bringing these areas of cooperation into focus enables us to appreciate the continuous ties 
between the FRG and GDR that opened up a sustainable dialog and maintained a certain 
degree of mutual understanding throughout the Cold War. The relatively smooth 
transition from the collapse of the GDR to German unification, then, seems less 
unexpected, because the GDR was already participating in and contributing to the West 
European idea of an aesthetic modernity. 
Divided Germany’s postwar history is largely about the way in which two 
opposing ideological systems faced the same postwar challenges. The Federal Republic 
and the GDR embarked on a mission for cultural rebirth in order to overcome wartime 
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destruction and the distrust of the international community. Integration into the West and 
East seemed the most convenient option as goals for reunification were repeatedly 
postponed. Whereas their European neighbors feared the strength of a reunited Germany, 
the political leaderships on each side of the border wanted to see their respective 
experiment of state-building come to fruition. This new beginning manifested itself in the 
reconstruction of German Wohnkultur, which developed against the background of three 
confluent concerns: the shadow of the Nazi Past, demarcation in the German Question, 
and Germany’s global position. As the governments in Bonn and East Berlin strove to 
distance themselves from the legacy of the Third Reich, they faced a new imperative 
reimagine the cultural and social fabric of the German states. Industrial design became 
central to the political and economic rebuilding of Germany. As such, both Germanys 
extended debates about the meaning and function of material culture in the early 
reconstruction years.  
Instead of a new beginning, however, continuity in aesthetic expression 
undermined visions for a fundamentally changed Germany. At first, the social ideals and 
hopefulness of Weimar modernism informed developments in East and West Germany. 
Designers relied on the aesthetics of the interwar years after 1945, leading to dramatically 
different results after the early 1950s critique of modernism. In the West, this aesthetic 
lived on as a functionalist consensus through the activism of the politically well-
connected Werkbund. Functionalism demonstrated West Germany’s Western integration 
as it shared modernist aspirations with other Western countries. At the same time, it 
communicated Adenauer’s policy of strength in the German Question. This policy was 
fueled by the conservative belief that German unification on democratic terms could only 
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materialize through alignment with the West and in opposition to the Soviet-dominated 
East. The fact that this policy of strength foreclosed the opportunity to reconcile with the 
eastern part, however, did not seem to matter to Bonn in the early 1950s. Rather, the 
government focused on reconnecting the Federal Republic to western world standards in 
cultural progress and technological development. Consequently, economic and 
diplomatic interests superseded concerns about unification of Germany until the mid-
1960s. In this way, the GDR lost its significance for Bonn in regard to the future of a 
democratic Germany. Meanwhile, the GDR looked toward socialism as the answer for a 
rebirth of Germany and a radical break with the Third Reich legacy. After initial 
experiments with functionalism, the GDR tapped into an aesthetic past that preceded 
Nazism and emulated the socialist realist doctrines of cultural Stalinism. The material 
environment connected to this aesthetic, which included the often petit-bourgeois 
interiors of the early twentieth century, mirrored the personal preferences and experience 
of the middle-aged GDR leadership. In aligning itself with the Eastern Bloc, East 
Germany’s government claimed the cultural heritage of the turn of the nineteenth century 
that combined their traditionalist outlook on German identity with the necessities of 
demarcation from the West in the German Question.  
By the mid-1960s both German states were forced to acknowledge the truth that 
the primacy of their diplomatic considerations had not created a real cultural break with 
the past. The relationship between people and their possessions had received updated 
appearances but no new content. Objects still signified social status, which the promotion 
of Good Design and the fight against kitsch as a marker of moral decay only affirmed. In 
failing to create a sense of belonging among the population through ideological 
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inscription of material culture, the focus of the German Cold War shifted to the realm of 
economics. Political legitimacy increasingly rested on the ability to provide a good 
standard of living. Consequently, the two states created materialistic narratives of 
national brands to facilitate the population’s identification with the new state. The 
Federal Republic benefitted from the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
convinced many West Germans of the advantages of democracy. In contrast, the GDR 
tried to advance its economy with Five-Year Plans, not only to compete with the leading 
industrialized nations but most importantly to convince its citizens of the advantages of 
socialism. In order for the national brand to develop its integrative power, however, all 
participants in the production and consumption processes needed to support this 
endeavor, which became difficult over time. Yet an increasing gap between centralized 
cultural policy and regional economic interests undermined the brand narrative’s 
coherence. By the 1970s it became evident that production optimization and consumer 
choice trumped governmental visions for a cohesive aesthetic identity.  
Having failed to devise a strong national brand identity, both German states 
remained vulnerable to external influences. With the shift from cultural to economic 
competition, the GDR invited West German capitalist success into the socialist realm. 
Encounters at the fair and intra-German trade opened the doors to growing 
interdependence. On the one hand, constant comparison generated exchanges in 
governmental, industrial, and design circles, thereby increasing awareness of aesthetic 
developments in domestic culture on the other side of the border. On the other hand, the 
trade fairs logically led to an increase in collaborative manufacturing between East and 
West German industry. Generous credit conditions in intra-German trade fortified ties 
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between East and West when the GDR restructured its industry-oriented economy in the 
1960s to satisfy consumer demands. These German-German dealings proceeded 
alongside the European integration process and the creation of the Common Market. 
Through its special relationship with the Federal Republic, the GDR became an unofficial 
member of the European Community. This status allowed the GDR to benefit from tariff 
exemptions by introducing products through West Germany into the EEC zone. 
Meanwhile, the European market incentives affected the appearance of East and West 
German furniture dialectically, and the two German states moved closer to a shared 
modern European product culture. This aesthetic Europeanization expressed the wish of 
both countries to regain a status of significance among the modern industrial nations as 
well as to be active contributors to the cultural fabric of Europe as they imagined it. 
Notions of a broader European identity, connected to hopes for a peaceful coexistence, 
flourished with the solidifying of European cultural and political processes.662 Although 
Western integration had been a dominant foreign policy principle in the Federal Republic 
since the 1950s, Bonn also emphasized the cultural and political importance of German-
German interaction in the European context throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Politically, the German Question superseded economic concerns in the Federal Republic. 
It safeguarded trade relations with the GDR from interference from France, Italy, and the 
Benelux countries to create a sustainable East-West dialog in the realm of export and 
material culture. At this point, the Federal Republic could afford to embark on political 
flirtations with the East as it was firmly integrated into the West,.  
                                                 
662 Mattei Dogan, “The Decline of Nationalisms within Western Europe,” in Comparative Politics, vol. 26, 
no. 3 (1993), 281-305. 
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This trend toward a German Cold War policy, detached from the concerns of the 
superpowers and the European neighbors, intensified with the German-German 
rapprochement during the détente years. Culminating in an agreement on the status quo 
of Germany’s division with the Basic Treaty of 1972, fundamental political 
disagreements could be tabled in order to foster contacts across the border. The 
Kulturabkommen that grew out of the Basic Treaty negotiations eventually “normalized” 
German-German interactions for cultural events, sports meets, and youth exchanges. By 
creating direct contact between the populations of East and West Germany without the 
involvement of the state, the German Question moved beyond the reach of both the GDR 
government and superpower involvement. To a certain extent, Germans could work 
together toward unity again. Industrial design, which had for so long served as a field for 
Cold War competition, became an arena in which to mediate and channel the German 
Cold War as it turned into a lingua franca through which Bonn and East Berlin could 
communicate. A vocabulary for transparency, humanity, and morality developed that 
shaped German engagement for peace in Europe in the 1980s since both Germanys faced 
similar struggles in the effort to overcome the legacy of the Nazi past, the reconstruction 
of the country, the struggle for international recognition and membership among the 
modern industrialized nations. When the superpowers ended global détente by stationing 
new nuclear missiles in Europe, the two German states took the opportunity to define 
their own position on these policies by cooperating in mutual exhibition projects against 
renewed arms buildup. This endeavor provided both Germanys with a certain degree of 
emancipation from the United States and the Soviet Union. However, such German-
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German interactions were less than harmonious, leaving the GDR to feel torn between 
economic opportunities in the West and political backing in the East.   
One event that displayed this ambivalence in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty 
and the Helsinki Accords was the annual Ostseewoche (Baltic Sea Week) in the East 
German city of Rostock. Between 1958 and 1975, it was one of the most important 
international events that the GDR hosted. The Ostseewoche allowed the East German 
leadership to increase its international standing and to contribute to the “tradition of good 
relations between the German and Northern European towns and communities.”663 After 
initial hesitation, the countries abutting the Baltic Sea increasingly sent diplomatic 
representatives to the event. By bringing these countries together in cultural 
performances, sport contests, product fairs and economic and environmental talks, the 
GDR claimed that the Ostseewoche contributed to peace in Europe.664 Of course, these 
annual happenings also served as a diplomatic stepping-stone in East Germany’s pursuit 
of regional influence.665 The state carefully presented itself in a progressive and modern 
manner. For example, the product fair showcased a furniture system in 1968 that the 
government commissioned just for this occasion under the fitting name of “Rostock.”666 
It exemplified GDR efforts to find adequate solutions for furnishing prefabricated 
                                                 
663 Michael F. Scholz, “Der Weg zur ersten Ostseewoche in Rostock 1958,” in Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft, Vol. 34, Nr. 4 (1988): 320. 
664 Ibid., 317-324. 
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housing. This resulted from a series of experiments for “variable living” by the 
centralized urban planning institution Deutsche Bauakademie, in collaboration with 
furniture designers to maximize options for storage, seating, decorative space, and even 
sleeping in the living room. Reviewing the modular system, the East German design 
journal Form und Zweck used the same neo-functionalist terminology of rationality, 
functionality, and versatility used in the West.667 Again, the GDR used the language of 
industrial design to present its progressiveness and acknowledgement of individuality 
despite its collectivist ideology. In this way, the East German leadership endeavored to 
appeal to western nations by emphasizing its humane side and downplaying the coercive 
nature of its economic and social systems.  
In 1976, a year after the signing of the Helsinki accords, the GDR demoted the 
Ostseewoche to a cultural fair and refrained from inviting diplomatic representatives of 
the Baltic Sea nations henceforth.668 FRG diplomats had expected an abrupt change in 
policy, as it was consistent with the GDR’s general policy shift from dialog to delineation 
in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty, yet they still speculated about plausible reasons 
behind East Berlin’s decision. Among the possible scenarios which the head of West 
Germany’s Permanent Representation in East Berlin listed was the low participation of 
high-ranking official representatives of Baltic Sea countries at the previous Ostseewoche, 
the avoidance of “a certain competition with the Federal Republic in the Baltic,” and the 
possibility of growing Soviet mistrust toward too much “East-West hanky-panky” (“ost-
westliches Techtelmechtel”) in the central Baltic region.669 However, these interpretations 
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see the GDR exclusively in a position of weakness and ignore the strategic nature of the 
GDR’s decision to eliminate the diplomatic dimension of the event. 
On closer examination, the new conception of the Ostseewoche is yet further 
proof of the GDR‘s participation in processes of Europeanization. By 1976, the East 
German leadership had gained international acknowledgement in the United Nations and 
had shown its significance as a sovereign state in the Basic Treaty and the détente process 
leading up to Helsinki. Consequently, the Ostseewoche had fulfilled its political function. 
Honecker could have chosen to abandon the event all together to please the Soviet Union 
and avoid competition with the Federal Republic in the Baltic region. Yet he continued 
the event with a focus on cultural exchange and knowledge transfer, thus turning it into a 
forum for the GDR to be an active player in the development of a constructive European 
identity. By keeping the dialog with the Baltic countries open, the GDR could work its 
way around the Iron Curtain while minimizing the potential for political controversy with 
either the Soviet Union or the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, this event and the question 
that it raises indicate the need for more research on East Germany’s position on European 
cooperation. What exactly moved the GDR to scale back official diplomacy with the 
West in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty, but made it open up again to German-German 
cooperation during a time of worsening Cold War tensions between the superpowers in 
the early 1980s? And what kinds of conclusions does the East German case allow us to 
draw in regard to other Central European countries, seeing that the GDR had special ties 
with the West? Taking the GDR as an example of cultural Europeanization outside of the 
official EEC zone opens up interesting avenues of inquiry for the integration and 
expansion process of the European Union in the first decade of this century, one that 
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included many of the former Soviet satellite states such as Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Hungary. Tired of being the buffer for American and Soviet security 
interests, these countries began to break away from the Eastern Bloc even before the 
GDR. An analysis of the interaction of Eastern European regional politics with pan-
European cultural ideas could offer new insights about the recent integration process and 
even suggest broader patterns of European identity formation.  
For the GDR, the events of 1989 cut the scope of such an investigation short. 
Instead of seeing its contribution to European culture unfold by becoming an EEC 
member in its own right, the East German population saw many of its achievements 
simply swallowed up when the Federal Republic absorbed it in 1990. Contrary to the 
plans for an all-German constitution spelled out in the Basic Law, unified Germany kept 
the 1949 law with minor alterations. Seeing an historic opportunity, West German 
Chancellor Kohl rushed the unification process without spending time on such 
considerations, which was both to West Germany’s advantage and disadvantage. From 
the perspective of Bonn, the Basic Law did not need to be changed, taking the fact that 
the Federal Republic was the last German state standing as proof of a success story. 
While nothing in terms of political culture, administrative structure and international 
significance changed for the FRG, East Germany simply disappeared from the map in a 
matter of a few months. Bankruptcy and revelations of its corrupt, dysfunctional 
economy discredited the GDR and every fiber of its political and public life. 
Accordingly, the FRG laid claim to being the sole “modern” German society out of 
political necessity to maintain leadership in the unification process. Contemporary 
debates about the healthcare system have shown that any of the positive results that East 
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Germany brought forward would carry the stigma of socialism and the GDR dictatorship. 
Searching for reform ideas for the reorganization of medical treatment in Germany to 
reduce costs, the Federal Republic turns to Scandinavian nations for solutions rather than 
building on the experience of East German polyclinics. This seems like a lost opportunity 
to apply lessons that could have been learned by studying social policy in the East. In 
turn, western ignorance has triggered the Ostalgie debate about the merits of social 
security, consumption, and material culture in the GDR. Ostalgie is a pun that combines 
the German words for nostalgia and East (Ost) to denominate former GDR citizens’ 
longing for the financial safety and social certainty of the socialist German state. It is the 
claim to a positive East German identity. At the same time, the term signifies gradual 
amnesia towards the violence with which this state forced its citizens to stay and the Stasi 
intruded into their private lives. Additionally the Ostalgie debate unintentionally ridicules 
the East German everyday by focusing on kitschy gadgets, such as the Sandman figurine 
or colorful egg-holder cups in the shape of roosters, when addressing the socialist 
material culture. This seems to be an overcompensation for the West German perspective 
that views the GDR as largely gray and dusty, which is ironic, because western 
functionalism itself was mocked as “rectangular, gray, and stackable” (“vierreckig, grau 
und stapelbar”). By showing how material culture both reflected and channeled the 
political realities of the German division, this work illustrates how the German Question 
was linked to concepts of European cultural unity. Perhaps it is time to end a debate that 
is trying to justify a dictatorial regime, and rather acknowledge that the East Germans 
themselves were a constituent part of this European modernity that the West has since 
successfully claimed for itself. 
  
284 
APPENDIX: FIGURES  
 
Figure 1: Bauhaus Newspaper Shelf, Walter Gropius, designed 1923. 
Photo copyright Katrin Schreiter. 
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Figure 2: Exhibition "We're building a better life," 1952. 
Photo copyright unsettled, Schwinning Estate, Werkbund Archiv Berlin. 
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Figure 3: Interior design display in East Berlin's first high-rise, May 1952.  
Photo copyright Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-14563-0005, Heinz Funck. 
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Figure 4: View into the West German exhibition at the World Exposition in Brussels, 1958. 
Photo copyright Werkbund Archiv, all rights reserved. 
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Figure 5: Werkbundkiste, 1958. Die Neue Sammlung – Staatliches Museum für angewandte Kunst, 
Munich.  
Photo copyright Sophie-Renate Gnamm. 
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Figure 6: Peter Maly, cover for Schöner Wohnen, 1968. Photograph copyright Richard Stradtmann 
für Schöner Wohnen 
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Figure 7: Rolf Heide for Brigitte, “Neue Formen, Farben und Materialien in alternativen Räumen: 
auch unter Dach kann man gut leben. 1968. 
Photo copyright Ortwin Müller 
 
 
Figure 8: Rolf Heide, room setting for Schöner Wohnen, 1986. 
Photo copyright Winfried Nörenberg.  
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Figure 9: MDW furniture system, designed by Rudolf Horn for the East German furniture combine 
Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau, 1967. 
Photo copyright Burg Gibiechenstein, Halle. 
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Figure 10: Spektrum furniture system, produced by Hülsta in West Germany, 1985.  
Photo copyright Hülsta. 
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Figure 11: "Blitz Tisch," designed by Wolfgang Flatz, 1982.  
Photo copyright Katrin Schreiter. 
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Figure 12: Bar "Duo," designed by Peter Maly for the West German furniture company Interlübke, 
1986. 
Photo copyright Rudolf Schmutz, jr. 
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Figure 13: "Zyklus" chair, designed by Peter Maly for the West German upholstery company COR, 
1984.  
Photo copyright Rudolf Schmutz, jr. 
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Figure 14: Interior design study for the East German concept furniture "Metropol," designed by 
Herbert Pohl, 1986.  
Copyright Herbert Pohl. 
  
297 
 
Figure 15: Furniture program "Metropol," designed by Herbert Pohl, 1986.  
Photo copyright Herbert Pohl. 
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Figure 16: Award "Gutes Design" for the "Metropol" furniture program, 1988.  
Private Collection of Herbert Pohl.  
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Figure 17: Desk, designed by Rotraut Pohl for the East Berlin furniture combine, 1987.  
Photo copyright Rotraut Pohl. 
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Figure 18: Hülsta interior design exhibition at the Cologne International Furniture Fair, 1982.  
Photo copyright Gerhard Wetzig. 
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Figure 19: Maps depicting the eastward expansion of ICSID.  
Copyright ICSID. 
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Figure 20: The historical section of East Germany’s FFQ exhibition in Warsaw, 1967.  
Photo copyright unsettled. 
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Figure 21: East German toy, exhibited at "GDR Design" in London, 1970.  
Photo copyright Günter Höhne. 
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Figure 22: Plastic garden chair, exhibited at "GDR Design" in London, 1970.  
Photo copyright Günter Höhne.
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Figure 23: East and West German designers at the opening of the West German exhibition "Design–
Vorausdenken für den Mensch," 1984. 
On the far left: Rat für Formgebung president Philipp Rosenthal, and next to him is Martin Kelm, 
the head of the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung. 
Photo copyright unsettled. 
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